DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC USE OF REASON: KANT, RAWLS, AND HABERMAS

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Abstract: From Plato and Aristotle to celebrated modern and enlightenment philosophers, including Hobbes, Locke, Voltaire, de Condorcet, Kant, and Hegel, democracy is suspicious and not compatible with the idea of the rule of reason. Their criticisms and suspicions of democracy are grounded in one assumption: the exercise of human reason could only be individual or collective, amid Kant's famously puts forth the illuminating concept of the public use of one's reason. Following and developing from Kant, Rawls, and Habermas, I demonstrate that the idea of democracy and the idea of the rule of reason are compatible; the public exercise of human reason is the best mechanism to integrate the ideal of popular sovereignty and the ideal of the rule of reason.

Constitutional democracy is a norm of our epoch. However, the question of whether the idea of democracy and the ideal of the rule of reason in government remains outstanding in philosophy since Plato and Aristotle. Modern Western philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Voltaire, de Condorcet, Kant, and Hegel had misgivings about the compatibility between democracy and the rule of reason. For example, John S. Mill indicates two dangers of representative democracy, of which "a low grade of intelligence" is one (Mill，2015, 264). Locke's worry that democracy may degrade into the tyranny of the majority is complicated by the present concern that democracy may degrade into the rule of what Gustave Le Bon calls "the crowd." A crowd, as Le Bon saw it, is a mass that is thoughtless and unreflective of what they believe and what they do.

The question that this essay asks is what is the best mechanism of the rule of reason? Is it the individual use of reason, the collective use of reason, or the public use of reason? It is the contention of this essay that democracy and the rule of reason are fully compatible when we replace citizens' individual or collective exercise of their human reason in a democracy with citizens' public use of human reason in a democracy. The individual use of reason is a subject-centered use of individual persons as autonomous thinkers, as immortalized in Descartes' immortal image of a philosopher thinking and reasoning with a candlelight in hand and standing lonely in front of a fire. The collective use of reason is a subject-centered use of reason by individual persons thinking and reckoning together as a homogeneous public or community. The abstract subject which this kind of use of reason centered on is abstract collectivity, calling it a community or a public. The public use of reason is citizens' autonomous but intersubjective use of reason in the public sphere. The intersubjective use of reason is that the use of reason is grounded in those necessarily

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intersubjective presuppositions for rational activities with rational communications geared to arrive at mutual understanding among citizens.

Kant first proposes the concept of the public use of reason, and Rawls adds new stock value to the concept. But neither Kant nor Rawls draws a distinction between the public use of reason and the collective use of reason, as well as a distinction between the individual use of reason and the public use of reason. Both fail to see that the public use of reason is necessarily grounded in some intersubjective presuppositions that are necessary conditions for rational communication in the public discourse. They fail to see that the essence of the public use of reason is the intersubjective use of reason, which implies the autonomous use of reason but is also beyond the autonomous use of reason. Habermas's doctrine of the public use of human reason makes up the deficit.

The Habermasian public use of reason makes democracy grounded in intersubjective deliberation by citizens. It makes the public will- and opinion formation of citizens grounded in citizens' intersubjective understanding, evaluation, and judgment. It makes the democratic process a process of rational deliberation, not merely a process of rational negotiation of desires and compromise of will, which in turn makes it possible that the ideas of justice, truth, prudence, and wisdom still rule in a democracy.

Rationally deliberative democracy is the best one to integrate the ideal of the rule of reason and the idea of democracy, and rationally deliberative democracy is made possible by the public use of reason.

I. The contradiction between the rule of citizen and the rule of reason

The Trial of Socrates convinced Plato that democracy was an unjust form of government because it was not compatible with the idea of the rule of reason, which was, for Plato, a necessary condition of justice. Moreover, for Plato, the rule of reason meant the rule of philosophical wisdom, knowledge, and truth, Thus, he claimed that until political power and philosophical wisdom are integrated, no hope for humankind. In Plato's view, popular sovereignty, or the power in the hands of all people in a community, is not a virtue of government. Instead, it is a virtue of government that power is in the hands of those who operate with reason, knowledge, and wisdom. Democracy is bad because it is the rule of desires, just as timocracy is bad because it is ruled by will or spirit. *The Republic* outlines several features of democracy as follows: (1) The rule of the working class, or "the poor," in Socrates' words; (2) the rule of desires and passions; (3) equality for all on everything; (4) licensed and unchecked individual liberty; (5) diversity of forms of life and disunity of a people; and (6) Anarchic and motley conditions (*The Republic*, 557a3–c6). Thus, democracy is profoundly unjust.

Aristotle also conceived democracy to be a bad form of government that was a deviation from a just form of government called "constitution" or "polity." In Aristotle's Vista, there are three forms of just government: monarchy, aristocracy, and polity/constitution, and there are three forms of unjust government: oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny, and democracy is the deviated form of polity or constitution

(*Politics*, 1279a28-1279b10). The differences between democracy and polity are in two crucial aspects. One is that polity focuses on public good and interests, while democracy focuses on personal interests and desires; "The true forms of government, therefore, are those in which one or few, or the many, govern with a view to the common interest" (Ibid, 1279a28-30); democracy has in view the interest "of the need" (Ibid, 1279b9). Another is that polity is under the rule of law while democracy is not. In the end, in Aristotle's view, what demarcates polity from democracy is that polity was under the rule of reason while democracy was under the rule of desires and wills of free citizens. Like Plato, Aristotle also suggested that democracy and the rule of reason are not compatible.

In Aristotle's view, "Democracy is the form of government in which the free are rulers," and the sovereignty of the mass public and the rule of reason cannot co-exist and are not compatible (Ibid, a1290a40-1290b1). Moreover, democracy is based on the principles of liberty and equality, but democratic equality is equalitarian equality, not what Aristotle would call "equality of ratio." Thus, "the democrats think that as they are equal, they ought to be equal in all things." (Ibid, 1301a33-34) "Democratic justice is the application of numerical not proportionate equality." (Ibid, 1317a40-1317b1) But justice as fairness requires equality of ratio, not numerical equality, in the distribution of offices, resources, opportunities, burdens, etc. Thus, democratic equality is not rational, or the democratic norm of equality is irrational.

Noteworthy here, in both Plato and Aristotle, deliberative political life was an important part of a just world. Even though neither Plato nor Aristotle claimed that most free citizens are not capable of exercising reason, they criticized that in a democratic society, most free citizens needed to exercise their human reason. In Aristotle's view, both democracy and polity are forms of government wherein free citizens rule. Still, while polity is under the rule of reason and thus purports to promote public good, democracy is ruled by the desires and wills of free citizens and thus focuses only on individual interests. Thus, in Aristotle's view, democracy is a deviated, degraded form of government called "polity" or "constitution," wherein free citizens are rulers, and there is the rule of reason.

In summary, for Plato and Aristotle, the rule of reason in government is essential to the justice of government and a core virtue of government. Democracy is undesirable because it is not compatible with the idea of the rule of reason, and thus not compatible with the rule of truth, prudence, and wisdom and the idea of integration of political power and philosophical wisdom. The Platonic-Aristotelian critique of democracy is shared by various modern philosophers. To this, we shall turn now.

II. How to Avoid the Low-grade Intelligence and the Tranny of Morality in Democracy

Various leading modern thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries distrusted democracy. Thomas Hobbes is not a Democrat. John Locke, who advocated religious toleration and representative government, believes that "the great bulk of mankind

wallows in 'passion and superstition.'" (Stromberg，1996, 19) Voltaire, a crusader against tyranny and bigotry, considers the masses to be like cattle and "doubted that the multitude should even be educated"; he "observed that attempting to instruct the masses was like building a huge fire under an empty pot."(Ibid) The Marquis de Condorcet (Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat) wonders, "What operation capable of producing any double good can be understood by the people?" (Ibid) David Hume "thanked God (if such existed) that he did not live in a democracy." (Ibid)

John S. Mill's view on democracy is more optimistic but also cautious. Mill distinguished between the pure concept and the common concept of democracy. In the pure concept, "Democracy … is the government of the whole people by the whole people, equally represented." (Mill，2015, 264) In the common concept, "Democracy as commonly conceived and hitherto practiced, is the government of the whole people by a mere majority of the people, exclusively represented." (Ibid) Like Locke, Mill also considered representative government as a norm. He thus preferred democracy. Still, Mill claimed that in practice, democracy faces two dangers: (1) "Danger of a low grade of intelligence in the representative body" and (2) "Danger of class legislation on the part of the numerical majority: the tyranny of the numerical majority and dominant class." (Ibid) Mill's first concern echoes Plato's criticism of democracy and underscores the view that a great challenge for democracy is how to integrate democracy with the rule of reason. As Mill insisted, democracy without the rule of reason is of low-grade intelligence.

Philosophically, Immanuel Kant is a Republican, not a Democrat. "Kant regarded democracy as the one illegitimate form of government because it is based not upon reason and right as found in the eternal order of things, but upon the caprice of majorities." (Ibid, 20-21) Still, Kant opened a way to address Mill's two concerns of democracy. Kant was the first modern philosopher to use the concept of the public use of reason and made it essential to enlightenment. He insisted that for enlightenment, "nothing is required but freedom … It is the freedom to make public use of one's reason at every point." (Kant，2001, 4-5) To make public use of one's reason is to make public use of one's understanding and judgment. Thus, Kant claimed that "by the public use of one's reason I understand the use of which a person makes of it as a scholar before the reading public;" "the public use of one's reason … alone can bring about enlightenment among men." (Ibid), p.5)

In Kant's view, the ability and courage to make public use of reason is the ability and courage to have individual autonomy. "To be autonomous is to have maturity and courage in using one's own understanding and judgment." (O'Neill，2002, 251) Kant advocated the public use of reason to advocate enlightenment instead of democracy. He nonetheless opened a road to integrate democracy and the rule of reason, amid he himself did not take the road. Meanwhile, Kant's public use of reason is subject-centered, and he could have distinguished between the public use of reason and individual use of reason, as well as between the public use of reason and collective use of reason. A subject-centered concept of public use of reason in democracy, at best can lead only to the rule of the majority, or worse, into what Mill dubbed as the

tyranny of the majority and may not be able to get democracy out of the danger of low-grade intelligence.

Georg W. F. Hegel is not a Democrat, either. As Stromberg notes, for Hegel,

> Democracy was … a form that had become obsolete in the modern state; it belonged to a bygone era of small communities. In the last year of his life the greatest thinker of his age opposed the British Reform Bill, enacted in 1832 to extend the right to vote somewhat (but by no means to all) and to make representative fairer." (Stromberg，1996, 30)

Like other modern thinkers, Hegel believed that the rule of the mass was not the rule of reason but the rule of desires and wills. Like Kant, Hegel also did not claim that the idea of democracy and the idea of the rule of human reason are not compatible. Instead, his criticism was that democracy was desire-governed and will-governed, not reason-governed. Moreover, Hegel's concept of exercise of reason is the subject-centered collective use of reason.

Considering the above, the core of modern philosophers' criticisms of democracy is the concern about the compatibility between democracy and the rule of reason. The concern is epitomized in Mill's warning of the two dangers of democracy. Thus, William Godwin, in 1793, indignantly claimed democracy to be "that intolerable insult upon all reason and justice" and insisted that truth "cannot be made truer by the number in its votaries." (Ibid, 20) As Stromberg notes, John Milton argued that "it was better than an enlightened minority compel the majority to be free 'than that a greater number, for the pleasure of their baseness, compel a less most injuriously to be their fellow slaves.'" (Ibid, 21) Those philosophers were unsettled about democracy because they worried that democracy was inevitable because of low-grade intelligence.

We are returned here to the Mill question of democracy today: How best to avoid (1) low-grade intelligence and (2) the tyranny of the majority in present democracy? Are these two dangers of democracy avoidable and overcomable?

III. The Subject-centered Reason and the Public Reason as Intersubjectivity

Rawls brings new stock value to the idea of the public use of reason in his view of deliberative democracy of political liberalism. He integrates Kant's idea of the public use of reason and democracy, claiming public reason to be the necessary ruling power in a democracy. But he could have drawn a distinction between public reason and collective reason. For him, "in a democratic society, public reason is the reason of equal citizens who, as a collective body, exercise final political and coercive power over one another in enacting laws and in amending their constitution." (Rawls，1993, 214) Thus, his concept of public reason can be easily conflated with collective reason, corresponding to the public use reason can be easily conflated with the collective use of reason.

Rawls's concept of the public use of reason is also subject-centered, not intersubjective. The subject-centered use of reason in the public is the public use of a

subjective power of thinking, either individually or collectively. An intersubjective use of reason is the public use of an intersubjective power that claims those intersubjectively presupposed norms and principles to be valid and necessary, indispensable for rational activities. The qualification "intersubjective" has a two-fold sense. On the one hand, what is publicly used is an intersubjective power or intersubjectivity. On the other hand, the way of using reason is to follow those intersubjectively presupposed norms and principles for any rational activities.

Intersubjectivity here is not a consciousness embodied in a subject, but a consciousness living in the rational norms, principles, and procedures necessary and indispensable for rational activities among autonomous subjects. For example, the intersubjectivity among drivers in a city is not a consciousness embodied in individual drivers' individual consciousness, or in the collective consciousness of a group of drivers, but a consciousness embodied in those intersubjectively presupposed norms and standards in a rational system of traffic regulation in a city. The public reason as an intersubjectivity is neither the collective aggregation of individual subjectivities nor the collective subjectivity (e.g., will) standing against individual subjectivities. The public use of reason is neither the collective nor individual use of autonomous individual persons' individual reason. It is the public use of reason as intersubjectivity. Rawls falls short of such distinctions.

Talking about the public reason as the ruling power in political liberalism and democracy, Rawls points out:

> [In democracy] knowing that they affirm a diversity of reasonable religious and philosophical doctrines, [citizens] should be ready to explain the basis of their actions to one another in terms each could reasonably expect that others endorse as consistent with their freedom and equality. Trying to meet this condition is one of the tasks that this ideal of democratic politics asks of us. Understanding how to conduct oneself as a democratic citizen includes understanding an ideal of public reason (Ibid, 218).

In the above, public reason requires that citizens be ready to explain the basis of their actions in terms reasonably acceptable to others as equal and free citizens.

Two things are conspicuous here. One is that the Rawlsian public use of reason is intersected with Habermas's intersubjective use of reason. In Rawls's public use of reason, one explains the basis of one's action in terms that one expects them to be acceptable to others as fair and reasonable. But Rawls differs from Habermas. Thus, another feature of his concept of the public use of reason is that this concept does not focus on rational communication geared to mutual understanding among citizens who are heterogeneous. No wonder Rawls's overlapping consensus of different comprehensive doctrines is akin to Wittgenstein's "family resemblance" of doctrines which diverse citizens appeal to as the basis of justification of their thinking, choice, and action, rather than the intersubjectivity that makes possible rational communication among these doctrines.

Thus, Rawls's concept of the public use of reason is Kantian to some extent: it is an individual exercise of one's human reason as an abstract public citizen.

Notwithstanding, in Rawls, the mechanism for individual persons to publicly use their human reason is the original position wherein all persons wear what Rawls dubs as the veil of ignorance. The difference between Kant and Rawls in their concepts of the public use of reason is that while in Kant, this means individual persons publicly think, choose, and act as universal human beings, in Rawls, individual persons publicly think, choose, and act as abstract, identical citizens; while in Kant the starting point of the public use of reason is that the public is homogeneous, in Rawls, the starting point of the public use of reason is that the democratic public is heterogeneous. All the same, in Rawls' concept of the public use of reason, the power called "reason" is not an intersubjectivity, but still the subject-centered individual human reason. The way in which reason is exercised is more collective than intersubjective.

Noteworthy, Rawls appeals to citizens' attitude of reasonableness—that is, an attitude of willingness to propose fair terms of social cooperation. Still, it would be difficult for any citizens to be reasonable without a certain degree of mutual understanding among citizens. Mutual understanding among citizens presupposes rational communication among citizens, which presupposes citizens' following governing norms and principles of rational communication that are intersubjectively presupposed among citizens.

A subject-centered use of reason, individually or collectively, is often self-idolized and thus cannot avoid totalitarianism, while an intersubjective use of reason is democratic and tolerant. A subject-centered collective use of reason often turns a democratic public into what Gustave Le Bon (1895) dubbed "the crowd." A subject-centered individual use of reason, at best, can lead only to the rule of the democratic majority. When the authority of truth, justice, the distinction between right and wrong, acceptability, legitimacy, and validity is a subject-centered consciousness, individual or collective alike, the rule of reason becomes the rule of subjectivity. When the rule of reason becomes the rule of subjectivity, totalitarianism cannot be avoided. In contrast, intersubjective use of reason requires all citizens in a democratic process to be mind-open, tolerant, and inclusive to negotiate publicly with others in rational communication. When the rule of reason is the rule of intersubjectivity, totalitarianism can be avoided.

IV. Three Normative Forms of Democracy and Three Forms of Use of Reason in the Public Square

We can see the difference between the subject-centered use of reason and the intersubjective use of reason by reviewing the three normative modes of democracy—the liberal, the republican, and the proceduralist mode of democracy—as discussed by Habermas. In both the liberal and republic modes of democracy, the public use of reason is subject-centered. Thus, neither can avoid the tyranny of the majority in a democracy, which Mill warned about. In the liberal mode, which Rawls' concept of public use of reason leads, the democratic process becomes a process of negotiation of subject-centered individual interests and desires. The public use of reason in a liberal democracy is akin to the public use of reason in a market. Thus, Poland

Stromberg (1996) sees the liberal mode of democracy as a market-kind of democracy. Rules and norms that govern democratic interaction will simply be determined by the opinions and decisions of the majority.

In comparison, political deliberation in the republic mode of democracy is collective and missionary. The public use of reason in the democratic process is the competition of collective paradigms of rationality, and citizens think, choose, and act in accordance with the paradigms of the rationality of the collectivity to which they belong, e.g., the republican party or the democratic party, the liberal or the conservative, etc. It focuses on those collective desires and a collective concept of the good of a community. Rules and norms that govern democratic interaction will simply be determined by the collectivity that is in the position of the majority of the public.

The public use of reason in liberal democracy is the subject-centered public use of reason in republican democracy is the subject-centered collective use of reason in the public. Both can fail to be truly open, inclusive of difference and diversity, and thus cannot be the basis for what John S. Mill would call "pure democracy," amid the public in a democracy today is inevitably heterogenous and can only be what Mill would call "common democracy, "which is democracy of low-grade intelligence in accordance with Mill.[1]

The proceduralist mode of democracy depends on the public use of reason as the public use of intersubjective reason. The intersubjective public use of reason in the proceduralist mode of democracy is (1) being inclusive of the heterogeneous public, (2) providing equal opportunities to all citizens to participate in the democratic process, and (3) purporting to develop mutual understanding among all citizens through rational communication.

The proceduralist mode of democracy emphasizes the public use of reason in democratic discourse. The public use of intersubjective reason has the following salient features: (1) the public use of individual reason is guided by intersubjectivity as a communicating power; (2) in the public use of intersubjective reason in discourse, citizens are free and autonomous on the one hand and be willing to communicate with one another, which in turn mandates them to follow communicative rationality for rational communication geared to mutual understanding; and (3) the embodiment of intersubjective reason is not individual consciousness or collective consciousness, but a set of intersubjectively presupposed norms of social interactions grounded in rational communication geared to mutual understanding among citizens.

Here, the proceduralist mode of democracy can be understood as "the institutionally secured forms of general and public communication that deal with the practical question of how men can and want to live under the objective conditions of their ever-expanding power of control." (McCarthy, 1991, 15) This mode of

[1] Mills claims that there are two concepts of democracy: "The pure concept of democracy … is the government of the whole people by the whole people, equally represented… The common concept: "Democracy as commonly conceived and hitherto practiced, is the government of the whole people by a mere majority of the people, exclusively represented." (Mill, 264)

democracy "results in differences both from the republican conception of the state as an ethical community and from the liberal conception of the state as a guardian market society."(Habermas，1998b, 246) This mode of democracy underscores that a subject-centered public use of reason is insufficient for the rule of reason in democracy.

The procedural mode of democracy is a strong form of deliberative democracy, and Habermas claims that "discourse theory invests [in] the democratic process with normative connotation stronger than those found in the liberal model but weaker than those found in the republican model." (Habermas，1998a, 298) It is instrumental to raise the level of intelligence of democracy and reduce the danger of the tyranny of the majority. This can be seen as follows.

First, it raises the intelligence level of the democratic process. In the liberal mode, the democratic process is a process wherein interests are negotiated and thus advanced. In the republican mode, while the democratic process is to form common public will and collective self-understanding, "democratic will-formation is supposed to take the form of an ethical discourse of self-understanding." (Ibid) In comparison, as William Outwaite notes, the proceduralist mode of democracy "incorporates elements both of liberal concepts of politics as the mediation of private interests and of the republican conception of self-organizing ethical community." (Outwaite, 2009, 142) In the proceduralist mode of democracy, the democratic process functions for citizens to communicate rationally and, therefore, to develop norms and rules that citizens find to be valid and acceptable to be the basis of regulation of the public life.
Second, it makes public intelligence the embodiment of popular sovereignty. In the liberal mode, popular sovereignty is conceptualized in that free, self-interest-centered citizens have rights. In the republican mode, popular sovereignty is "bound to the notion of an embodiment in the (at first actually physically assembled) people." (Ibid) In the proceduralist mode, "popular sovereignty … retreats into democratic procedures." (Ibid, 251) It retreats to the procedure wherein, guided by the voice of intersubjectivity, citizens think, choose, and act both as free, equal, and autonomous citizens on their own and as citizens of a heterogeneous democratic public of a democratic polity (Habermas，1998a, 298).

Third, it makes practical reason reside in the public reason. In the liberal mode, practical reason resides in universal human rights. In the republican mode, practical reason resides in the ethical substance of a specific community. In the procedural mode, "practical reason no longer resides in universal human rights, or in the ethical substance of a specific community, but in the rules of discourse and forms of argumentation that borrow their normative content from the validity basis of action-oriented to reaching understanding." (Ibid, 296) It resides in public reason as an intersubjective power of communication and reasoning and in those public norms and rules as intersubjectively presupposed as norms and rules of regulation of citizens' public conduct and participation in public life.

In summary, Rawls rightly insists that the public reason is, and should be, the ruling power of democracy today. However, Rawls's concept of public reason, as well as the public use of reason, is subject-centered. Such a public reason and the

public use o reason at best can only lead to a liberal mode or a republican mode of democracy. Both the liberal mode and the republic mode of democracy suffer the two dangers of democracy that Mill warns us of.

V. Beyond the. Individual, and Collective Use of Reason

The public reason that is the governing power of democracy today should not be merely individual reason or collective reason in the public. Instead, it should be an intersubjectivity of all citizens of a democratic political association. The public reason that is publicly used is not, and should not be, merely the overlapping of individual or collective uses of reason in public. Instead, it should bear these salient features as follows: (1) it is intersubjective; it is an intersubjectivity; (2) it is the power of intersubjective communication that produces mutual understanding among citizens; and (3) its embodiment is not a person's individual consciousness or the collective consciousness of a people, but a set of intersubjectively presupposed norms and rules of public interaction.

Intersubjectivity is not merely overlapping consensus. Intersubjectivity governs the activities of individual actors in public interactions. It dictates norms and produces structure-to-structure activities of different actors. In contrast, overlapping consensus refers to the intersected parts of understanding. For example, a Confucian and a Buddhist both teach detachment from material desires, and their understanding thus shares an overlapping consensus on the matter of detachment. However, the overlapping consensus is just an overlapping consensus, not an intersubjectivity of these two persons. Meanwhile, two persons—one lives in culture A, and another in culture B—both respect a cultural taboo, say X. This shared respect is dictated by the intersubjectivity of obligation of cultural toleration and respect for cultural rights and diversity. The intersubjectivity that dictates the norm and obligation of toleration of diversity is the power producing the two persons' overlapping consensus in respecting the same, specific cultural taboo.

Accordingly, in the intersubjective use of reason, the rational power called "the public reason" is neither individual reason nor collective reason, but an intersubjectivity. The public use of reason is not just individually or collectively using reason in the public either. The paradigmatic example of individual use of human reason is the Cartesian-Kantian exercise of reason. In this paradigm, full exercise of one's reason is to fully exercise one's human reason individually by oneself and in oneself. In the exercise of reason, the criteria of truth, value, and universality lie totally in the individual subject. The way for the individual exercise of reason to be reasonable is either for individual persons to wear what John Rawls dubs "the veil of ignorance" or to have what Thomas Nagel would call "altruism" in reasoning or reckoning. The public reason here thus becomes a power of abstraction or altruism.

A conceptual distinction exists between public reason and collective reason (e.g., cultural reason), too. A collective reason is still a subject-centered reason, amid the subject is not an individual person, but a collectivity. The public reason should be intersubjectivity, while the collective reason is subjectivity; it is an abstract subjectivity. For example, a cultural reason is a culture-centered collective reason,

and culture, or the people of a culture, are a collective subject. The same can be said of Marxist so-called "class consciousness."

Correspondingly, the collective exercise of reason is the reckoning wherein the thinking-subject is a collectivity, e.g., a political party, religious community, or political association, and wherein a person does not think as a free, equal, and autonomous citizen but as a member of the We. The fatal flaw of this kind of exercise of reason is multiple. First, it turns the public into what Gustave Le Bon would call "the crowd," an aggregation of thoughtless individuals. In the collective exercise of reason, individual persons do not think as free, equal, and autonomous citizens but think as agents or members of an abstract collectivity.

In true democracy today, the democratic public is not, and cannot be a homogeneous public, but is and will remain as a heterogeneous public. How to achieve full inclusion of a heterogeneous public and high-grade intelligence out of a heterogeneous public? That is the question for democracy today!

The intersubjective use of reason by all citizens as free, equal, and autonomous citizens is the key for democracy to be truly inclusive and grounded in rational communication geared to mutual understanding among citizens. True democracy must be inclusive and grounded in rational communication. It must be one wherein public power and authority, such as government power and authority, must be firmly, reflectively, and constrained by public reason and facilitated by rational communication geared to mutual understanding among all citizens of a democratic public. Differing from the collective use of reason, intersubjective use of reason consists of individual citizens' public exercise of their human reason as free, equal, autonomous citizens, not merely as members of a collectivity, and thus, it is inclusive and tolerant of difference, diversity, and individuality.

The alternative to both the individual and collective subject-centered use of human reason is the public use of reason as an intersubjective use of reason. As discussed above, the intersubjective use of reason is both using an intersubjective reason and using individual reason by following those intersubjectively presupposed norms and principles that make possible rational activities. It is procedure-centered and can be seen as a proceduralist use of reason. The intersubjective or proceduralist use of reason has some salient characteristics as follows.

First, in the proceduralist use of reason, individual citizens not only think, choose, and act equally, freely, and autonomously but also justify their thoughts, choices, and actions on reasons that are acceptable to all citizens as participants in democracy and democratic deliberation.[2] Citizens are asked to follow the same procedural rules, just as different drivers in a city are asked to follow the same traffic rules.

Second, the proceduralist use of reason purports to bring about rational communication and is thus constrained by intersubjective presuppositions of norms that make rational communication possible. Thus, in the proceduralist public use of reason, democratic deliberation and choice are procedurally rule-governed.

[2] Here, we should also follow Habermas to draw a distinction between acceptability and acceptance. Acceptance is an act or situation. Acceptability is a quality.

Third, in the proceduralist use of reason, the ideas of justice prudence, public good, duty, obligation, social cooperation, truth, justification, and justifiability become the indispensable analytical tools of public reason. The use of reason in democratic deliberation entertains an incompatibility between human reason and human interests, public good and individual rights, as well as between public interests and individual interests. Instead, the proceduralist use of human reason purports to reconcile each of these dichotomic pairs of conflict.

Fourth, the starting point of the proceduralist use of reason is not that the democratic public is homogeneous or can be homogeneous. Instead, it is that the democratic public is heterogeneous. The proceduralist use of reason does not purport to integrate citizens to make a homogeneous public and people thinking the same, desiring the same, choosing the same, and acting the same. Instead, it allows different people to pursue their different lives under the same set of rules, just as it asks different drivers to follow the same set of traffic rules.

Fifth, in the proceduralist use of reason, the tool of reason to search for the common and identical is no longer an abstraction but communication purported to arrive at mutual understanding among actors. The proceduralist use of reason does justice to the concrete, the particular, and the substantial, while both individual and collective use of reason is oppressive of the concrete, the particular, and the substantial for the sake of the universal, identical, and absolute.

Sixth, in the proceduralist use of reason, the ruling power is shifted from a subjectivity of constructing, creating, and communicating to an intersubjectivity of constructing, creating, and communicating. In it, public reason is de-centered and intersubjectified and embodied in intersubjective communicative practices, argumentation, and association.

Therefore, the proceduralist use of reason makes a democratic process inclusive, reflective, deliberative, and intersubjective in a time of ethical pluralism, cultural diversity, and social heterogeneity. It is the mechanism to make democracy the viable source of ethical-moral, and socio-political legitimacy of government, norms, and laws in public life. It is for peoples of difference, diversity, and even incompatible *to be together*, forming a viable, sustainable polity under the rule of law. It is the mechanism of *being together of the strangers, the different, and the incompatible* without oppression and repression.

Kant could have distinguished between public reason and collective reason in his categorical imperative. Rawls could also have made such a distinction in his mechanism of the original position. Instead, when both philosophers ask persons to think as abstract persons—Kant, abstract human beings; Rawls, abstract citizens—of an abstract homogeneous public, they ask their agents to think with collective reason instead of public reason, amid both talk about the public use of one's human reason. The same can be said of Amartya Sen (2009) who should distinguish between public reasoning and collective/communal reasoning in his doctrine of justice and public reasoning in a democratic polity.

O'Neill (2002) rightly sees that Rawls's doctrine of deliberative democracy and Habermas's deliberative democracy both draw importantly from Kant's concept of the public use of reason. He could have seen that Habermas also reconstructs Kant's

concept of the public use of reason when he replaces Kant's mechanism of categorical imperative with his mechanism of practical discourse and ideal speech situation, transforming Kant's and Rawls's public reason as a semi-collective reason into an intersubjectivity.

Cristina Lafont (2020) claims that the better road to democracy in our time of cultural pluralism, ethical diversity, and social heterogeneity is the long, participatory road that citizens take to forge the collective will to change one another's hearts and minds. I should revise her proposal to a Habermasan one: the better road to democracy is the long, participatory road that citizens take to forge public understanding, judgment, and will to conjoin one another's hearts and minds.

Kostas Koukouzelis (2009) sees the limit of Kantian and Rawlsian public use of reason. But he could have seen that this indicates the limit of a citizen's individual exercise of reason in public or a citizen's collective exercise of the collective reason in him/her, not the limit of the public use of reason *per se*.

Meanwhile, Jocelyn Maclure (2006) does not make a distinction between the public reason and overlapping consensus in her misgiving about the generalizability test as "the cornerstone" of public reasoning (Maclure，2006, 37). Maclure identifies the public reason with overlapping consensus in her resistance of the alleged generalizability test in both Habermas and Rawls, claiming the generalizability test as a filter excludes the particular, the diverse, and the different. But Habermas does not deny what Maclure insists: "the degree of a generality of a claim is not something that is disclosed and then simply cognized by those to whom it is addressed"; "not only must judgment about the generalizability of a claim be made with reference to the context in which the claim is put forward"; "the degree of generalizability of a set of motives … must in many instances be discursively decided." (Maclure，2006, 48) Habermas also insists that a claim always has a *Janus face*: context-transcendence in validity and context-immanence in rising and being cognized (Habermas，1993, 321). In Habermas's mechanism of discourse and ideal speech situation, the construction of a consensus is negotiated, debated, worked, and reworked, and discursively decided, not the work of an abstract generalization. It is a fruit of rational communication, not a fruit of abstract generalization.

In summary, the public use of reason as the intersubjective or proceduralist use of reason makes possible the integration of the idea of popular sovereignty and the idea of the rule of reason. It is the mechanism for having rational, deliberative democracy amid a heterogeneous public. It makes democratic use of reason inclusive, deliberate, and constrained by the four norms of communicative rationality: comprehensibility, truthfulness, truth, and normative rightness, not merely driven by the desires and wills of the morality of the democratic public. It makes the democratic process of opinion and will formation a process of pragmatic, ethical, and moral reflection not only of individual and public interests, but also of truth, justice, good, and human excellence.

VI. Conclusion

In conclusion, true democracy depends on rational communication among citizens of a democratic polity geared to arrive at mutual understanding among citizens. A democracy should avoid two fatal flaws: (1) low-grade intelligence and (2) the tyranny of the majority. Popular sovereignty is that political power and authority belong to all citizens of a people, not just the majority of a people. The rule of the majority without the rule of public reason is another kind of tyranny.

Our epoch is one of ethical pluralism, cultural diversity, and social heterogeneity. In such a time, to integrate the ideal of the rule of reason and the idea of democracy, public reason is the light, and public use of reason is the way. The rule of free, autonomous citizens and intersubjective use of reason entail each other.

The heterogeneity of the democratic public makes intersubjective use of reason necessary, and intersubjective use of reason makes a heterogeneous democratic public operational, competent, and sustainable. True democracy of a heterogeneous democratic public depends on rational communication among citizens geared to arrive at mutual understanding, which is made possible by heterogeneous citizens' recognition of and abiding by norms that are intersubjectively presupposed to the basis of regulation of public life.

A democracy akin to a market is a bad democracy. A democracy akin to a party or church is a bad democracy, too. Young and Allen propose "city life" as the normative mode of democracy—that is, democratic life as *the being together of strangers*. I propose university life as the normative mode of democracy—that is, *the being together of the different, diverse, and strange* in a reflective, deliberate life of searching for knowledge, truth, good, justice, beauty, human excellence, and outstanding. Democracy is not just about being together. It is about *being together* to progress, elevate, prosper, and pursue happiness.

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