MEANING HOLISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN BHATRHARI AND QUINE

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Abstract: The present work objectively evaluates the theory of meaning proposed by Bhatṛhari and Quine. This statement elucidates the underlying semantic and metaphysical presuppositions inherent in the theory of meaning. An endeavor has been undertaken to establish the relevance of Bhatṛhari in the ongoing discourse around meaning holism in modern scholarship. This study has undertaken a holistic examination of the emergence of holism in the works of Bhatṛhari and Quine, although within distinct contextual frameworks. In Bhatṛhari's meaning theory, the akhaṇḍapakṣa posits that language (šabda) serves as the fundamental unit of meaning. This perspective enables an encompassing sentence and word meanings analysis within the holistic grammar framework. Quine posits that the nature of meaning is grounded on empirical evidence and is inherently holistic. "The meaning of a sentence" depends on its indication of truth, particularly in theoretical sentences. These sentences derive their indication from being part of larger sets of holistically related sentences, rather than in isolation. Quine has advanced the aforementioned semantic premise in his holism and confirmation holism theories. An attempt has been undertaken to establish a correlation between Bhatṛhari's sentence holism (Tiwary 2008, 04) and Quine's theory of holism (Ghosh, 2022, 183).

Introduction

The present work presents a holistic analysis and evaluation of the theory of meaning put forward by Bhatṛhari and Quine. Semantic meaning has been a subject of interest for philosophers across different periods. The contemplation of the epistemological dilemma regarding the connection between thoughts, words, or sentences, and their referents or intended meanings has been a significant focus of intellectual inquiry both in Eastern and Western traditions. Despite being the most recent addition to current linguistics, the theory of meaning has emerged as one of its most dynamic and active fields. Recent Philosophers such as Bertrand Russell, Ayer, Frege, Wittgenstein, Carnap, and Quine have extensively examined the multifaceted nature of the issue of meaning in contemporary decades. The discourse surrounding the issue of meaning, as explored by the esteemed Indian philosopher Bhartṛhari, has remarkable linguistic and philosophical prowess. It is replete with insightful remarks that can significantly contribute to the elucidation of complex matters in contemporary discourse on this topic. This paper aims to provide a concise overview of the Bhatrihari and Quine theories of meaning, highlighting their relevance in scholarly discourse on linguistic topics about meaning (Raja, 1963, 03-06).

The concept of meaning holism pertains to the theoretical framework about the ascribed meanings of words and their interconnectedness with other words within a given language. This theory posits the concept of reciprocal reliance among all elements of knowledge of languages. Frequently, holistic theories are drawn from a broader concept of holism, which pertains to the holistic nature of mental /cognitive states. Therefore, the concept of meaning holism may be comprehended as a theoretical framework that exhibits interconnectedness with the discipline of philosophy of language. The essential principle of meaning holism can be summarized in the following manner: The interpretation of an expression is contingent on the entirety or a significant component of the linguistic system to which it is subservient. Several interpretations of the notion of meaning holism can be observed within the realm of philosophy of language, albeit sharing a common foundation in the proposition. The dissimilarities among the different notions of meaning holism are commonly attributed to

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variations in their applications. The statement can be divided into two distinct arguments. Firstly, a particular party asserts that the meaning of an expression is reliant on the entirety of the language system to which it is associated. Secondly, another party contends that the meaning of an expression is reliant on a significant component of the language system to which it is associated (Estrela, 2018, 258-270).

I. Bhatṛhari and Meaning Holism (Akhaṇḍapakṣa)

Bhatṛhari is a philosopher who emphasizes the holistic nature of sentences (Tiwari, 2008, 95). Bhatṛhari's theory of meaning holds a significant position within the field of theories of meaning, as it is considered a non-naturalist theory. The metaphysical non-dualism of Bhatṛhari, when linked to the domains of language (šabda) and grammar (vyākarana), brought about a significant shift in the philosophy of language. Furthermore, it contributed to the development of the concept of holism within the field of meaning theory. Emphasizing the concepts and views put forward by Bhartrhari, their significance in contemporary days has acquired heightened importance. The intention is to commemorate the profound and extensive nature of classical Indian academia and assess the extent of influence of classical Indian concepts.

Bhartrhari emphasizes the indivisible nature of the sentence, asserting that it cannot be fundamentally divided "pade na varṇā vidyante varṇeṣu avayavā na ca | vākyat padānām atyantaṃ praviveko na kaścana ||" (VP 1.73). You can break it into different parts when conceptually analyzing a sentence that seems one piece. This makes the "meaning," which is naturally "indivisible," seem like it is made up of different parts (VP 2.27; Pillai, 1971, 43). Neither letters nor words are made up of smaller units. Separating the word from its context does not reflect reality (Pillai, 1971, 15). The meaning of the sentence, its words, etc., cannot be separated, i.e., indivisible. There are no parts to the word (Ibid., 39). "śabdasya na vibhāgo sti kuto rthasya bhavisyati" (VP 2.13.). The sentence can be understood as a manifestation of consciousness undergoing a transformative process. Speech has an inner word principle that cannot be split up. This is shown using speech sounds, and speech has unity in sentences. (VP 2.30; Pillai, 1971, 43). The term "sphoṭa" refers to the concept of the word, while "pratibhā" pertains to its corresponding meaning. Meaning is an intrinsic principle that becomes evident through fragments of verbal meaning (VP 2.31a; Pillai 44). The speech and meaning, as integral components, are inherently interconnected and inseparable (VP 2.31b; Pillai, 1971, 44). "ekasyaivātmano bhedau śabdārthāv apṛthaksthitau" (VP 2.31). The sentence's meaning, being a cohesive entity, can be divided into separate clauses depending on its various aspects (VP 2.88; Pillai, 1971, 58). "avibhakte pi vākyārthe śaktibhedād apoddhṛte| vākyāntaravibhāgena yathoktaṃ na viruddhyate||" (VP 2.88).

Bhartrhari emphasizes that the sentence is a cohesive entity that cannot be fundamentally divided (VP 1.73). The sentence's meaning is likewise inseparable, i.e., indivisible (Ibid., 2.58). It is posited that sphoṭa represents the linguistic unit of a word, while pratibhā corresponds to its meaning. The word and its meaning are two facets of a unified entity and are not distinct. The practical analysis of a sentence and its meaning is conducted by considering the variation in evocative ability, known as "šaktibheda," by applying copresence and coabsence. Analyzing language structure involves examining the parts of speech and morphological groups such as stems and suffixes. On the other hand, the analysis of sentence sense involves classifying meaning, such as Jati, dravya, guna, kriya, samkhya, and so on. Likewise, "meaning" can be further categorised into primary and secondary classifications. Bhartrhari claims that the referent in a speaker's mind gives a word or a sentence its meaning. Additionally, the referent that rapidly comes to mind for the listener pertains to the semantic content of the word or sentence they have perceived. The speaker's expression may not necessarily have a corresponding object. Hence, regardless of inherent contradictions, a word's primary signification is its meaning.

Bhartrhari, an advocate of the akhaṇḍapakṣa perspective, posits that the sentence serves as the inner, indivisible and meaning revealing unit of communication" (Tiwari, 2008, 176). The sentence is perceived as a unified whole, with its constituent parts being inconsequential to its meaning. He defines the sentence as a "single integral symbol" ("eko navayavaḥ śabdaḥ"), which is manifested through the constituent letters and words it contains. The conveyed meaning is encapsulated by the vākya-sphoṭa, which refers to the sentence as a unified and inseparable linguistic symbol. The conveyed meaning of this concept is a sudden and immediate occurrence of profound understanding or intuitive perception, commonly referred to as "pratibhā." The meaning is devoid of any constituent parts. The lexical units lack inherent existence and serve solely as cues to assist the recipient in comprehending the intended message. Numerous challenges encountered in linguistic analysis about meaning stem from the prevailing premise that words are the fundamental units of thought. However, many of these challenges can be mitigated by relinquishing this assumption and acknowledging words as abstract entities within the language system, akin to roots and suffixes. The words are tangible in pragmatics (Raja, 1963, 09).

Sphoṭo, a sentence in sentence holism, represents a unit characterized by awareness. It is inherently inner, indivisible, meaning-revealing language, and capable of conveying meaning in a unified manner (Tiwari, 2008, 96). The sphoṭa doctrine, as expounded by Bhartṛhari, offers a holistic and meticulous examination of the phenomenon of speech. Initially, the phenomenon under consideration pertains to the auditory manifestations of linguistic units, specifically the vocalized articulations of phonetic elements, which are commonly referred to as vaikṛta-dhvani. The aforementioned sounds serve as evidence of the enduring prākṛta-dhvani, which is an abstract representation derived from the diverse vaikyta-dhvani-s. Alternatively, it can be regarded as the standard form lacking linguistically insignificant personal variations. The third stage of linguistic analysis is the sphoṭa, which refers to the complete utterance being viewed as a cohesive entity, functioning as an indivisible symbol within a language system. The sphoṭa is the entity that discloses the meaning, which manifests as an intuitive perception.

As pointed out by Tiwari, "The sphoṭa is a unit that reveals meaning. The word as sphoto is awareness; the meaning revealed non-differently by it is also awareness (pratibhā). While sphoto, as awareness of itself and of meaning, is an expressed being" (Tiwari, 2008, 335-336). The sphoṭa and the meaning are distinct facets of the speech-principle. Bhartṛhari appears to integrate the different facets of speech by aligning them with the three stages of speech manifestation: pasyanti, madhyama, and vaikhari, which correspond to sphoṭa, prākṛta-dhvani, and vaikṛta-dhvani, respectively. The sphoṭa doctrine, as advocated by Bhartṛhari, underscores the importance of regarding the sentence as an indivisible and integral symbol within language, once all metaphysical elements have been removed. Segmenting text into individual words, categorizing them as verbs, nouns, and other parts of speech, and further analyzing them into roots and suffixes, is a valuable tool for examining language. However, they do not possess inherent objective existence. However, the grammarian must not overlook these elements, as they significantly assist in studying language (Raja, 1963, 14-15).

According to Bhatṛhari, the determination of the meaning of a sentence is not exclusively dependent on its form, but is also influenced by contextual factors (Raja 49). In the Vakyapadiya (VP. 2; 253,267,268,335,338), Bhartṛhari repeatedly emphasizes the significance of contextual elements in interpreting linguistic expressions. The understanding of elliptical sentences is facilitated by the context in which they are used. Likewise, the determination of whether a word should be interpreted in its primary literal sense or its secondary metaphorical sense is influenced by contextual factors (Raja, 1963, 59).

According to Bhartṛhari, all phenomenal entities consist of two elements: jāti, which pertains to the real aspect, and vyakti, which pertains to the unreal aspect (VP, III. 1. 32; "satyam yat tatra sä jätir asatya vyaktayaḥ smṛtāḥ"). The specific details undergo modifications, while the concept of jāti remains consistent. The concept of the jāti represents the fundamental essence of various entities. "jāti" refers to the inherent existence or essence

present in objects, which can be understood as the underlying reality denoted by this term. Consequently, all actions observed in the world can be regarded as its visible expression. According to proponents of the dravya or substance theory of word meaning, the intended referent of a word does not necessarily have to be a tangible external entity. However, instead, the mental representation evoked within us of said entity (VP, III. 1. 19: anupravṛttirupām yām prakhyāyām ākṛtim viduḥ kecid vyavṛttirüpam tu dravyatvena pracaksate). The connotation is cognitive as opposed to a corporeal one. The presence of a physical object in the world does not necessarily dictate the existence of a corresponding mental image. This perspective aligns closely with the viewpoint espoused by the Vijñānavāda school of Buddhism (Raja, 77-78).

According to Bhartṛhari, the notion posits that speech and thought are inseparable components of a unified speech-principle (VP, II. 31: ekasyaivätmano bhedau fabdarthav apṛthak sthitau). A sentence is regarded as a cohesive and indivisible expression (VP, II. 1: eko navayavaḥ śabdaḥ.), and it means "an instantaneous flash of insight" (pratibhā) (VP. II. 119, 145). A thought lacks structure, as does an utterance. Bharthari's linguistic theory is predicated on the notion that the sentence is the fundamental linguistic fact and that words are unreal abstractions of the sentence. It is also important to comprehend what a sentence means as a whole. The distinctions between words and their meanings are valuable for studying language; they do not exist in and of themselves (Raja, 1993, 99). As pointed out by Tiwari, Bhatṛhari is a "sentential holist" and "his theory of sentential meaning is an indivisible unit" (Tiwari, 2008, 176). Tiwari also states, "For Bhatṛhari, Sentential meaning is the indivisible flash (pratibhā)" (178). For Bhatṛhari, "meaning is always meaning of language, which is naturally fit for conveying several meanings (sarve sarvātha vācakāh)" (Ibid., 179).

II. Quine and Meaning Holism

The concept of meaning holism is a theoretical framework that considers sentences in a language as interconnected entities, rather than isolated units, to derive meaning within the overall system of a language. Quine's primary focus lies in examining the semantic implications associated with "theoretical sentences" in the context of a "scientific theory" framework". The term "holism" refers to a semantic thesis. As per the thesis, the attribution of meaning applies to the entirety of sentences rather than individual sentences. Quine says that to comprehend the "meaning of a statement," one must comprehend the meanings of all the other statements in the system. This is because the "meaning of a statement" relies on the other statements that are linked to it. Quine posits that the significance of an individual expression depends on its membership within a larger whole. The term "meaning holism" is employed to describe this concept. If we want to know what "snow" means, for instance, we need to become familiar with it in the context of several different sentences. Quine proposed that linguistic representations serve as the repository for cognitive output, while sensory output is dispersed across the discourse. The comprehension of meaning does not involve any form of compartmentalization. Thus, the concept of meaning becomes holistic (Dummett and Heck, 1997, 71-80).

In his masterpiece "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," Quine posits that evaluating any statement cannot be undertaken in isolation, but must consider its surrounding contextual framework. The renowned maxim attributed to him is as follows: "Our statements face the tribunal of sense experience only as a cooperative body" (Ibid., 41). Hence, the notion of "meaning" assumes a holistic character. Quine has devised a strategic approach to establish meaning holism, encompassing the following arguments. First, he critiques the "verificationists' theory of meaning" by highlighting its inherent fallacies. Secondly, he challenges the "dichotomy between analytic and synthetic." In this third argument, he presents the concept of "indeterminacy of translation" to illustrate the indeterminate nature of meaning. All of these arguments have been thoroughly examined systematically.

Quine refutes the position of reductionism. Logical positivists argue with the intention of "The Meaning of a statement is the method of empirically confirming or inferring it" (Quine, 1952, 37). He is not in agreement with this perspective. When two statements are verified using the same method, they are considered to have the same meaning. Logical positivists believe that "synonymy" or "sameness" is essential for establishing meaning. In other words, a statement's credibility hinges on whether or not it can be corroborated by experience, and the "meaning of a word" or "statement" is intrinsically associated with experiential correlation. There is a "linguistic component" to a statement and a "factual component." In Quine's opinion, the linguistic and factual components are inextricably intertwined.

> Our statements about the external world face the tribunal of experience not individually but only as a cooperative body (Ibid., 41).

Nevertheless, by adopting particular conceptions of "epistemological holism," a considerably less robust and more reputable theory regarding meaning would suffice in directing us towards the notion of "meaning-holism" (Cozzo, 2002, 06-07).

Quine encompasses the verificationist principle, which posits that the determination of meaning depends on empirical evidence. A sentence that lacks observable consequences and is not analytic is deemed cognitively meaningless. The focal aspect to emphasize in this context is the underlying assumption of this theory, which posits that it is possible to analyze individual sentences in isolation to ascertain their empirical content. Quine strongly disagrees with this aspect of empiricism, which he terms the "dogma of reductionism." As pointed out by Quine:

> The dogma of reductionism survives in the supposition that each statement, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit of confirmation or infirmation at all: my countersuggestion….is that our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body (Quine, 1952, 41).

Quine formulates his concept of "meaning holism" by drawing upon the ideas of confirmation holism proposed by Duhem and the notion of verificationism about meaning. In the field of physics, Duhem introduced the holist thesis. He states, "An Experiment in Physics Can Never Condemn an Isolated Hypothesis but Only a Whole Theoretical Group" (Duhem, 1991, 183). Quine highlights the relationship between meaning and evidence and the importance of empirical content in the realm of meaning. To a significant extent, he adhered to the empiricist tradition. In his work titled "Ontological Relativity and Other Essays," he explicitly articulates his stance.

> If we recognize with Peirce that the meaning of a sentence turns purely on what would count as evidence for its truth, and if we recognize with Duhem that theoretical sentence has their evidence not as single sentence but only as larger blocks of theory, then the indeterminacy of translation of theoretical sentences is the natural conclusion (Quine, 1969, 80-81).

Quine's alignment with the empiricist and positivist traditions is reinforced by his emphasis on identifying meaning through evidence.

Quine employs the "holism thesis" to refute the analytic-synthetic distinction, laying the foundation for his holistic epistemological framework. In his work titled "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," he presented his own philosophical framework known as epistemological holism. In his piece of work "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," Quine's foremost contention in opposition to "analyticity" is that other complicated ideas solely clarify it. Ideas like "meaning," "necessity," "synonymy," "proposition," and "definition" are some of these (Sober and Hylton). As an illustration, it can be argued that the statement "bachelors are unmarried" possesses analyticity due to its truth being derived from the definitions of the constituent terms within the sentence.

Quine operates within the framework of analyticity, which he defines as the property of a statement being true solely based on its meanings, independent of empirical facts (Quine, 1952, 21). Quine criticized the "Analytic/Synthetic distinction," arguing that it requires the ability to independently evaluate propositions ("truth" or "falsity"). Moreover, he argued that this assessment would be detached from other propositions and the external world in the case of analytic propositions. According to his perspective, the notion of isolation is deemed unsustainable. The comprehension of any given sentence is rendered unattainable without the prior assumption of a significant foundation of beliefs about the world. Furthermore, individual sentences derive meaning solely through their contribution to the entirety of empirical knowledge concerning the world. Given the lack of empirical evidence, it is impossible to dismiss the possibility that alternative, equally well-supported beliefs could be adopted to explain the same empirical data. These alternative beliefs may conflict with ours, but could yield comparable pragmatic success regarding explanatory or predictive capabilities. From this perspective, meaning is intrinsically linked to individuals' preexisting beliefs, which are solely influenced by empirical evidence. This assertion posits that synthetic knowledge renders all knowledge contingent, making analytic knowledge unattainable. According to Quine, the widely accepted notion of analytic truth can be seen as nothing more than a deeply ingrained habit, which he refers to as dogma.

In Quine's words, the boundary between "Analytic and Synthetic propositions" is unclear and misleading. He contends that statements that appear purely informative and analytic are not inherently immune to revision based on empirical evidence. Consequently, Quine asserts that the philosophical error lies in accepting the existence of such a distinction and advocates for its rejection. In order to illustrate, it appears uncontentious to assert that the statement: (1) asserting that all unmarried men are not married, or (2) the statement claiming that all bachelors are not married, can be deduced analytically from the inherent meaning of the concepts involved in the proposition and their internal connections. Quine posits that proposition (1) can be conceptualized as analytic. The terms "un" and "not" function to express negation, thereby ensuring the truth of the proposition regardless of the specific meaning attributed to "married." The assertion does not hold for (2); for (2) to possess meaningful analyticity, it is necessary to provide a clearly defined method to articulate that "bachelor" and "unmarried man" share identical meanings without relying on empirical knowledge. Quine posits that formulating a definitive criterion for designating a proposition as analytic is unattainable. He presents three seemingly plausible approaches that could serve as a criterion, only to demonstrate each approach's inherent shortcomings, thereby rendering them inadequate for establishing a reliable criterion.

Quine's critique examines the possibility of finding a less problematic alternative to analyticity and suggests the concept of "synonymy." However, it is important to note that meaning and synonymy are not interchangeable concepts. Meaning can be understood as assigning names or references to entities. The phrases "creature with a kidney" and "creature with a heart" pertain to similar entities in the world, yet they possess distinct meanings. Thus, synonymy and meaning should not be confused. That logically factual statements can be categorized as "analytic" is a claim to which Quine does not object. In the aforementioned illustration, "all unmarried men are not married" will retain its truth value regardless of the various interpretations of the term "married," as long as we comprehend the logical operations of negation and the prefix "un-." On the other hand, the aforementioned example, "all bachelors are not married," represents an analytic proposition that lacks logical truth. The terms "bachelor" and "married" exhibit a linguistic connection, although this association is not inherent within the proposition itself. To comprehend the relationship, it is imperative to incorporate a holistic range of empirical knowledge, thereby rendering the sentence incapable of being deemed true solely based on its inherent meaning. The concept of analyticity posits that the meaning of a word should not be conflated with the referent to which the word pertains.

For the concept of interchangeability, salva veritate, to be considered feasible, it is imperative to delineate the specific conditions under which such interchangeability can be legitimately employed. The circumstances at hand can be elucidated by invoking the notion of necessity, which can solely be explicated through its function in ascertaining the analyticity of propositions. However, employing this explanation would entail engaging in circular reasoning. In order to comprehend the concept of synonymy, it is imperative to possess prior knowledge of the meanings associated with the subjects under consideration. A non-circular definition of "analytic" does not exist. Understanding these concepts and their interrelationships can only be acquired through engagement with the external world. More specifically, this engagement occurs within the linguistic community that originated these concepts. Since the meaning of the concepts involved derives empirically from such interactions with the world, the linguistic convention of synonymy cannot be described without appeal to synthetic knowledge, making it contingent on knowledge of the world. The statement's veracity is no longer solely based on its inherent meaning, independent of any experiential context. Even propositions that appear unquestionably true can be influenced by this phenomenon. We may strongly resist revising such beliefs, but cannot (Quine, 1952, 42-43). It defends holism by dismissing "the Analytic and Synthetic distinction." Quine declares "the distinction between the analytic and synthetic" is quantitative. That "Analytic/Synthetic truth" exists in two distinct categories is not an epistemological distinction, in Quine's view. In the Quinean framework, our truths or statements are considered integral components of a comprehensive system confirmed through a holistic approach.

According to Quine, translation, or the determination of meaning, is indeterminate. So, Quine raised the question regarding the determination of word meaning, specifically inquiring about the empirical evidence or experiential basis that could ascertain the meaning content of a given word. He argues that behavioral evidence is the sole evidence that can be deemed acceptable, as meanings must be accessible to the public. However, it is important to note that behavioral evidence alone is insufficient in determining the intended meaning behind a person's words. This is because there will always be multiple interpretations that are consistent with the observed behavior. For instance, what potential behavioral indicators could be utilized to ascertain that when a speaker utters the word "Gavagai," they are referring to the concept of a "Rabbit" as incompatible with an "undetached rabbit part" or a "time-slice of a rabbit"? Quine draws the inference that, due to the underdetermination of meaning by empirical evidence, the existence of an objective determination of the meaning of a word is negated. The indeterminacy thesis does not pertain to the individual correctness, rightness, or truth of translation manuals. In a specific language, the meaning of a single sentence relies on where it fits in the larger collection of sentences in that language. The indeterminacy thesis shares a comparable perspective with meaning holism due to its reliance on Duhem's conformational holism. This pertains solely to scenarios where two or more translations are behaviorally equivalent in a manual. The indeterminacy thesis posits that the selection among these translations lacks determinacy.

Quine's philosophical framework entails the empirical investigation of the concept of meaning, emphasizing its essential quality of being publicly accessible. In his piece of work "Ontological Relativity and Other Essay" Quine was legitimate when he said that the concept of meaning is intrinsically linked to behavior. Language is "a social art which we all acquire on the evidence solely of other people's overt behavior under publicly recognizable circumstances" (Quine, 1969, 26). Quine views meaning as public and social, especially about evidence or practical application. This alignment with verificationism, particularly in Quine's case, is explicitly manifested through behaviorism. Quine's seminal illustration of translation and meaning revolves around a thought experiment that requires extreme translation: translating a wholly unfamiliar language from an unknown linguistic source. This translation does not allow for any pre-existing knowledge and prompts us to consider that translation is "indeterminate." There are no objective criteria for determining whether two linguistic expressions are synonymous, and therefore no standards for identifying intentions. The

existence of a holistic theory of interpretation assumes the presence of specific normative principles, which are incompatible with Quine's holism.

Quine's preference lies with the moderate holism perspective on meaning, which posits that the determination of meaning for a proposition occurs holistically. This entails that the meaning of a proposition is reliant on its relation to other propositions within a given language and expression. In this context, "meaning" refers to either a corporate entity or a holistic phenomenon. This means that to comprehend a proposition, it must possess comprehension of a collection of propositions within the given language or expression.

Conclusion

The present work presents a comparative analysis between Bhatṛhari and Quine about their respective theories of meaning. Both Bhatṛhari and Quine espouse a holistic framework when it comes to understanding the meaning of a sentence. They both engage in a profound discourse regarding the semantic meaning of a given sentence. Bhatṛhari's primary focus is examining sentence meaning, particularly emphasizing language as it is employed in practical contexts. Quine rejected "reductionism" and the "analytic-synthetic distinction" because he believed in holism and naturalism. Quine believes in physicalism, which says that physical entities and processes can sum up everything. On the other hand, Bhatṛhari is primarily concerned with studying language and its structures as a linguist. In contrast, Quine views language as a network of interconnected sentences. Bhatṛhari's concept of holism is developed through an analysis of the understanding of the word "meaning." In contrast, Quine's concept of holism is derived from an analysis of the comprehension of the meaning of numerical terms, requiring a comprehension of the 'meaning' of the "whole sentence" in which they are used. Bhatṛhari espouses the concept of holism within theories about language and meaning. At the same time, Quine endorses holism within a theory that faces experience not on the level of individual sentences, but as an integrated whole. The holism of Quine applies to a group of sentences, while that of Bhatṛhari applies to a single, whole sentence. Unlike Bhatṛhari, who promotes the idea of sentence holism, Quine promotes the idea of theory holism.

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