ROOTED COSMOPOLITANISM
AN ANAWER TO EXCLUSION AND CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY

Cheikh Mbacke Gueye*

Abstract: Addressing the issue of crime against humanity requires a robust theory about personal attitude, politics, justice at home and abroad, as well as a true conception of human nature. The present paper contributes to this debate by emphasizing the importance of adopting a "rooted cosmopolitanism" that neither excludes wider loyalties, nor overrides the narrower ones. It is a theory that requires, not a world state, but solid democratic, and accountable states respectful of the rights of their citizens and the demands of the human person. The call for normative democracy at the global scale is motivated by the failure of politics that has been dangerously confined to the realization of local and national interests leaving aside crucial issues that engage other people and nations.

> "I prefer normative to substantive democracy because of its highlighting of ethical and legal norms, thereby reconnecting politics with moral purpose and values…"
> (Falk 2000, p. 171)
> "A particularism that excludes wider loyalties invites immoral conduct, but so does a cosmopolitanism that overrides narrower loyalties. Both are dangerous."
> (Walzer 2002, p. 127).

EVIL IS as old as the world. Human civilizations have provided diverse answers to the question of the origins, causes of, and remedies for evil. Reflecting in the twenty-first century about "crimes against humanity" (which include numerous kinds of inhumane and odious acts that constitute serious attacks to human dignity and integrity), gives an opportunity to re-conceptualize and sharpen our philosophical arguments which are permanently challenged by the geo-political realities of our globalized world. Crimes against humanity are no effects of our globalized world. But it is the configuration of our present world that makes those sorts of crimes more visible and people more aware of them. Crimes against humanity bear on consequences on a global scale because of the large interconnections of people and institutions. Hence, addressing these sorts of evil requires a concrete understanding of the global political arena as well as a realist conception of the human person.

Cosmopolitanism as a philosophical concept about identity, allegiance, justice, and awareness, is anterior to globalization as a political phenomenon. Cosmopolitan feelings have been throughout rekindled or even revived by crises. Debates about crimes against humanity have been taking place not only because of the continuing occurrence of human tragedies, but also and mostly because of the broad and

*Dr. CHEIKH MBACKE GUEYE, Assistant Professor, International Academy of Philosophy, im Schwibboga 7 b, FL-9487 Bendern, Liechtenstein; email: cgueye@iap.li.

widespread knowledge of those tragedies. New information and technologies play an important role by bringing people closer to those kinds of evils, thus forcing them to take stances.

In this essay, I propose to defend a kind of cosmopolitanism that is compatible with national allegiance. Along the same lines, the cosmopolitan justice that derives from it is informed by the fundamental need to (re)place the human person at the center of our concerns, not only locally, but also globally. The terms of the debate should be casted not by positing an alternative between local justice and global justice; rather, the point is to reconcile the demand of cosmopolitan justice and the fact of national allegiances by treating the former as an "institutional ideal" (Tan 2005, 165) But taking seriously into account our embeddedness, or rootedness in parochial systems should not lead us to adopt sorts of relativism that are incapable of condemning evils such as crimes against humanity, because those theories give blank check to cultures and traditions regardless their contents or qualities. Finally, the essay will discuss the issue as to whether there is a need to implement a global state in order to tackle global issues such as crimes against humanity.

I

The cosmopolitanism discourse has been in the last decades polarized around many questions among which those about allegiances, identity, values, and justice. Detractors of cosmopolitanism criticize not only its highly idealized and illusory form (Hilary Putnam, Robert Pinsky, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Richard Rorty) (Nussbaum 2002), but also its tendency to promote a sort of "a-patriotism" (the cosmopolitan is the betrayer of a nation in that he does not feel, let alone accomplish, any duty towards it.) But if those attacks to cosmopolitanism have done a great damage it is mostly because the cosmopolitan project has been expressed in so many different, and often contradictory ways and forms. Moreover, the question about the interconnections between various kinds of cosmopolitanism (moral, economic, and political) has remained insufficiently elaborated.

Cosmopolitanists are often mistakenly put before this alternative: they have to be either extreme patriots (or nationalists) or abstract world citizens. I wish to defend here one kind of cosmopolitanism that is termed by Kwame Anthony Appiah (2005, p. 222) as a "rooted cosmopolitanism," i.e., a cosmopolitanism which "doesn't seek to destroy patriotism, or separate our "real" from "unreal" loyalties…." I take the problem with the theory of cosmopolitanism to be ultimately, not about its detractors, but rather about how it can persuasively accommodate local loyalties on the one hand, and deconstruct conceptual and operative dichotomies on the other hand.

Rooted cosmopolitanism is a balanced view of how we could theorize about and liven up the principles found at national and global levels. In fact, we are not only humans, but also citizens of *that* country, member of *that* community, partner in *that* association, and co-worker in *that* company. All these kinds of attachments must not be treated as irrelevant and uninteresting for the individual's life. We may well want to think globally but most of the resources needed for a global initiative are gained through our respective parochial communities. The universal and the particular should

not be taken as antagonistic, but rather complementary. This is the sense of a rooted cosmopolitanism.

The criticism to the cosmopolitan project that it promotes rootlessness is then nullified by the option that cosmopolitans can also claim their membership to, for example, a national entity, without dealing a blow to their global citizenship. It would be mistaken to think that this position is a recent (modern?) invention. Already in the Antiquity, philosophers, especially the late Stoics (Gueye 2006), have proposed to avoid presenting the two allegiances as incompatible. The rooted cosmopolitanism advocated here is also what Appiah has expressed in this kind of manifesto: "We cosmopolitans *can* be patriots, loving our homelands (not only the states where we were born but the states where we grew up and where we live). Our loyalty to humankind—so vast, so abstract, a unity—does not deprive us of the capacity to care for people closer by; the notion of a global citizenship can have a real and practical meaning (Appiah 2002, 27)."

An adept of a rooted cosmopolitanism does not only consider his country of birth his homeland; he cherishes and loves every piece of land in which he has lived part of his life, made friends, and experienced meaningful encounters. For these make meaningful contributions to human lives. Denying the relevance of concrete experiences made in our concrete human lives means denying altogether our human condition. A rooted cosmopolitan is not the one who despises parochial ties; he is the one who can lean on his concrete insular life to take up challenges of the universal.

Defending the project of a rooted cosmopolitanism would then also entail expressing the virtues of national attachments. But beyond that, what is at stake is the kind of view of human nature we endorse. Remaining very sympathetic to cosmopolitanism, I strongly attribute to local attachments positive and enriching aspects that an abstract and dry cosmopolitanism alone fails to see. Cosmopolitanism needs not be incompatible with patriotism, and it is possible to be a *cosmopolitan patriot*. This is the view that Charles Taylor also very unequivocally defended in the following lines: "… we have no choice but to be cosmopolitans and patriots, which means to fight for the kind of patriotism that is open to universal solidarities against other, more closed kinds. I don't really know if I'm disagreeing with Martha Nussbaum on this or just putting her profound and moving plea in a somewhat different context. But this nuance is, I think, important (Taylor 2002, 121)."

Yes, indeed, the nuance is important, even crucial. What Charles Taylor was reacting against here was the vague abstract cosmopolitanism that Martha Nussbaum emphasized in her inaugural article ("Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism") to the book *For Love of Country*, in which she expressed quite general and unnuanced claims such as "we should recognize humanity whenever it occurs, and give its fundamental ingredients, reason and moral capacity, our first allegiance and respect" (Nussbaum 2002, 7).

Nussbaum will then in her "Reply" to the various criticisms of her abstract cosmopolitanism, clarify her thoughts by clearly spelling out the Stoic demand of not to give up local identifications "which can be a source of great richness in life" (*ibid*., p. 9): "Cosmopolitanism does not require, in any case, that we should give equal attention to all parts of the world. None of the major thinkers in the cosmopolitan

tradition denied that we can and should give special attention to our own families and to our own ties of religious and national belonging… cosmopolitans hold, moreover, that it is right to give the local and additional measure of concern. But the primary reason a cosmopolitan should have for this is not that the local is better per se, but rather that this is the only sensible way to do good (Nussbaum 2002, 135-6)."

Local attachments are important for a cosmopolitan since, besides the fact that they are real, participate significantly in our self-improvement and education to be citizens of the world. Our endeavors to serve humanity wherever it exists start at our doorsteps. It is hard to gain knowledge of our universal duties if we have not been locally trained and educated to do so. It is also hardly possible to educate citizens of the world if relevant experiences about life have not been made within the parochial communities by those very concrete human beings. That is, cosmopolitanism is no theory that promotes a dry standardization that leaves no room for diversity and difference. It is rather through diversity and difference—concrete life—that we arrive at constructing a meaningful cosmopolitanism, both in theory and practice.

II

The evocation of cosmopolitanism in the philosophical debate during the last three decades is very much connected to the idea of how global justice can be elaborated to address problems like environment, peace, immigration, crimes, etc. National means have proved insufficient to tackle issues of this scope. Here also the problem arises as to whether national or local justice (understood here as all rules, duties, obligations, and structures being embodied in the constitution or any other binding text) alone is able to provide satisfactory answers to the above-mentioned issues, or whether national or local justice has to be supplemented by a more neutral, general, and "transcendental" global justice. Another aspect of the discussion is focused also on how some exclusively domestic issues would have to be put into the test of global justice.

Hard-line cosmopolitans would suggest local justice to give entirely way to global justice. The reason for this replacement is not much that local justice is inapt to deal with social, economic and political problems than that global justice is the only kind of setting that can fully guarantee impartiality and equality, two of the most important pillars in the pyramid of justice. On the other hand, nationalists strongly believe that *justice cannot be de-contextualized* or *uprooted* under the pretext that it is the only way to comply with justice itself. Does this mean, as it were, that local justice and global justice are irreconcilable?

I believe there are some ways to account for a certain complementarity. At the same time, the possibility of reconciliation should not make us blind to the fact that there exist limits of toleration and compromise. Kok-Chor Tan poses the problem in the following terms: "if the cosmopolitan idea of justice is to have any appeal for human beings, it must acknowledge the local attachments and commitments people have that are characteristic of most meaningful and rewarding human lives…. The challenge for cosmopolitans, therefore, is to show how they can accommodate and

account for national allegiances *without* compromising their motivating and fundamental commitment to global equality (Tan 2005, 164)."

Tan points here one side of the challenge cosmopolitans would have to face, i.e., how an individual believing in and living up to the principles of cosmopolitanism can be *justified* to "say no" and turn his back to his local commitments when he judges the latter to be unjust. The other aspect of the problem is how, from a purely structural, institutional, and formal point of view, could global justice be justified to override local justice.

The dilemma in which we find ourselves facing injustice and iniquitous laws at home is the following: how great should be the terms and principles of global justice so that we decide to freely deny our local laws and "justice"? We land here in the heart of what I would call the Socrates dilemma, whereby Socrates, condemned by iniquitous laws, had to "surrender" his universal convictions, and remain an exemplary citizen of Athens. But could we call this really surrender?

A key passage, among others, to pose the Socrates dilemma is to be found in the *Crito* (51 b-c) where Socrates utters the following: "… in war and in court and everywhere, you must do whatever the state, your country, commands, or must show her by persuasion what is really right…." Eric Brown, trying to untangle the nods of the message, proposes two ways of understanding it: "We might understand the Laws to be saying that Socrates must persuade the city that its demands are unjust, or (failing that) obey the demands: obedience is required unless one can actually persuade the city. On the other hand, we might understand the Laws to be establishing the condition of justifiable disobedience: obedience is required only if one does not seek to persuade the city that it is unjust (Brown 2000, 83)."

Socrates did obey to the Laws of Athens. But he did so, not without pointing at the injustice these Laws were responsible for. Socrates has been brought to court, judged, condemned and executed because of the Laws of Athens, unscrupulously used by some group of people, did allow it. But the attitude of Socrates, overtly sensible to the call of moral universalism, should not denote any kind of failure or resignation in face of the unjust Laws; it extols rather the silent strength of Justice and its power to break the barriers of noisy local injustices. With Socrates the terms of the divide between local justice and global justice take another face: *the triumph of Justice over local justice is not about the triumph of one individual over others.* Socrates' victory over the unjust Laws of Athens is assured already at the time when he "denounced" the iniquity of those Laws.

Civil disobedience, in Socrates' example, is first about laying out arguments why the local laws are unjust. Even so, Socrates the cosmopolitan, does not link the fate of his cause to the retraction of the Laws. This is of a secondary importance. With Socrates the *principled denunciation* is to be distinguished from the *actual happening* or *result*. Here lies a potential reconciliation between the global justice and the local justice, in which one can still praise the one and obey to the other. All in all, "becoming a citizen of the world is often a lonely business (Nussbaum 2002, p. 15)." For one will be confronted with crucial choices to obey to overriding universal principles and discard local justice. But there is still a structural dimension in which the opposition between local justice and global justice arises.

Kok-Chor Tan thinks that "one way to reconcile" the "demands of cosmopolitan justice and the fact of national allegiances" is "to treat cosmopolitan justice as an 'institutional ideal' that is primarily concerned with the global 'basic structure'" (Tan 2005, p. 165). I am very sympathetic to this idea and take it to be a very plausible and reasonable way to deconstruct the either/or alternative of local justice and global justice. What cosmopolitanism as an "institutional ideal" would require is first of all the elaboration of a theoretical framework containing overriding principles that would place a crucial accent on the demands of justice, equality, respect, solidarity, and empowerment. This "institutional ideal" should play at least an inspirational role; and at the most, it should be incorporated in the basic local structures and be expressed in the operative scheme.

Cosmopolitan principles, based mainly on a high recognition of responsibility both at individual and institutional levels, are meant to have concrete impacts on individual lives and society. It is first in the mind-sets of individuals that those principles should be borne before they can be translated into concrete acts. To be a citizen of the world is first and foremost an attitude. Before turning to the point as to how a cosmopolitan justice can be an appropriate answer to crimes against humanity, it is useful to briefly recall some features of crimes against humanity.

III

A cosmopolitan justice is constituted by a bundle of principles the practical translation of which should not make us oblivious of its deep philosophical-anthropological basis and justifications. It is in these mainly that we should seek reasons why a cosmopolitan justice can be the appropriate answer to crimes against humanity. In the first place, though, we try to list basic understandings of crimes against humanity.

The question as to whether/when a crime becomes crime against humanity is rendered complex by the different understandings of the word "humanity". Depending on whether we mean by "humanity" the "human race", or the "quality of being human", we can end up putting different accents on the criterion of "number". If humanity means the human race, we can be confronted with various qualifications of crimes as crimes against humanity:

1. A crime that involves a considerable number of victims (genocide, mass-murder, deportation, etc.) can be serious candidates to be qualified as "crimes against humanity".

2. When humanity is understood as a group, or a family (human family), a crime becomes a crime against humanity also when a member of this group is attacked. With this understanding the criterion which helps qualify a crime as a crime against humanity is the "belonging" of the victim to the human family.

3. Crimes are crimes against humanity when they participate in disrupting the human family, for example, by eliminating one or many of its members.

Since a crime involves in general a victim, a perpetrator and a plaintiff, in this first understanding of crimes against humanity, it is the human family that is the

plaintiff. Formally this complaint can be "filled" by institutions representing the people, or the international community.

But if we understand by "humanity" the "quality of being human", then a crime against humanity would entail:

1. A crime whose odious character is in complete contradiction with the way a human being should act. A crime against humanity would then be an inhuman crime;
2. A crime that defies all principles of reason;
3. A crime that attacks the dignity of the human person.

In this understanding of crime against humanity, it is even legitimate to ask whether there is no redundancy or pleonasm when we use the words "crime" and "against humanity". Are not all sorts of crimes absolutely "crimes against humanity"? Isn't the quality of being human strictly forbidding acts such as crimes? Isn't it against human nature to kill?

For Larry May (2005) group-based crimes are crimes against humanity since those crimes treat their victims as members of a group, denying in this way their humanity as persons. Moreover those kinds of crimes constitute real threats to peace and security. Hence we need not only to have an adequate and true conception of the human person, but also to bear in mind the consequences crimes against humanity can have in the immediate and global environment. The human person is not reducible to his membership to a community. He is bearer of intrinsic value (dignity) for being a person *tout court* (Ricoeur 1988, p. 236.) This dignity, which elsewhere Josef Seifert (1997, pp. 101-6) calls ontological dignity, is rooted in the being of the person, in its essence. It is not at the level of acts and accidents, but at the level of person's essence and *substantial* nature. This dignity is inalienable in that it is rooted not in the functionality of a person, but in her being a person.

There is, in my opinion, a third ground why a group-based crime can amount to a crime against humanity: the inherent vulnerability of the human person. As a matter of fact, the idea of crime against humanity needs to be put in connection with a realistic view about the human person. As persons we are all vulnerable, in one way or another. And what befalls to one can well befall to others. A crime against groups then becomes a crime against humanity because other groups can also be victims of such crimes. The perpetrators of crimes against humanity use arbitrary arguments and they have only personal or ideological motivations that run counter the demands of the human person: respect for human life and dignity.

It is important to emphasize that some versions of normative moral relativism stipulating that morality is throughout culture-bound and that right and wrong are neither universal nor absolute (but depend on culture) constitute potential ideological justification of any evil. Boosted by the anthropological observation of the fact of diversity of cultural customs, traditions, and practices, and disagreements over self-evident moral truths and values, normative moral relativism denies any objective truth and forbids any transcultural standard. "In the folkways", says Sumner (1906, p. 28) "whatever is, is right". Hence those two principles: "morality is relative", and "we should not judge other cultures". Normative moral relativism is the doctrine that forbids any cross-cultural evaluation. It claims that it is morally wrong to interfere with the moral practices of others who have different moral codes and traditions than

our own. By forbidding interference and cross-cultural evaluations this version of relativism has no ground or justification to condemn violations of human rights and crimes against humanity. Making morality dependent on cultural traditions is a way to give blank check to anarchy and abuses on the human person.

Facing the challenges of global evil in general and of crimes against humanity in particular, philosophical debates have been centered around the question as to whether we need a global state (or any other kind of global entity) to take up those very global challenges. Is a global state necessary for taking up global challenges such as crimes against humanity?

IV

Hannah Arendt's cosmopolitan ideas arose out from the historical background of the Nuremburg trial where the guilt of "crime against humanity" was first uttered. Preferring to speak rather about "crime against human condition"—because human nature cannot be known, Arendt holds that there are actions such as crimes that should be denounced and condemned wherever they occur and irrespective of the laws of the country in which they are perpetrated. For Arendt our personal responsibility goes beyond the walls of the nation-state. As humans we are responsible also for others. Human condition is a universal given and is also to be understood within the idea of one single world. "Whether we like or not" writes Arendt (1979, p. 297), "we have really started to live in One World." Arendt calls then for an awareness of a global responsibility that guarantees the sustainability of the human condition.

Arendt's cosmopolitan thought is also closely related to an understanding or "sense of history." For her, a parochial or compartmental analysis or view of history is not able to provide humanity with a total grasp of history in general, and unprecedented events in particular. Only a world historical sense can judge an event. This global perspective is fundamental to successfully and efficiently anticipate new events, and it provides durable solutions to human life, existence, and history. History is not either to be understood as being constituted by sequences which are independent of each other, but rather as a whole whose parts are interrelated. Grasping the sense of history is tantamount to linking the events which can seem sometimes so unrelated.

As much as she sees the need to restore awareness and responsibility to fight against and condemn crimes against human condition, Hannah Arendt is not in favor of the establishment of a global state. Arendt worries are less in the inefficacy of such global state than in its power to wipe out local citizenship. The ideal of world citizenship should not replace the reality of local citizenship. This also resonates with Karl Jaspers (1953) for whom world citizenship cannot provide the human being with the same advantages and "possibilities" as local citizenship. Indeed "nobody one can be a citizen of the world as he is the citizen of his country." The need for mankind to unite around the big questions and take up the challenges of global disasters and evils should not necessarily lead to the implementation of a sovereign force (global state) that would trample on individual states and their citizens. Arendt (1968, p. 81)

develops this thought further: "no matter what form a world government with centralized power over the whole globe might assume, the very notion of one sovereign force ruling the whole earth, holding the monopoly of all means of violence, unchecked and uncontrolled by other sovereign powers, is not only a forbidding nightmare of tyranny, it would be the end of all political life as we know it. Political concepts are based on plurality, diversity, and mutual limitations."

The fears ending up with another kind of totalitarianism with the implementation of a world government are very much justified. A world government would mean for Arendt the end of citizenship. Even facing the horrible faces of evil, mankind should not be tempted to wipe out difference and diversity by putting into place a monstrous ogre that would devour our rights and obligations as citizens of particular states. At this point it is interesting to note that the failure of politics can also be at the source of not only the idea of implementing a global government, but also the occurrence of crimes against humanity. When politics fails at a local level, there is the risk that unlawful states engage into crimes and odious acts against some groups. As David Luban (2004, p. 108) so clearly states it: "the leitmotif binding together all the legal features [of crime against humanity] is that of politics gone horribly wrong." A state exercising mass murder and genocide for example deprive its citizens from all means of protection. Actually it is even a contradiction in terms when a state—which is supposed to provide security to its citizens—uses its machineries to exercise unjustified and unjust violence on a group of its citizens. The recent history is full of examples which show how the state's collapse can be detrimental to its citizens and neighboring countries. The Rwandan genocide which took place in 1994 and which has led to a death toll of almost a million of people, was significantly supported by the national government using its local military, civil officials, and media. The idea of implementing a global state can also be the result of a failure of politics, when the latter is strictly confined to the realization of local and national interests leaving aside crucial issues that engage other people and nations.

If, according to Arendt, global government is no solution to counter crimes against humanity, it is legitimate to ask for an alternative. Arendt (1968, p. 83) sees solidarity, a positive one, as one of the remedy to the evil. Mankind needs a "positive solidarity coupled with political responsibility." She is up against the cultivation of a "negative solidarity, based on the fear of global destruction" which can lead to "common reactions" such as "political apathy, isolationist nationalism, or desperate rebellion."

Martha Nussbaum (2011, p. 114), in view of the implementation of her Capability Approach, likewise discards the idea of a world state. A "world state" she states, "were one ever to come into being, would probably be very unsatisfactory from the point of view of human autonomy, because it would be too insensitive to the diverse views of people from different experiences and traditions." What interests us here is less the rejection of a world state that the alternative proposed instead. Nussbaum (*ibid*., pp. 121-2) proposes then a "thin and decentralized institutional solution" consisting in nations ratifying international agreements in major areas of human capability. Such solution would also mean the involvement of existing nations as well as the establishment of a "network of international treaties and other

agreements" that "can impose some norms on the community of nations, while corporations and nongovernmental organizations can also play a part in promoting human capabilities in the regions in which they operate."

In the search for solution as to how to eradicate crimes against humanity, it is useful to strengthen the role of democratic states which can guarantee full respect for human rights; at the same time, it is necessary to draft treaties and agreements which should be followed by the erection of international courts responsible for judging authors of crimes against humanity. But, absent appropriate education of the people, these efforts can prove insufficient. It is the people themselves who can put into place solid democratic states respectful of the rights of citizens and demands of the human person. Furthermore, nongovernmental organizations have the task of helping with not only the awareness of the people, but also the monitoring of human rights abuses and crimes of all kinds. A synergy of action is needed with in its basis a responsible citizen and a solid democratic state. The offer of democracy is to be made to non-democratic states, but not at the expenses of local differences and traditions that can well be compatible with it.

There is number of scholars who think that not only democracy should be promoted beyond the individual states to the global level, but also that even some decisions—those engaging the lives of others—taken within those states can only be democratic when those others are taken into account. As Archibugi (1998, p. 204) states in this example: "A decision on the interest rate in Germany has significant consequences for employment in Greece, Portugal and Italy. A state's decision to use nuclear energy has environmental consequences for the citizens of neighboring countries. Immigration policies in the European Union have a significant impact on the economic development of Mediterranean Africa. All this happens without the affected citizens having a say in the matter."

We seem, indeed, to be living in a world which is so global that practically no course of action can be isolated. Whether this is a solid ground to cease qualifying decisions taken locally as democratic remains questionable. For I believe rather that the challenge rests on the way we can inculcate awareness and sense of responsibility into state citizens so that, while taking decisions or voting locally, they also take into account the others who will be affected by their decisions. Focusing on acting locally is not in itself a wrong attitude, provided that consequences on a global scale are known and seriously taken into account. That requires that citizens are correctly, truthfully, and objectively informed about the global situation and how their decisions are going to affect some of the "remote" others. Politics should then neither be reduced to crypto-national interests, nor subordinated to the whims of international lobbies and multinational; politics should rather be open to global issues and put in place platforms for local citizens to be "trained" to think globally.

This is all the more important in issues such as crimes against humanity. For the sake of preventing such atrocities which, even if perpetrated locally, do cause incalculable global pain, consternation, and suffering, it is crucial to have educated citizens capable of monitoring states' actions and respectful of the rights of their fellow citizens. Those rights, made explicit by and embodied in constitutions and various legal treaties and agreements, find their ultimate justification and foundation

in the human person as a thinking, rational, and free being endowed with an inviolable substantial dignity that is to be respected.

V

By way of concluding, I assert that the world of uncertainties and risks (Beck 2007) in which we live requires, not a world state, but solid democratic, and accountable states respectful of the rights of their citizens and the demands of the human person. It also needs responsible, educated, and respectful citizens who are capable of taking seriously into account the preoccupations of the "remote others." That is, a cosmopolitan awareness of each individual is primarily needed before the implementation of any global constituency that would be taking charge of global issues such as those relating to environment, economics, politics, etc.

A cosmopolitan justice, then, largely based on an objective conception and understanding of justice as a body of principles that enable a sustainable and peaceful life in accordance with respect for the human person, should not command the implementation of a world state. Rather, it requires a synergy of actions and initiatives from institutional structures both at the national and international levels. These structures should play not only preventive roles, but also they should be capable of bringing to justice authors of those hideous crimes against humanity.

There is no need to discard local allegiances since these can serve as springboards to realize the cosmopolitan goals and ideals. As Van Hooft (2009, p. 43) rightly states it: "The ethical commitment of a cosmopolitan is to human rights and global justice. Because the cosmopolitan's own country has a role to play in the pursuit of human rights and global justice both in its internal policies and in its foreign policies, she pursues her global ethical concerns through the political processes of her own country and therefore has a pragmatic commitment to those processes."

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