A Review of *Cognitive Phenomenology* by Elijah Chudnoff (New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2015, Pp. 182, ISBN: 978-0-415-66025-9)

*Cognitive Phenomenology* is a volume in the *Routledge's New Problems of Philosophy* series edited by Jose Luis Bermudez, Texas A&M University, USA. Its author is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Miami, USA, who has previously published *Intuition* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013).

Cognitive phenomenology is a contemporary variant of phenomenology. The debate about the legitimacy of cognitive phenomenology has lasted for two decades. This volume is brimmed with innovative, challenging, and insightful ideas involving in issues concerning both contemporary phenomenology and foundation of cognitive science. Those scholars who are actively doing research in the domain of phenomenology will see this volume as a significant contribution to the literature because it elaborates and rigorously defends a position about the experience of thinking, which has been a highly controversial topic. For those scholars who are intrigued by the problems of cognitive phenomenology, this volume provides a comprehensive, lucid, and stimulating introduction. This volume may also be used as a textbook for graduate and advanced undergraduate students as it provides a highly informative guide and overview together with helpful chapter summaries. The addition of further readings and a glossary allows one to increase their understanding of the mind, consciousness, experience, perception, and cognition as it relates to philosophy in general as well as phenomenology in particular.

*Cognitive Phenomenology* would draw a wide range of scholarly interest because it offers a comprehensive, all-inclusive treatment of the frontier issues and current debates concerning the major areas of phenomenology. As well, these issues have wide impact on other areas of philosophy such as epistemology, philosophy of the mind, philosophy of language and ethics. The author's discussion is developed throughout six chapters following a general introduction, which explains the general nature and present status of the debate about cognitive phenomenology as well as the fundamental concepts involved in the debate. The logical structure of this deployment goes in the sequence of the following topics: introspectability, phenomenal contrast, irreducibility of cognitive phenomena, the streams and temporal structure of conscious experience, phenomenal holism and the interdependence of sensory and cognitive states, and intentionality and mental

representation. Moreover, this topical sequence exhibits a rigorous logical structure.

What makes this volume controversial is the author's relentless defense of the very notion of cognitive phenomena, which is apparently self-contradictory from the perspective of analytical philosophy. This notion is also radically opposed to the position held by traditional phenomenologist such as Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. On the classic views of phenomenology, experiential phenomena or phenomenological states, for example, the phenomenon of what it is like to have a headache, are characteristically non-cognitive, non-doxastic, and non-epistemic. Thus, a cognitive phenomenon or experience of cognitive activity, for example, the experience of what is like to believe that so-and-so is the case, would be tantamount to a non-cognitive state of cognitive activity. In other words, the author is defending a position that cognitive states have non-cognitive features. Hence, it is interesting to see how the author dissolve the puzzle and explain how cognitive phenomenology is a philosophically legitimate enterprise and how it is worth exploring.

One of the crafty arguments for the legitimacy of cognitive phenomenology that the author makes in this volume is that phenomenal differences made by some cognitive states are irreducible to and independent of those made by sensory states. Thus, cognitive phenomenal states and perceptual phenomenal states are different and each stands in its own right. This line of argument connects to another one, namely, the argument from phenomenal intentionality to the effect that some cognitive phenomenal states feature phenomenal intentionality. Specifically, phenomenal characters of some cognitive states determine their intentional states, namely, their intentional objects and representational contents. Therefore, if you are conscious that you are thinking, then your inspective consciousness of your thinking determines 'what' your thinking is directed at and what you are thinking of. This theory singles out phenomenal intentionality as a distinct type of intentionality, though it is not quite clear about how this second line of argument helps distinguish cognitive phenomenal states from perceptual phenomenal states.

The author hopes that by individuating cognitive phenomenal states, the above-mentioned puzzle of contraction in phenomenology would be dissolved, and cognitive phenomenology would have a proper object of study. However, individuation of cognitive phenomenal states would entail the distinction between sensory phenomena and cognitive phenomena. As a result, cognitive

phenomenology would consistently mirror traditional phenomenology, which might be now renamed sensory phenomenology. Though this radical conceptual move is interesting, it goes against the main current in cognitive studies that sees increasingly more connections than differences between perception and cognition. The theory of cognitive phenomenal states might dissolve the logical puzzle; but it may also introduce a puzzle concerning the difference between conscious states and phenomenal states. If conscious states could be made identical with phenomenal states (so that we are conscious of something if and only if we are in a phenomenal state), then it would seem the mind is essentially phenomenal, and everything else which characterizes the mind is secondary. However, consider exactly the role our consciousness plays within our mental life? One can be conscious without being rational; but one cannot be rational without being conscious. Would the following theory be more plausible? I think; therefore, I am conscious that I think. If so, the consciousness of cognitive states does not have to be phenomenal, and it may well be just cognitive.

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