

GLOBAL JUSTICE AND DUTY TO HUMANITY —A PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract: This essay is devoted to exploring global justice as duty to humanity. The essay first explores humanity as the universal substance of all humankind, indicating that if a person loses a quality, s/he is not alienated or less than himself/herself; but if a person loses his/her humanity, s/he is alienated and absurd. Second, the essay demonstrates that the idea of humanity as the universal substance of all humankind is necessary to make senses those operating norms and principles of global justice in our time, including human rights, crimes against humanity and toleration. Third, essay indicates that global justice is the way of human living because it is consistent with humanity as the universal substance of all humankind. Therefore, the essay concludes that global justice is giving due to humanity as a substance.

We can hardly talk about global justice today without mentioning the concepts of the law of humanity, human rights, crimes against humanity, and global cultural toleration. What are conspicuous also follow. First, we search for global justice of, for, and by all humankind in the globe, not justice for all beings—humans and non-humans included. We aim at global principles of justice that normalize all humankind on the earth, not principles of justice that regulate all beings, humans and non-humans alike. Second, if there should be global justice of, for, and by all humankind on the earth, all humankind must share some commonalities. Third, the global human community formally declares the norms of human rights, crimes against humanity, and cultural toleration as the norms of global justice recognized in the UN *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* in 1948 and the *Rome Statute of International Criminal Courts* in 2002. Therefore, the following normative question arises: What necessary condition(s) must be met if the norm of human rights, the laws of crimes against humanity, and the norm of global cultural toleration are applicable to all human persons, institutions, and practices

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in the world? Therefore, in this essay, it is argued that in order for us to make better sense of the concept of global justice, we must have a concept of humanity that can account for: (1) humankind in whole is an entity that can be an object of criminal injury; (2) humankind in whole is a sovereign entity that has legitimate legal authority to which those who commit crimes against humanity or offence to the law of humanity and human rights must be answerable for their activities and responsibilities; and (3) humankind in whole is a sovereign entity of legitimate legal authority in whose name juridical laws (such the Roman Statute of International Criminal Court are established and issued, just as America is a political community of legal sovereign in whose names such constructs such as “the American Constitution” and “American Laws”) come into existence. In short, we must have a concept of humanity as an entity with legitimate authority, power, and rights to make claims. What kind of entity can, and should, humanity be in this context? A quality, virtue, or a substance? Without further introduction, I present my case below.

I.

Let us start with the concept of humanity as the universal substance or the Aristotelian secondary substance of all humankind. The concept implies three ideas: (1) all human beings belong to the same species or family of beings called “humankind” named by humanity; 2) humanity is not merely a quality, but an entity-subject that underlies all human activities and is embodied in all human persons; and (3) the most justified way of living for humankind, consistent with humanity as a substance, is universal and necessary to all humankind.

The term “humanity” can name a species or family of beings, not merely a quality. In English, the term “humanity” is often synonymous to such terms as “the human race” or “mankind” (Mazlish 2009, 1). A substance is a subject or entity that possesses qualities or that is predicated by qualities. A quality is a property possessed by an entity. To claim that a being is a substance is not the same as claiming a being is a material entity or a being has a physical body. In reality, we can indulge ourselves in the view that there can be non-material or non-bodily substance, e.g., mental substance. Thus, for example, one can reasonably claim that God is a substance without meaning that God has a physical body or is a physical being. It is not unreasonable for us, and it does make sense for us, to claim that God is a spiritual substance, or to claim that the mind is a

mental substance. Similarly, to claim that humanity is the universal substance of all human beings is not to claim that humanity is a physical or bodily entity, which occupies a physical space in human beings. Similarly, to claim that a tomato is a substance is not to claim that tomato is a physical entity that occupies a physical space or has a physical body.

As Aristotle points out, a substance underlies, and is the subject of, properties, conditions, and activities. That is to say, a substance is not merely a property, but a substantive subject of which properties, conditions, and activities are predicates. As Aristotle sees it, substances divide between primary and secondary ones. A primary substance is an individual entity that “is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject.”(Aristotle 1941, 9) A primary substance is not a predicate to another subject, but can only be a subject, which is predicated by qualities, quantities, conditions, and activities. In comparison, a secondary substance refers to species and genus to which primary substances belong and which signifies an entity qualitatively differentiated (Ibid, 12). For the purpose of this study, we should focus on the concept of the secondary substance here. While a secondary substance is asserted of or embodied in a family of primary substances, it does not “merely indicate quality, like the term ‘white’.”(Ibid.) Instead, a secondary substance is also an entity that underlies and is the subject of properties, conditions and activities. Thus, apple is not merely a quality or property of particular Fuji apples, and differs from sweetness as a quality or property of them. Instead, apple indicates a substance qualitatively differentiated from tomato or potato. The humanity of Barbara Stanwyck and Cary Grant differs from goodness, beauty (handsomeness), specific height, and weight that are qualities of these two persons. Their humanity is an entity of which reason, equality, human dignity and free will are properties. Their humanity is a substance designating a family of beings wherein human status and human rights exist.

For conceptual clarity, three points warrant repetition. First, an Aristotelian secondary substance is substantially constitutive of a primary substance. That is to say, it is part of the substance of a primary substance in whole. An Aristotelian secondary substance necessarily presents in the substances of primary substances themselves, not their properties or virtues. Proper primary substances necessarily embody the secondary substance as part of its substance or otherwise it is an alienated substance. No wonder, when a person loses his/her humanity substance, s/he is an alienated person and thus becomes absurd. In comparison, if a person loses a quality, s/he is not alienated or less than they are self, but simply lacks the

lost quality. Second, an Aristotelian secondary substance is a substantive subject or entity that has predicates, though it is embodied in a family of primary substances. In particular, humanity is a substantive subject or entity of which human rights, human status, human dignity, and reason are predicates. It is a subject or entity, which can be both a possible object of legal criminal injury and a sovereign being with the legitimate legal authority to define what a legal offence is. Third, the way of an Aristotelian secondary substance's existence is universal and necessary to all members of the family named by this secondary substance. Moreover, we can understand that humanity is the universal substance of all humankind further as follows. First, humanity has as its functions a set of human feelings such as love, hate, compassion, shame, and repugnance. Meanwhile, humanity itself is not the functions of love, hate, compassion, shame, or repugnance. This differs from that when love functions as love, it is itself; when hate functions as hate, it is itself; when shame functions as shame, it is itself; or when repugnance functions as repugnance, it is itself. Second, it singles out a set of universal values such as dignity, autonomy, liberty, and personal integrity as its properties and predicates. That is to say, these properties or attributes become valuables for humanity, by humanity, and of humanity. Third, it singles out a set of properties or qualities as virtues, e.g., courage, wisdom, propriety, consistence, and the like. Again, these virtues can be predicates of humanity, but humanity is not identical to any of them. Though Kant never uses the concept of humanity as a substance, we can read Kant as asserting the following: (1) all humankind share a common mind which is rational by nature; this universal mind is of definite faculty; and (2) all human beings share a common humanity that has an intrinsic value called "dignity", and that is not, and must not be, merely means to other beings, but also an end in itself. By this token, if claim (1) is valid, humanity must be a substance naming a family of beings that share a universal mind. In Kant's claim (2), all humankind share a universal humanity that has an intrinsic value and that binds all human beings to recognize it as an intrinsic value. Therefore, Kant in effect operates with a concept of humanity as the universal substance of all humankind.

Christine Korsgaard claims that humanity is the practical identity of all humankind. By practical identity, Korsgaard means the ethical-moral identity. I would like to make a stronger claim: humanity is the metaphysical identity of all humankind; our humanity identity is not merely a social identity such as our American citizenship, but a formal identity. Noteworthy, in our ethical-moral life,

again, human alienation is self-alienation. When a person loses his/her humanity, a person does not just lose a social attribute such as one loses one's citizenship, party membership, or a job; instead, one loses core part of the substance of his/her self. Admittedly, the loss of one's humanity is not a necessary condition of the loss of a self. Nevertheless, the loss of one's humanity is a sufficient condition for the loss of a self. That is to say, it is not that "if LS, then LH", provided LS signifies the loss of a self and LH signifies the loss of one's humanity. It is definitely that "if LH, then LS". However, the loss of a quality or virtue does not necessarily mean self-alienation at all. Alienation is the loss of a substance or part of the substance, not the loss of a quality or a virtue. Notwithstanding, in contemplating global justice, to replace the concept of humanity as a quality by the concept of humanity as a substance brings about at least three immediate dividends here. First, it brings into prominence the idea that humanity is a subject or entity that can make claims. Second, it provides the metaphysical basis for the universality and necessity of norms and rules of living for the family of human beings. Moreover, rules and norms of global justice are among those norms and rules for human living. Third, it brings into prominence that humanity connotes also an intersubjectivity or an evolving intersubjective consciousness of all humans. It names a community of minds. Admittedly, because of cultural diversity, individual persons who grow up in different culture think, feel, will, choose, and act differently and have different thoughts, feelings, choices, intentionality and actions. Still, the development of the consciousness of global justice is also the development of the consciousness of humanity. Human minds, diverse as they are, are still minds of humankind, not minds of non-human beings such as non-human animals or divine beings. In sum, we should recover a concept of humanity as the universal substance of all human beings. The concept brings about the concepts of global human identity, bond, and status of humankind, which are necessary for us to make full sense of those core concepts of the spirit of our time including human rights and crimes against humanity.

II.

We are now in a position to appreciate the relationship between the concept of global justice and the concept of humanity to be a necessary one. This can be seen as follows: Where there is global justice, there is humanity as the universal substance of all human beings. Where there is no humanity as the universal

substance of all human beings, there can be no global justice. That is to say, the concept of humanity as the universal substance of all human beings is the necessary condition for a plausible concept of global justice. In *Justice Beyond Borders*, Caney provides a brilliant “General Argument” for a universalistic concept of global justice. Caney’s General Argument goes as follows: 1. “there are valid moral principles”, 2. “moral principles that apply to some persons apply to all persons who share some common morally relevant properties”, 3. “persons throughout the world share some morally relevant similarities.” (Caney 2006, 35—36) In Caney’s argument, the condition that persons throughout the world share some morally relevant commonality is the necessary condition for principles and norms of justice to be universal and global. It can be rephrased as “If *G*, then *P*; no *P*, no *G*.” Here, “*G*” signifies that the principles and norms of justice are universal and global; “*P*” represents that persons throughout the world share some morally relevant properties. Needless to say, “*P*” can occur necessarily or contingently. If it occurs contingently, not necessarily, then it could not have occurred. Where “*P*” does not occur, there can be no “*G*”. The common problem for Caney’s and other arguments is that they all conceptualize the commonalities of all humankind as some common properties or attributes, say, common needs, vulnerability, and good including life, bodily integrity, and thought—which these arguments outline must occur necessarily (Ibid. 36). Doing so, they cannot demonstrate that their list of common properties are universal of all humankind. For example, the *P* or the 10 properties, which Caney outlines may or may not occur. And here what we look for is not merely “*P*”, but “*P* necessarily”. A “*P*” that may or may not occur is not sufficient to justify that *G* occurs. The case that “if *G*, then *P*; no *P*, no *G*” is not the case that “if *G*, then possibly *P*; no *P*, still possibly *G*”. This amounts to saying that the “*P*”, which we search for here, must be the one that necessarily occurs in all humankind on the one hand and is sufficient to ground the universal principles for all humankind on the other hand. The “*P*” which we search for here can be commonality or commonalities. What is such a “*P*”?

With this question, we can see that if any commonalities occur in all humankind, all human beings must belong to the same species of beings in the first place or they must be constituted of a same family substance first. It is truism that only beings of the same substance necessarily share some commonalities. Noteworthy, what we look for are not some so-called “family resemblances”, but a set of commonalities. Such commonalities are what Aristotle called attributes.

Turning the table around, we will find that only a same substance can have the same attributes. Thus, whatever universal commonalities we look for here, they can only be commonalities of beings that share the same substance. Therefore, whatever universal commonalities, which all human beings may share, all human beings can share these commonalities if and only if they share the same family substance and therefore belong in the same family of beings. In other words, the substance called humanity that names the species of humankind to which all human beings belong is necessary for whatever universal properties that all human beings must have. Meanwhile, if all humankind shares a common substance, principles and norms that are applicable to some are applicable to them all. Meanwhile, the necessary relationship between the concept of global justice and the concept of humanity can be inferred as follows: Premise 1: If there is global justice (*GJ*), then they must be principles and norms of justice can be applied globally to all human persons (*G*); Premise 2: If *G* (for example, the norm of human rights and the norm of crimes against humanity), then *P*; *P* represents that all human beings share some morally relevant commonalities; Premise 3: If *P* necessarily, then *Q* (= all human persons share a common family substance); Premise 4: *Q* presupposes *E* (= the existence of a shared family substance or a secondary substance that names a species or family of beings). Conclusion: therefore, the concept of humanity as *E* is necessary for a plausible concept of *GJ*. Premise 1 should be self-evident. Premise 2 is the core claim of Caney's General Argument. Premise 3 is what we concluded in discussions above. Premise 4 is self-evident from Premise 3. Therefore, the conclusion is logically warranted. Now, the necessity of the concept of humanity to global justice can further be deduced from the principle of crimes against humanity and the norm of human rights, which are core principles of global justice today. Given the *UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, the *Rome Statutes of International Criminal Courts*, as well as other international statutes, we can take the principle of crimes against humanity and the norm of humanity as our examples here. What do the concepts of human rights and crimes against necessarily presuppose? In other words, if these two concepts make sense and these two principles are principles of global justice, what is necessarily presupposed? The answer is, "the concept of humanity as the universal substance of all humankind". The concept of crimes against humanity necessarily presupposes the concept of humanity as a substance, not merely a value or virtue. The concept of crimes against humanity makes two claims: (1) humanity is the victim of such crimes called "crimes against

humanity”, and (2) humanity is a sovereign subject to which those who commit certain crimes should be answerable. Only a substantive subject can be a victim of crime and only a substantive entity can name a sovereign community to which members of the community must be answerable. A value or a virtue cannot be either of them. That is to say, only a substance, not a value or virtue, can be a victim of a crime, or an entity that names a sovereign community to which those human persons who commit what are called “crimes against humanity” should be answerable to and by whose laws certain transgressions and offences are called “crimes.” As “Articulated in the Judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Erdemovic case, ‘it is therefore the concept of humanity as victim which essentially characterizes crimes against humanity.’”(Geras 2011, 57) The victimized humanity is Humanity as such or humankind in whole. In the sense of humanity as such, the victimized Humanity is not, and cannot be, merely a value, but must be a subject or an entity having rights or making claims on rights. In the sense of humankind in whole, the victimized humanity must also be a subject or entity of which rights are asserted. Admittedly, value can be violated, and virtue can be damaged. Neither offence to a value nor to virtue can be counted as a crime that should be legally prosecuted. Neither value nor virtue imposes obligation. Only offence to a subject that has right to something can be a legal crime. That is to say, the victim of a crime must be a substantive subject, not a quality. When a human community establishes violation of given values or virtues as a criminal offence, the human community acts as a subject or entity to claim its rights to live in accordance with such values or virtue. It is the offence to this community, not violate the values or virtues in itself that makes an act a crime. Mazlish argues, “The actual victims of crimes against humanity are Bosnians, Rwandans, Sudanese; they, not Humanity as such, suffer in their bodies and minds.” (Mazlish 2009, 27) Mazlish’s view is flawed. Admittedly, in crimes against humanity, direct victims are persons such as Bosnians, Rwandans, or Sudanese. Nevertheless, crimes against these victims are called “crimes against humanity” precisely because these persons’ common humanity is violated. It is not merely their bodies or minds that are injured. This is why crimes against humanity are not identical to crimes such as murder, rape or torture. Indeed, *the Roman Statute* requires that only those murders, rapes, torture or other offences, which are conducted systematically, and as part of some policy, acts constitute crimes against humanity. The requirement is clear: the focus is on the offence to humanity as such. At any rate, in crimes against humanity, humanity is

the *actual* victim as much as individual persons are direct victims.

Another claim in the concept of crimes against humanity is that humanity is the sovereign subject with legal authority to which states, governments, communities and persons are answerable for their acts and activities. Certain offences are crimes against humanity in the sense that humanity has the legal authority to hold those offenders accountable by her laws—that is, the laws of humanity. As Massimo Renzo indicates, in crimes against humanity, humanity is not only the victim on which a crime introduces injury, but also the authority to which agents must be legally answerable for their activities. Thus, according to Renzo, the concept of crimes against humanity indicates that a criminal is held accountable and answerable for his/her actions not only to his/her immediate victim(s), but to humanity as well. If we accept the claim that humanity is a sovereign subject of legal authority as Renzo indicates, we must see that humanity is a substance. Only humanity as a substance is, and can be, a substantive subject with legal authority. A value or a virtue cannot be a sovereign subject of legal authority to which governments, social organizations and individual persons must be answerable for their activities. All the same, as Renzo argues, the concept of crimes against humanity implies that humanity is a sovereign entity to whose authority governments, social organizations and individual persons must be answerable for their activities. If humanity is a sovereign entity in the concept of crimes against humanity, it must be a substance. A value or virtue or any qualities cannot claim sovereignty. Noteworthy, humanity's sovereignty today is also asserted formally in formal international politics, e.g., it is formally asserted in both the *1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights* and the *Roman Statute of International Criminal Court*.

A few words on the concept of the law of humanity are in order. As Robertson writes, “As one Nazi war crimes tribunal explained, ‘crimes against humanity ... can only come with the purview of this basic code of humanity.’” (Robertson 1999, 208). What does the concept of the law of humanity presuppose? To start with, conceptually, the law of humanity are laws in the name of humanity. The concept of the law of humanity makes two claims. First, it claims humanity as the sovereign entity of legal authority and in its name, given laws are issued. Second, it claims humanity is able to ground the law of humanity as juridical laws of necessity and universality for all human beings. By this token, the concept of the law of humanity claims humanity as a substance. Only humanity as the substance of all humans can make the claims mentioned above. A value or a

virtue cannot. A sovereign entity is, and must be, a substantive subject. Only a primary substance or a secondary substance—that is, shared family substance—can be such a sovereign, substantive subject. However, a primary substance cannot issue laws of necessity and universality for all human beings. Only a secondary substance—that is, shared family substance—can issue laws that have universality and necessity to all members of its family. Therefore, only humanity as the family substance of all human beings can be the needed basis for the law of humanity as laws of universality and necessity.

This leads us to the concept of human rights. The concept of human rights presupposes not only the concept of a substantive subject, but also the concept of a family of beings. First, human rights are entitlements that must be claimed and possessed by a substantive subject. Second, human rights are entitlements in virtue of a human status. A human status, by definition, is a familial status or a status in the family of beings called humankind and named by humanity. Thus, even if human rights are claimed by an individual person as a primary substance, they are claimed as entitlements of belonging to family beings named by a secondary substance. Third, humanity as a substance naming a family or species of primary substances called “human beings” is an Aristotelian secondary substance described above. In sum, the concept of human rights conceptually presupposes the concept of humanity as a secondary substance. All the same, if the principle of human rights can be, and are, applicable to all human persons, all human persons necessarily share a common human identity and human status. All human persons can necessarily share a common human identity and human status if and only if humanity is the shared family substance of them. That is to say, where there are a common human identity and a common status of all human beings, there is humanity as their shared family substance. In sum, principles of global justice exist. This presupposes that all human persons necessarily share some commonalities, which presupposes that all human persons necessarily share the same family substance and belong to the same family of beings. Thus, to claim that global justice exists is to claim that humanity is the universal substance of all human persons.

III.

Principles and norms of global justice define a way of human living. If this way is a justified way for all humankind, if it is the way of necessity and universality for

all humankind, it must be consistent with humanity as the universal substance of all humankind. Kant claimed: “Out of the crooked timber of humanity, nothing straight could be built”. We should insist that no way which is inconsistent with, and thus crooks, humanity as the universal substance of all humankind is a justified way of human living. By this token, the source of the validity and justifiability of global justice is that it is the way of human living consistent with humanity as the universal substance of all humankind. Every Aristotelian secondary substance or the universal substance of a family of beings has its natural and healthy way of existence, continuity, and growth. Correspondingly, the most natural, justified and legitimate way of existence for all members of a species or family of beings is the way consistent with the universal substance of this species or family of beings. For example, tomato has its way of existence, continuity, and growth for all kinds of tomato as apple has its way for all kinds of apple. The Chinese Daoist master Laozi called such a natural way the “*Dao*”, warning that whatever violates the *Dao* will perish. By this token, humanity as the universal substance of all humankind has her way of living. This way is called “global justice”. In other words, global justice is the natural, healthy way of human living consistent with humanity as a substance. It is the natural, healthy way of human living, which is necessary and universal. For this reason, it makes sense for us to say that the principle of global justice is a principle of natural law.

Jean-Paul Sartre claimed that existence precede essence; persons first turn up on the scene, then define themselves. The ramification of Sartre’s view is that there is no *a priori* essence of X that defines what is the legitimate, healthy way of X’s existence. Sartre’s view has insight but is also one-sided. If existence preceded essence, then there could be existence without essence. However, there can be no existence without essence. One can claim that what do not exist cannot have essence. It makes no sense to say that X exists but have no essence. For the present study, what matters here is that we cannot claim that X exists without belonging to a family of beings, or otherwise X would be unintelligible and we would be in no epistemic position to call it “X”. When we claim that X exists, we claim at least two things. First, we claim that X exists as a member of a kind of beings. We may still not be able to claim the exact family of beings to which X belongs. Nevertheless, we do claim that X is a member of a family of beings. We do claim that when X come into existence, its Aristotelian secondary substance is inherent and inborn with it. Second, we claim that X’s family substance also determines what way of existence is natural, justified, necessary, and universal to

all members of the family of beings to which X belong; our task is to locate the way for X. In Sartre's case, a person who turns up on the scene is a human person—that is to say; s/he embodies the universal substance called “humanity”. S/he will define himself/herself with existential attributes later, but her/his humanity (substance) is inborn and inherent when s/he comes into existence. Equally crucial, a person's humanity determines that a person can have freedom, and freedom is the natural, justified way of human existence, while slavery is not.

This leads us to the concept of cultural toleration in global justice. As defined by various international treaties, global cultural toleration is a norm of global justice at our time. This should not be a surprising. Global cultural toleration is a norm of global justice because it is a norm consistent with humanity as the universal substance of all human beings. Since humanity as the universal substance of all human beings is necessarily embodied in persons (as primary substances) growing in different cultures, it necessarily demands recognition of and respect for different cultural modes of embodiment of humanity. The recognition that humanity is naturally embodied in diverse individual persons (as primary substances) calls for toleration of different embodiments of humanity in different individual persons. This in turn calls for the respect for toleration of different cultural modes in which individual persons (as primary substances) exist and grow. Thus, the 1995 *Declaration of Principles of Tolerance of the United Nations* claims: “Tolerance is respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world's cultures, our forms of expression and ways of being human.” (www.un.org). Michael Walzer also indicates, “Toleration makes difference possible; difference makes toleration necessary.”(Walzer 1997, xii). Meanwhile, humanity as the universal substance of all humankind mandates that those principles and norms of global justice must be necessary and universal to embodiments of humanity in all persons. Global cultural toleration recognizes and respects this natural mandate of human living and is necessary and universal for all human beings to make humanity, not crooks humanity. It is thus a valid, justified norm of global justice that imposes the obligations of justice.

In short, the validity, legitimacy, and justifiability of the norm of global cultural toleration as a norm of global justice is that the norm is naturally consistent with humanity as the universal substance of all human beings; it is necessary and universal for all human beings to preserve and grow their common humanity. Accordingly, that which is true of global cultural toleration is also true of the norms of human rights and crimes against humanity. Humanity as a

substance names a family of beings called humankind. Therefore, all members of the human family, or humankind, have human rights. Any offences against the human family—that is to say, crimes against humanity—must to be legally prosecuted. In other words, the validity, legitimacy, and justifiability of the norms of human rights and crimes against humanity as norms of global justice is that they are naturally consistent with humanity as the universal substance of all humankind; they are necessary and universal for all human beings to preserve and grow their common humanity.

Brian Orend indicates that “a human right, like any other rights, is not a property of persons; rather it is a reason to treat persons in certain ways.”(Orend 2002, 18). We should treat Orend’s view with some care. A human right is a necessary attribute of humankind or that which a human being is entitled to by necessity. In this sense, it can be conceived as or said to be a property (though not a material property such as a house or a car). At the same time, the norm of human right indicates the way of how human beings ought to treat one another. In sum, a human right is a necessary attribute of humankind and constitutive of the natural, healthy way of human living. Moreover, a stronger claim can, and should, be made here. The way which the norms of human rights and crimes against humanity define as the justified, necessary, and universal way of human living. This is consistent with humanity as the universal substance of all humankind. This is why the principles of human rights and the crimes against humanity are part of the law of humanity. The law of humanity are natural laws and define what is the most natural, legitimate, healthy, necessary, and universal course of human living.

IV.

In conclusion, at the end of the day, the concept of humanity and the concept of global justice are inseparable. In essence, global justice is giving due to humanity as the universal substance of all humankind. Global justice mandates a duty to humanity and is defined by “the law of humanity.” Notwithstanding, it singles out a class of offences called “crimes against humanity.” In sum, global justice in terms of humanity, that is the ideal of our epoch. This much we know, and this much we ought to know.

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