

THE PROBLEM OF PERCEPTIBILITY OF DIK (SPACE), KĀLA (TIME), AND KRIYĀ (MOTION): A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE DEBATE BETWEEN THE NAIYĀYIKAS AND THE MĪMĀMSAKAS

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Abstract: This paper attempts to concentrate on the examination of the thesis that dik (space) and kâla (time), and kriyâ (motion) are perceptible. The first objective of this paper is to discuss the views of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas concerning the perceptibility of dik (space) and kâla (time). The second objective of this paper is to discuss the debate between the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas with regard to the perceptibility of kriyâ or karma (motion). Regarding the perceptibility of kriyâ or karma (motion), the Naiyāyikas, the Prābhākaras, and the Bhāṭṭas differ. According to the Prābhākaras, kriyâ is never perceptible, and it is to be inferred. However, according to the Naiyāyikas and the Bhāṭṭas, in normal conditions, kriyâ or karma is perceptible if the locus of kriyâ is perceptible. We shall try to support our interpretation from the respective schools of philosophy texts.

Both the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā philosophies are realistic and pluralistic. Being Realists, they admit the thesis that the object of cognition can exist independent of cognition and the cognizing mind. In other words, the external object exists as something over and above cognition. They also admit that the nature of things can be known through *pramāṇa*-s. Neither the Nyāya philosophy nor the Mīmāṃsā philosophy admits the functional or transitory state of worldly objects as *only apparent*. For them, ‘something exists’ means it exists ultimately. Both these philosophies in this context differ fundamentally from the views of the Idealistic Buddhist schools and Advaita Vedānta. Despite being realistic and pluralistic, the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā philosophers differ from each other in many issues. Again, the Mīmāṃsā Philosophy has two schools represented by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara Miśra, respectively. They also differ regarding the perceptibility of motion, which is in Sanskrit called *kriya* or *karma*. Let us first discuss the debate between the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā philosophers concerning *dik* (space), *kāla* (time) etc. Both the Prābhākaras and the Bhāṭṭas agree with the Naiyāyikas to the view that both *dik* (space) and *kāla* (time) are ubiquitous (*vibhu*) in nature. For them, though *dik* is one and *kāla* is one, we conceive both as many because of certain conditions (*upādhi*). In this respect, *dik* and *kāla* resemble *ākāśa*. Both the Nyāya and the Prābhākara philosophers admit *śabda* as the *guṇa* (quality) of *ākāśa*. However, according to the Bhāṭṭas, *śabda* is a separate variety of substances. For the Naiyāyikas and the Prābhākaras, *dik*, *kāla*, and *ākāśa* are not perceptible, whereas, for the Bhāṭṭas, these three are perceptible. The perceptibility of *ākāśa* is complicated and a

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matter of long debate, which is difficult to accommodate in this short expository essay. For brevity, let us concentrate on the examination of the thesis that *dik* (space) and *kāla* (time) are perceptible. Again, regarding the perceptibility of *kriya* or *karma* (motion), the Naiyāyikas, the Prābhākaras, and the Bhāṭṭas differ. According to the Prābhākaras, *kriya* is never perceptible, and it is to be inferred. However, according to the Naiyāyikas and the Bhāṭṭas, in normal conditions, *kriya* or *karma* is perceptible if the locus of *kriya* is perceptible. In section A of this essay, we shall discuss the main arguments of the debate between the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas concerning the problem of perceptibility of *dik* and *kāla*. Nārāyaṇa Bhāṭṭa discusses the most popular presentation of the Bhāṭṭa view in *Mānameyodayaḥ*. He gave the list of perceptible objects in the following verse: ¹ *Indriyavyatiriktāni dravyaṇyeṣāmcajātayah/ prāyeṇa guṇakarmāṇi pratyakṣāññītivakṣyate//21//*

That is to say, according to Nārāyaṇa Bhāṭṭa, perceptible objects are *indriyas*, *dravyas* other than *indriya*-s, *jāti* inhering in *dravya*-s, and the maximum number of *guṇa* and *karma* or *kriyā*. Accordingly, it is admitted that *dik* and *kāla* are perceptible. However, the Nyāya philosophers do not admit this thesis of perceptibility of *dik* and *kāla*. All perceptible objects must have two necessary characteristics; say *mahat-parimāṇatva* and *udbhutarūpatva*. These two conditions are necessary for the perceptibility of any object. There is the absence of *rūpa* (formless) in *dik* and *kāla*, so these are devoid of perceptibility. The existence of *dik* and *kāla* is established by inference. In the section devoted to *Sādharma-vaidharmya-prakaraṇa* of *Padārthadharmasamgraha* Prāśastapāda states that “*trayāñāmpratyakṣarūpavattva-dravatvāni*.” ² It implies that according to the Vaiśeṣika philosophers, earth, water, and fire are three perceptible substances, but *dik* and *kāla* are non-perceptible. According to the Prābhākaras, like *rūpavattva* (having formability), *sparśavattva* (having touch-ability) too is a necessary condition for the perceptibility of a substance. Since *dik* and *kāla* are devoid of touch-ability, *sparśasūnya*, these cannot be claimed as perceptible. Here a pertinent question may arise: Why do the Bhāṭṭas admit *dik* and *kāla* as perceptible? How far do they give the reasons satisfactorily? It will lead us to the following sub-section A1.

A1. The Bhāṭṭas admit the perceptibility of *dik* and *kāla*. For them, *kāla* is perceptible by all *indriya*-s. It is a distinguishing mark (*mudrā*) of the Bhāṭṭas. Most philosophers admit that amidst all external sense organs, only organs of seeing and touch can yield the cognition of substance. It means that the other three sense organs cannot yield the cognition of substance. There is no such instance of cognition where *kāla* (time) is not cognized as the object of cognition (*naso'stipratyayoloke yatrakālonabhāsate*), and this indirectly shows that *kāla* is cognizable by all sense-organs. Whatever is the object of cognition, it is cognized either as an object of past or present, or future. The object of memory is always cognized as something of the past, the object of perception is always cognized as a matter of present

¹ See, *Mānameyodayaḥ*, (text with Bengali Translation by DinanathTripathi), Sanskrit College Research Series, No. CXXXVIII, Calcutta, 1990, p. 44.

² *Prāśastapādabhāṣya* named ‘*Padārthadharmasamgraha*’ (text with Bengali translation by Anamika Raychoudhury), published by T.K Raychoudhury, Kolkata, 2017, p.87.

(*samvandhamvartamanancagrhyatecakṣurādina*), and the object of indirect impression (*anubhava*) becomes something of past or present or future in consideration of the contextual variations. Suppose we see a lump of ashes, and now we can infer that there was a fire. However, in the case of the perception of smoke in a hill, we can infer that the hill in the context has fire. We can very well infer the forthcoming rain from the perception of the raising of dark and thick clouds in the sky. As we already said that in the case of indirect impression, we have the cognition of the past, present, and future. Past, present, and future are the terms that qualify *kāla*. Since the object of perception is always operational in the present time, it is to be admitted that here “time (*kāla*)” it is perceptible. Whatever is cognized in perception is graspable only by sense-organs. It is also to be admitted that as the qualification or adjective of the object of perception is *kāla*, “time” and therefore, *kāla*, time is also to be admitted as perceptible. For the same reason, “present-ness (*vartamānatva*)” is a necessary condition of all perceptible objects. There is no other alternative than to admit ‘time’ as something perceptible by all sense-organs.

A2. There may be further arguments in favor of the perceptibility of ‘time’ (*kāla*). When we perceive two events, we cognize them as either in order of former and latter or as simultaneous. Similarly, some events seem to happen first, some as slow or late. This sense of order, simultaneity, rapidity or late happening of events etc. is characteristic of “time.” If sense-organs cognize objects with these characteristics, then the object itself with these characteristics must be admitted as perceptible. It is interesting in the passing to see how Jayanta Bhaṭṭa³ apprehended two objections in the form of *pūrvapakṣa* (opponent’s position). Similar arguments we see in the Bhāṭṭas in favor of the perceptibility of *kāla*. Let us consider the following instances: “The chair is upon the platform,” “The chair is nearer to me, but the table is away from me,” and “This house has a tank in the western side and a garden on the eastern side” are some of the examples where the objects of perceptual cognition are cognized as having spatial-relation (having *deśikasambandha*). Therefore, as in the afore-said cases of perception of the objects having spatiotemporal relations (*deśika-kālika-sambandha*), it must be admitted that space and time are also perceptible in those particular cases. However, though both *dik* and *kāla* (space and time) are perceptible for the Bhāṭṭas there are differences between the two. Though *kāla* is perceptible by all sense-organs, *dik* is not. The objects of our internal (mental) perception, such as pleasure-pain, etc., though appear as the qualities of the self, they never appear as space-characterized objects. To emphasize on this point Jayanta Bhaṭṭa says, “*avamsāmānyatvāt pūrvāparādi pratyayagamyādigapipratyakṣā veditavyeti.*”

A3. The thesis that “*dik* (space) and *kāla* (time) are not perceivable because they are objects devoid of any arisen form (*udbhūta-rūpa*)” is the view of the Nyāya

³ “*pratyakṣagamyatāmevakecit kālasyamonvate/viśeṣatayākārya protyayepratibhāsanāt // kramenayugapatkṣipramcirātktamitīdrśāḥ/ pratyayānāvakaḥpatekaryamātrāvalamvanāḥ//.*” Then he concludes by saying *na hi viśayātīśayamantareṇapratibhāsātīśayo vakalpate*. Jayantabhaṭṭa, *Nyāyamañjarī*, ed. Suryanarayana Sukla, Beneres, Chowkhamba, 1971 reprint (1936).

philosophers. Philosophers of the Bhāṭṭa school of Māṃsā have objections to it. For them, what is known in the cognition gained through sense-organ as the instrumental cause (*indriya-karaṇaka-jñāna*) is the object of perception. This rule is logically sound. Let us take an example. If a person's eyes are not open, that person cannot see anything characterized by *deśa* or *kāla*. A necessary condition for such a perceptual cognition is that the eye of the cognisor must be "open". Our visual sense-organ is the instrumental cause (*karaṇa*) for such cognitions. It is established by the afore-said example of reason based on similarity and dissimilarity. Both *dik* and *kāla* are to be admitted as cognized by the visual sense organs or eyes. Jayanta Bhāṭṭa, a Naiyāyika supported this contention by saying, "nacānudghātākṣasyakṣiprādipratyayodayaḥ/tadbhāvānubidhānenatasmātkālastucākṣuṣaḥ/." (Ibid.) Again, it is true that a thing having a form or not having a form cannot be a necessary condition for its perceptibility or non-perceptibility. Cow-ness (*gotva*), pot-ness (*ghaṭatva*) etc. are perceptible despite not having any form. On the other hand, the ultimate indivisible elements (*paramāṇu*) of earth or fire, though does have form, neither of these are perceptible. It shows that in the case of *Dik* and *Kāla* "being not having a form" (*rūpa-rahitattva*) cannot be called the sufficient condition for the imperceptibility of *Dik* and *Kāla*.

A4. Now here arises another essential question: How the Naiyāyikas would respond to the rejoinder given by the Bhāṭṭas? They could simply say that "the Bhāṭṭas' answer is inappropriate." The Naiyāyikas never said that all objects "having no form" are imperceptible. For them, apart from the substance (*dravya*) there are other independent ontological categories such as quality (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), universal (*sāmānya*), absence (*abhāva*) etc. that are perceptible. As they all are different from the substance, these are devoid characterized by a quality (*guṇarahita*), and as quality, it has the tie of inherence with substance. Form (*rūpa*) is a kind of quality and the other objects just mentioned are formless. The Naiyāyikas also admit this. The statement that "all formless objects are imperceptible" is the logical ground (*hetu*) of the arguments of the Bhāṭṭas. The claim is that "all objects having form are perceptible" and therefore, the *paramāṇu* of the earth is perceptible. However, this is not justified, according to the Nyāya philosophers. If anything is an object of perception, it must have a perceptible form (*udbhūtarūpa*). The *paramāṇu* of earth etc. though, have some form, but that same form is not *udbhūta-rūpa* which is only perceptible.

So in our humble opinion, the Nyāya thesis that "the *paramāṇu* of earth, etc. are not perceptible" is likely to act as merit instead of blemish. *Iṣṭāpatti* is not capable of refuting any thesis; rather indirectly gives a defense to the thesis in question. We know that the controlling characteristic (*niyāmakatva*) of the perceptibility of any substance is the presence of perceptible form, and there is no exception to this rule. Both *dik* and *kāla* (space and time) are substances, and neither of these has perceptible quality. It is the reason for which the Nyāya philosophers say that the existence of these two types of substance is imperceptible and is to be admitted as known by inference.

A5. The Nyāya philosophers can give further arguments in order to refute the view of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas. It is indeed true that the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas,

despite recognizing the perceptibility of *dik* and *kāla* there is a further compulsion for them to admit that these two substances are exhibited (*pratyamāṇa*) as adjectives of other objects. However, a little reflection would suggest that all perceptible objects are not cognized as adjectives (*viśeṣaṇa*) of other objects. At least in some cases, those objects are cognized as *viśeṣya* or nouns and as an independent. Let us consider an instance like "John is seen with a stick in hand ." Here 'the stick' independent of any person, can be an object of cognition. It is not a necessary condition for a stick to be seen as an adjective with a person. From this analogical instance, the Nyāya philosophers can argue that as *dik* and *kāla* as objects are never seen as an independent subject (*viśeṣya*) or conditioned by other character/s as a subject (*viśeṣya*), it is not proper to consider them as perceptible. Furthermore, what is reflected as the character (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the object in the arguments supported with an example of the Bhāṭṭas is, in fact, nothing but *upādhi*, the condition of *dik* or *kāla*. These two ubiquitous substances, namely *dik* and *kāla*, each by nature is one and indivisible. What is characterized by distinct quantity is called *mūrtta-dravya* (existent things)? They are used as *upādhi* or the condition of *dik* such as east of, west of, near to, distance from etc. In the like manner, there arisen or effectuated objects are used as *upādhi* or condition of *kāla*, and because of this, imagine different parts of the same *kāla* and call it using the adjective "before", "after", simultaneous, order, motion etc. Neither *dik* nor *kāla* is not by nature cognized as a "character" adjective (*viśeṣaṇa*). The view that *dik* and *kāla* are not cognized as subjects (*viśeṣya*) is admitted by the Bhāṭṭas themselves. So we cannot claim the perceptibility of *dik* and *kāla* with the arguments given by the Bhāṭṭas. In this perplexing situation, the Naiyāyikas argue that *dik* and *kāla* are always to be known by inference. In support of their contention, the Naiyāyikas further say that it is not always true to say that *atiśaya*, excess in appearance (*pratibhāsa*), is caused by the excess (*atiśaya*) of "object." In many instances, because of differences in the cause or instrumental condition, we have differences in cognition. To make it clear, let us take an example. "That is this John" is an instance of recognition. This kind of cognition is perceptual (*pratyakṣātmaka*), but this kind of cognition is not only due to the sense-organ. However, there is sense-object-contact (*sannikarṣa*) between Smith and the sense-organ. A person who had seen Smith earlier has the recognition of Smith now again through perception. However, one who did not see Smith earlier cannot have such recognition, although that person does have the perception of Smith. What might be the cause of such recognition? The answer would be this: the person who had perceived Smith earlier has that impression inhering in his Self. That impression, though imperceptible, may appear as a subsidiary episode, and for this reason, the person in the question has that type of recognition. The person who did not have any perceptual cognition of Smith earlier cannot have such an impression of having inherence relation in his Self. Therefore he does not have any recognition of Smith. Because of this analysis, the Naiyāyikas say that just as impression itself, despite being imperceptible, may act as an auxiliary or subsidiary condition in the case of perception-oriented recognition. Similarly, *dik* and *kāla* function as the auxiliary conditions of perception, although they are imperceptible. As a result, we have the perceptual cognition of nearness, distance, simultaneity etc. Each *dik* and *kāla* is one

and devoid of any internal difference. Moreover, they do not appear as an adjective to any other object in perception; that is to say, they do not appear as a “perceptual noun,” and all admit this.

We have discussed the debate between Naiyāyikas and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas regarding the perceptibility of *dik* and *kāla*. Let us now (in section B) consider another question: Is *kriya* or *karma* (motion) perceptible? Here the debate, unlike the debate regarding the perceptibility of *dik* and *kāla*, centres around the Naiyāyikas and the Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas.

B1. We have seen that in some cases, due to other conditions, both the Naiyāyikas and the Bhāṭṭas admit the perceptibility of *karma* or *kriyā*. However, according to the Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas, all cases of *karma* or *kriya* are imperceptible. Here an interesting consideration may arise. In the *Śābarabhāṣya* of the *Jaiminiśūtra* “*saṅkhyābhāt*” (1.1.20), both *buddhi* and *karma* are described as “imperceptible.”⁴ The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas.⁵ view seems to be more consistent with *Śābarabhāṣya*. Though usually, the Bhāṭṭas follow the line of philosophical thinking of Śābara Swāmī, it is difficult to explain why they differ from their usual adherence to Śābara Swāmī. However, in our usual understanding, we claim that the *karma* (*kriyā*) or motion inhering from the perceptible object is also the object of our perception. Suppose a person I have seen in a standing position starts walking. We can very well perceive that person’s ‘un-moving-position’ in the earlier position and the ‘moving-position’ in his subsequent state of affairs. Now, if we were to admit the imperceptibility of all *kriyās* or *karmas*, we would not be able to distinguish between what is “unmoving” and what is ‘moving’ among objects. Since there exists agreement and disagreement (co-presence and co-absence) between sense-object contact and the cognition of motion (*kriyā*) and that cognition is the effect of sense-object-contact, it is justified to admit it as perceptual. If this is universally acceptable, then why do the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas consider all *karma*-s as imperceptible? Is it because of their blind adherence to *Śābarabhāṣya* that they disagree with admitting the universally established truth? What might be the possible arguments in favor of the position of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas? For this, we are to see the next section.

B2. To address the afore-said questions, the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas might argue that it is true that we do not directly perceive motion (*karma* or *kriyā*). However, we perceive it in the effects like orderly difference (disjunction) and conjunction produced from *karma*-s. After this episode of conjunction and difference in continuation of *karma*, the motion is cognized by inference. A moving object always moves from one place to another place, and for this, the object in question must destroy the conjunction with the previous place and then establish new conjunction with the subsequent place. If that moving object were the cause of this

⁴ Śābara Swāmī, *Mīmāṃsāsātrabhāṣya*, ed. M. Nyāyaratna, Bibliotheca Indica 45, Calcutta, Asiatic Society, 1889; also see, Bhūtanātha Saptatūtha (Chattopadhyay), *Mīmāṃsādarśanam* (Bengali translation and annotation of *Mīmāṃsāsātra* of Jaimini with *Bhāṣya* of Śābara, 2 vols, Basumati Sahitya Mandira, Calcutta, 1345 Bengali Era (1938 AD), vol 1, p. 62.

⁵ For details see, Śāliknātha, *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, ed. A. Subramanya Śāstri, Benares, Benares Hindu University, 1961.

continuous conjunction-disjunction or division (*vibhāga*) process, then we are to admit that it would always be in motion. Nevertheless, it does not happen as apprehended. That is why there must be some cause which is something over and above this conjunction-disjunction process, and this must be known by inference. This additional cause is *karma* or *kriyā*. In this way, the existence of *karma* is established. Conjunction-division-continuity etc. is known by perception, and only after this *kriyā*-s are inferred as caused by conjunction-division continuity.

B3. Here arises another essential question: Let us take an example, “Smith is moving.” It is a sentence expressing the cognition of the perceptible object. Here the act of motion (*kriyā*) is usually recognized as something perceptible. However, suppose the conditions of perception and inference are found simultaneously operative in any particular case. In that case, the case in question must be admitted as perceptible because the force of the conditions of perception is more powerful than the conditions of inference. It is thus futile to use inference in knowing something knowable by perception. When a person can perceive an elephant, no intelligent person feels any need to employ inference to know the elephant’s existence from the roaring of the said elephant.⁶

However, why the Prābhākaras are, so eager to say that *karma* or *kriya* is imperceptible? They argue that though a moving object is perceptible, its motion is not perceptible. Though all perceptible objects contain motion, motion itself, by rule, cannot be said to be perceptible. Whenever we perceive the sun, we see it as non-moving and not a moving object. Nevertheless, there is motion in the sun, which is known by inference. We see the sun in the east in the early morning, upon our head in mid-noon, and in the evening in the west as the sun-set. If there were no (daily) motion in the sun, then this variation of its existence we cannot explain. We never say that the motion of the sun is perceptible. The same is the case with the earth. It moves around the sun, and we cannot understand through the perception that the earth is moving. So it is pertinent to say that a moving object may be perceptible, but the motion inheres in the said object is not perceptible. Due to erroneous cognition, we think that with sense-object-contact, there are both “co-presence and co-absence affairs” (*anvaya-vyatireka*) in our cognition of motion (*kriyā-jñāna*). However, the fact is that because of sense-object-contact in that case, the cognition of the continuous process of conjunction-division takes place, and from such cognition, the cognition of the caused-motion arises. There would be the context of irrelevancy (*anyathāsiddhi-prasaṅga*), just as in case the potter’s father is an irrelevant factor in the production of the pot because the sense-organ itself, in reality, becomes the cause of the cognition of motion. If this is so, then the sense-organ cannot be called the cause of the cognition of motion. From this, it becomes evident that motion cognition cannot be called perceptible. After producing the cognition of the determinants like conjunction-division of motion, the sense organs become weak and cannot produce the cognition of motion. In short, according to the Prābhākaras, only the moving

⁶ We may recall Vācaspati Mīśra for his interesting remark made for a similar situation, “na hi karaṇidṛṣṭecītkāreṇatamanumimate prekṣāvantaḥ.” See, Vācaspati Mīśra, *Tātparyatīkā*, ed. R. S. Dravid, Varanasi, 1925.

object and the subsequent conjunction and disjunction produced by the motion (*kriyā*) are perceptible, but the motion itself is imperceptible.⁷ Co-presence and co-absence by any sense-organ are exhausted when we perceive the conjunction and disjunction. So, there is no other way than to use inference for such cognition.⁸ It is an example of *kārya-liṅgaka-anumiti* (inferential cognition which is gained through effect as the *liṅga* or reason). That is why a philosopher of Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā named Varada- viṣṇu Miśra, who is also known as Bhaṭṭa Viṣṇu, has beautifully expressed this fact. Bhaṭṭaviṣṇu has said, “*parokṣam karma karmatvādādityagatakarmavat/ Akṣtadbhāvabhāvitvam kṣīṇam liṅgasya darśane//*,” that is to say; “Action is super-sensuous, because it is an activity, like the activity present in the sun. The presence of the sense of sight where that action is present is exhausted with the perception of the probans.”⁹ If we carefully examine what is said in the second half of the above verse immediately, it clarifies our common-sense way of looking at things.

B4. But in the history of Indian philosophy, we see that both the Naiyāyikas and the Bhāṭṭas have vehemently objected to the afore-said position of the Prābhākaras. They might argue that the inference cited by Varadaviṣṇu Miśra has the blemish of *asādhāraṇahetu* (uncommon reason). Because the reason (*hetu*) used in that inference only *pakṣatāmātra-vṛtti* (having only the nature of being subject).

They would further say that if the cognition of the motion of Smith is exclusively a matter of the continuity of conjunctions and divisions, then in the instance of “Smith moves” instead of a complex unitary cognition, we would have simple cognitions like “Smith is having conjunction and division” (*saṃyujyatevibhāyateca*). Apart from this, both conjunction and division are qualified by two qualities. In that case, it is to be admitted that the object, which is the locus of conjunction and division, is to be inferred as having motion. Let us consider another example. Suppose in a trunk that is non-movable by nature, the birds come and sit and afterward leave the trunk. Here the fact of conjunction and disjunction or division is equally applicable with the trunk and the birds. Now do the Prābhākaras admit that a trunk is also a moving object? We move on the earth, and we have both conjunction and disjunction with a part of the earth by our legs. Should we say instead of “I am walking” “the earth is walking”? It is not a fact verified by our experience. When we see pieces of stone in the river's tide, we understand the tide as moving and not the stone. So the object for which conjunction-disjunction etc. are taking place is inferred. When the locus of the motion (*kriyā*) is a *paramāṇu*, the ultimate indivisible unit of the object is by nature beyond the range of perception (*atīndriya*). The relation of conjunction and division or disjunction of *paramāṇu* with other objects is also, by nature, beyond the range of

⁷ *Prakaraṇapañjikā of Śāliknātha Miśra*, ed. A. Subramanya Śāstri, Benares Hindu University, 1961, p.79.

⁸ “Nanu saṃyogavibhāgābhyāmeva karmāmeyam. Tenendriyānvayavyatirekau saṃyogavibhāgadarśnopakṣiṇu. Tasmādananyathāsiddhatvamasiddhameva.” See, *Mānameyodaya of Nārāyaṇa* (An Elementary Treatise of the Mīmāṃsā), edited with an English Translation by C. Kunhan Raja and S. Suryanarayana Śāstri, The Adyar Library and Research Centre, Series No 105, Madras, 1975, p. 283.

⁹ *Ibid*, 283.

perception (*atīndriya*). In that case, the motion cannot be known through inference. Again, it may still be argued that motion is known through inference from the so-called conjunction and divisions belonging to “the body and the space.” Nevertheless, this is absurd because though the body is movable, space (*dik*) by nature is devoid of motion. The body's conjunction or division (disjunction), an object of perception, cannot serve as a sufficient condition for motion inferred in the perceived body.

In view of these difficulties, the Naiyāyikas do not admit the Prābhākara's thesis that “motion (*kriyā*) is known through inference.”¹⁰ The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas advance the similar arguments against the thesis of Prābhākara-s. For the Bhāṭṭas, what is said by Bhāṭṭaviṣṇu is logically faulty; because non-perceptibility or inferability, according to Naiyāyikas, is conditioned by a universally concomitant relation or *vyāpti* arising from the absence of the not otherwise explained co-presence and co-absence of the sense-organ. otherwise explained co-presence and co-absence of the sense-organ'.¹¹ It may lead to the absurdity of assuming motion (*kriyā*) in the post because of “the conjunction and disjunction of a hawk” with the post.¹² Even if, for the sake of argument, we admit the non-perceptibility of motion (*kriyā*), then we cannot say that there is motion because, for any conjunction or disjunction, the presence of non-inherent cause (*asamavāyi-kāraṇa*) is a necessary condition. In such a case, the conjunction of the body with the self (*ātmā*) exercising volition can serve as a necessary condition. Here the admission of motion (*kriyā*) becomes redundant. However, “how does the conjunction with the body of a soul exercising volition produce the effect called conjunction in some space which is different from its abode and what is inherent in that abode?”¹³ So motion is to be admitted only as of the non-inherent cause (*asamavāyi-kāraṇa*). Nevertheless, this argument is not tenable, according to the Bhāṭṭas. Because even the conjunction between two *anu* (atom) is cognized to give rise to a third one as its effect, and it is an admitted promiscuous rule that one is different from the locus of that conjunction and from what is inherent in that locus.

Because of the above consideration, the Bhāṭṭas, like the Naiyāyikas and unlike the Prābhākara, say that motion (*kriyā*) is known by perception alone.¹⁴

¹⁰ *Nyāyakandalī* of Śrīdhara, ed. D. Jha, Varanasi, Sanskrit Vishva-Vidyalyaya, 1963, p.195; also see, *Śāstradīpikā* of Pārthasārathi Miśra, (with English translation by D. Venkatramiah) Baroda Oriental Institute, 1940, p.71.

¹¹ See, *Mānameyodaya* of Nārāyaṇa (An Elementary Treatise of the Mīmāṃsā), edited with an English Translation by C. Kunhan Raja and S. Suryanarayana Sastri, The Adyar Library and Research Centre, Series No 105, Madras, 1975, p. 283.

¹² “saṅyogavibhāgamātrasyaiva netragocaratve tābhyāṃ ca karmānumāne śyenasamīyogavibhāgabhyāṃ sthānāvapikarmakalpanaprasaṅgāt.” Ibid, p. 284.

¹³ Ibid, p. 288.

¹⁴ “ataḥ pratyakṣeṇaiva karmasiddhiḥ,” Ibid, p. 289.