

A CRITICAL STUDY ON INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE (PRĀTIBHĀ-JÑĀNA)

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Abstract: A few privileged can foresee events to happen as future events. This type of fore sighting is called prātibhā pramāṇa. It is a variety of Extra-Sensory Perceptions like telepathy. It is valid knowledge and is direct. Like self in the world, many things cannot be known through ordinary sense organs. The inadequacy of intellectual power indicates the existence of a world beyond our sense organs' reach. Therefore, Gopināth Kavirāja, the celebrated Indian thinker, concludes that a man has some faculty that enables revealing that world. That faculty is known as pratibhā. However, the existence of these things, e.g., God, has already been admitted into Indian philosophy. We can know them with some supernatural power called pratibhā. There are two types of perception- ordinary and extraordinary. Opposite of the ordinary concepts, liṅgaśarīra is known through the supernormal faculty known as pratibhā, and Pratibhā means a flash of light that reveals the objects. Pratibhā may be both higher and lower. The supreme wisdom of the seer is included under the first category, and the extraordinary perception like telepathy, etc., belongs to the second one. Pratibhā is one in its essence but differing in kind, Pratibhā can make a man yogi or seer, and Pratibhā is accepted by the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems. Kavirāja accepts two types of yoga intuition: yukta (eternally conjoined) and yuñjāna (occasionally conjoined), and there are yukta yogins and yuñjāna yogins. To the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, yogaja pratyakṣa is of two kinds – yukta pratyakṣa and yuñjāna pratyakṣa. However, the Mīmāṃsakas do not accept the validity of any sort of pratibhā cognition. Nevertheless, the Naiyāyikas have refuted all the arguments given by the Mīmāṃsakas. They have established the justification of yogic perception, i.e., intuitive knowledge (prātibhā-jñāna). However, the tradition of Vyākaraṇa accepts all knowledge as revealed (pratibhā). The intelligible being of language expresses it non-differently. The language and meaning are flashings of consciousness of which the former is expressed, and the latter is what the former expresses non-differently.

When we repeatedly concentrate upon an object, each act of concentration leaves an impression on the mind, and impressions of objects get accumulated in the self and constitute a permanent basis of our knowledge. They produce the highest form of our knowledge if they are arranged in order. ¹

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¹ *Tatra Kevalamabhyāsātpṛakṣaye Kaphamedasoḥ. Śarīralāghavam labdhvā laṅghayanti yothocitām. Iha vijñānanyastu saṃskāro vyavatiṣṭhate. Kramopacīyamānosau parātīśayakaraṇam.* The Nyāyamañjari of Jayantabhatta ed. Pt. Surya Narayana Sukla, The Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Benares City, 1936, p. 97.

The inner organ of ordinary men is covered with passions, and so they cannot rise to the highest stage of knowledge (omniscience). When all the impurities of the mind of a sage are burnt away by the one-pointed practice of meditation, any object is directly apprehended by the pure inner organ of the sage. When they consume all the inner drosses and attain high proficiency in the art of concentration by continuous meditation, they acquire the property of being omniscient with the help of their faculties of *pratibhā*.²

A few privileged can foresee events to happen as future events. This type of fore-sighting is known as *prātibha pramāṇa*. Such kind of fore-cognition is not hallucinatory. It is not a case of doubt. Again it is not even negated by a contradictory judgment. It does not arise from a defective sense organ. Hence these cases of foreseeing or cognizing should be treated as pieces of valid cognition.³

Prātibha pramāṇa is a variety of Extra-Sensory perceptions. Some critics doubt such knowledge on the ground of accident. It may be sure that knowledge in the form of judgment “My brother will come tomorrow” is compelling, though his coming is totally accidental or unexpected⁴ to the critics.

This kind of valid knowledge, i.e., *prātibha-jñāna* is direct but not indirect. Its directness is objected to on the ground of its non-sensuousness. This objection does not stand. It is the inner organ that determines it. Someone could argue that if the inner organ would by itself feel about external objects, there should be no blind person in the world. The reply to this objection would be that the inner organ intuits the external objects perceived by the eyes. Therefore, the objection that there should be no blind man does not arise.

The critics point out that the direct awareness of a sage is not a case of perception as it is not conditioned by a definite set of conditions as normal perception is. One may answer that the transcendental knowledge of a sage is perceptual. If it is not direct, it can never be the knowledge of a sage. Another criticism may regard the non-perception of foresight which refers to a present thing. Kumārila advocates that a thing that is present and comes in contact with our sense organ can only be perceived. This objection cannot be accepted. The Mīmāṃsakas themselves have stated that an object with its future property is also apprehended by perception. Provided that is so, then the perception that my brother will come tomorrow indicates a future event.

² *Tathaiva bhāvanābhyāsād yogināmapī mānasam. Jñāne sakalavijñeyasākṣātkāre Kṣamaṃ bhavet Asmādadeścā rāgādimalābarāṇadhūsam. Mano na labhate jñānaprakarṣapadavīm parām. Pratyūhabhāvanā bhyāsakṣapitāśeṣakalmavam. Yoginām tu manaḥ śuddham kamivārtham na paśyati. Yathācu teṣām rāgādi pramāṇamavakalpate. Tathā 'pavargacintāyām vistareṇābhīdhāsyate. Tadevam ksinadosanamdhyānavahitacetāsam. Nirmalam sarvavisayam jñanam bhavati yoginam, p. 98.*

³ *Api cānāgatam jñānamasmadāderapi ka cit. Pramāṇam prātibham śvo me bhrātā aganteti drśyate. Nānārthajam na samdigdham na bādhavidhurīkṛtam. Na duṣṭakāraṇam ceti pramāṇamidamiṣyatām.*

⁴ *Ka cidvādhakayogaścedastu tasyāprāmānatā Yatrāparedyurabhyeti bhrātā tatra Kimucyatām. Kākatāliyamiti cenna pramāṇapradarśitam. Vastu tat Kākatāliyamitti bhavitumarhati.*

Since the perception of an ordinary person presents a future event, the extraordinary perception of a sage presents future *dharma* (the merit arising from the performance of the acts as laid down by the Śāstras or scriptures). So the argument against omniscience contributed by Kumārila stands rejected from the Nyāya standpoint.

The theory of *pratibhā* may be apparent to us if we try to understand Gopinath Kavirāja's view on *pratibhā*. Let us discuss the theory in the light of his view. Many things in the world cannot be known through ordinary sense organs. The inadequacy of intellectual power indicates the existence of a world beyond our sense organs' reach. Therefore, Gopinath Kavirāja, firstly in Indian Philosophy, concludes that there is some faculty in a man that enables revealing that world. That faculty is called *pratibhā*. (Kavirāja, 1984, 3) Many things, such as self, God, *liṅgaśarīra* (subtle bodies), etc., cannot be known through sense organs. However, the existence of these things is already admitted in Indian Philosophy. Indian philosophers have explicated the nature of things, and there are supernormal means of realizing them in Indian philosophy. We can know them with some supernatural power called *pratibhā*. There are two types of perception – ordinary or normal and extraordinary or supernormal. Ordinary perception of an object is possible through our sense organs. Opposite of the ordinary concepts like *liṅgaśarīra*, God, etc. is known through the supernormal faculty known as *pratibhā*.

Pratibhā means a flash of light that expresses the objects. This light is "the wisdom characterized by immediacy and freshness." (Ibid.) *Pratibhā* is such wisdom having the capacity to illumine the objects newly again and again. (Apte, 1973, 358) *Pratibhā* has been explained as "super sensuous and suprarational apperception." (Kavirāja, 1984, 3) the knowledge attained through *pratibhā* is not always of a higher type. *Pratibhā* may be both higher and lower. The Supreme wisdom of the seer is included under the first category, and the extraordinary perception of clairvoyance, etc., belongs to the second category. (Ibid.)

Pratibhā is an effect; it is not eternal. Many individuals can become seer (*Rṣi*) when they acquire *pratibhā* with the help of their constant *sadhana* (the continuous practice of yoga) though they were not so at their very early stages of lives. However, according to Kavirāja, very few persons are born genius, and *pratibhā* is eternally identical with the Supreme spirit only concerning them. When a person acquires *pratibhā* or seerhood, it is not for the time being, but it is eternal. That is to say, it has a beginning but no end. The meaning of the term "*Rṣi*" is a seer. (Kavirāja, 1984, 4) A seer sees past, present and future with his transcendental vision. For this reason, *Rṣi* is mentioned as Kavi in the Upanisad. (*Īśopaniṣad, Mantra – 8*) Here, "*Kavi*" implies *Krāntadarśi* or omniscient. This vision is similar to a searchlight because all objects are revealed under its scope. 11 A person who acquires this vision is regarded as nothing but Brahman or the Kavi in accordance with *Īśopaniṣada*.

Kavirāja points out that there is another, a secondary faculty found in the literature. Our interest in art objects again and again in search of aesthetic pleasure is an impulse that is due to *pratibhā*. This *pratibhā* regulates our all behavior. When a person thinks of an object as pleasurable or painful, he is drawn towards or away from

it, and it happens because of this *pratibhā* that generates a flash from within an individual. (Kavirāja, 1984, 18)

Perhaps Kavirāja points out that there is no difference between *pratibhā* for the attainment of aesthetic pleasure and functioning in ordinary behavior. However, we suppose that there is a sharp distinction between them. Our experience shows that the former is mysterious, but the latter is not. Therefore, the difference, at least in the degree of *pratibhā*, is accepted. In the first case, the degree of *pratibhā* is stronger than in the second. According to Kavirāja, all kinds of activities, aesthetic or ordinary, are done by an impulse possible by *pratibhā*. This impulse may be higher or lower in accordance with *the pratibhā* of an individual. According to Kavirāja, *pratibhā* is one in its essence but differs in kind by the following: it can be developed by a steady and continuous effort or produced automatically by virtue of *Adrṣṭa* (unseen factors). Kavirāja does not give much importance to this type of *pratibhā* because, in the case of aesthetics, it can give temporary spiritual pleasure to a person. However, it is sufficient for humankind. Therefore, Kavirāja emphasized that *pratibhā* which can produce a permanent vision or make a man seer or *yogin*.

Kavirāja asserts that *manas* or mind stands face to face with the pure self and with realities of all things. This vision is called *ārṣajñāna* or *pratibhā*. (Ibid., 5) As the mind stands face to face with pure self, the mind can generate one's deep concentration or yoga through the power of the sense organs, and thus their power becomes increased. If the power of our eyes can be increased through this type of deep concentration, one can perceive any object anywhere. In the same way, one can hear any sound anywhere by increasing the power of the ear. In the same way, all the objects can be known by a person or a *sādhaka* (an aspirant) through experience, which is produced by the concentration of the mind on the objects. (*Nyāyasūtra*, IV/2/38-50) his type of experience, according to Vaiśeṣika, is possible by the merits of the previous birth or this birth and following the restraint (*yama*) and observance of rules by which a proper state of mind and body can be continued. The transcendental perception of a *yogin* is possible by this mental practice of concentration. (*Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, IX/1/11-15)

According to Jayantabhaṭṭa, *pratibhā* exists in a place where there is a sudden flash in the life of an ordinary individual at some rare moments but not in the case of yoga. There was a strong objection of Kavirāja against this view of Jayantabhaṭṭa. He points out that in both the cases, *pratibhā* is one in essence but differing in kind since it is generated automatically in a person following his *Adrṣṭa*. (Kavirāja, 1984, 5) Kavirāja's view will be convinced when we state that Naiyayikas accept this yoga or *pratibhā* as a *pratyāsatti* or contact. This supernormal contact may comprehend the whole external world in a single moment.

Pratibhā is accepted by the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems. Following Viśvanātha Nyāya Pañcānana, Kavirāja accepted two types of intuitive yoga knowledge. There are two types of yogins: *yukta* (eternally conjoined) and *yuñjāna* (occasionally conjoined). (*Bhāṣā-Pariccheda*, Verse No. 65) Thus *yogaja pratyakṣa* also is of two kinds: *yukta pratyakṣa* and *yuñjāna pratyakṣa*. A *yuktayogin* has attained spiritual perfection, and such intuitive knowledge of all objects is constant and spontaneous to him. The perception of *yuktayogin* is called *yukta pratyakṣa*. The *yogins* acquire the

power of perceiving all objects with their pure minds, free from all taints and one-pointed by constant concentration. (*Nyāyamañjari*, 1895, 106)

A *yuñjāna yogin* is a man who is on the way to perfection, and so he requires the help of concentration for occasional intuitive knowledge of things. Here a *yogin* requires *dhyāna*, *dhāraṇā*, etc. as additional subsidiary factors for the supernormal perception. The perception of a *yuñjāna yogin* is called *yuñjāna pratyakṣa*. The *yuñjāna yogin* has occasional flash regarding an object existing in the past, present, future, and imperceptible objects like space, atoms, etc. This *yogin* is endowed with a mind having two types of properties- a particular method of thinking (*cīntāviśeṣaḥ*) and power generated through the practice of yoga (*yogābhyāsajanitaḥ*). Both the methods are accessory to the attainment of transcendental perception.⁵

The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems believe in the Śruti, which is the fruit of *pratibhā*, and *pratibhā* belongs to Vedic seers. The Vedic *mantras* are poetry, and these *mantras* are composed or contributed by the Kavi or seers. To believe in Śruti is to believe in the product of *pratibhā*. These systems believe in liberation (*mokṣa*) or *apavarga*. In this state, an individual can realize the true nature of all things because of having possessed *pratibhā*. When a man can remove wrong knowledge from his mind through the constant yoga practice, he can be possessed by *pratibhā*. The nature of the world is revealed to an individual endowed with *pratibhā*.

The power of the sense organs of an ordinary man like us is limited. The Naiyāyikas point out that there can be natural or inborn variation in the capacity of sense organs. For example, the cat can perceive darkness also, and vultures can see an object from a very far distance from the sky. Sampāti, the king of vultures, saw the daughter-in-law of Daśaratha (Sītā) from a distance of a hundred yojanas. (*Nyāyamañjari*, 1936, 96) However, the human eye cannot see after a certain distance. The superior quality of perception varies in degrees, like the superior quality of the color white. A section of men attains the highest degree of perception if they develop in quality of the same. Those whose perception reaches the highest degree of perception are called sages. So we cannot deny the possibility of a higher degree of functioning of the sense organs of a living being. The most excellent perfection is constituted by the apprehension of subtle, remote, past, and future objects. (Ibid, 96)

Nevertheless, the Mīmāṃsakas, like Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, do not accept the validity of any sort of *pratibhā* cognition (yogic or commonplace). In his Ślokavārtika Kumārila Bhaṭṭa points out that just as commonplace *pratibhā*, not depending on perception, is not capable of determining anything, so also is the *pratibhā* of the *yogins*. (Ślokavārtika – 4.32) Sucharita Misra, the commentator, also holds that though the *yogins* and *siddhas* may have some *pratibhā* knowledge about future events due to *dharma*. They cannot be accepted as sure testimonies to determine any reality since they may be erroneous, just like *pratibhā* knowledge like- “My brother will come tomorrow.” (Ślokavārtika-tīkā – 4.32)

However, the earlier Naiyāyika admits the validity of *pratibhā jñāna* and meets the above objection of the critics. In the Nyāyamañjari, Jayantabhaṭṭa points out that

⁵ Prabhā Commentary on Verse No. 65, *Kārikāvalī with Muktaivalī*, ed. Śrī Śankarrām Sāstrī, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan, Delhi, 1988, p. 470.

sometimes valid intuitive (*pratibhā*) knowledge about future events is produced in us, such as when we know intuitively that my brother will come tomorrow. This knowledge is valid for it is not of the nature of doubt, it corresponds with the object, and it is not vitiated by any defect in the conditions of knowledge. If a fact contradicts this knowledge, then it is invalid. Nevertheless, when the brother comes on the next day, how can it call invalid? It is not an accidental coincidence (*kākatāliya*) because an event revealed through some source of knowledge (here- *pratibhā*) cannot be held to be an accidental coincidence (*kākatāliya*). (*Nyāyamañjarī*, 1936, 96) So, in the cases where a fact does not contradict the cognitions, *pratibhā* cognitions are regarded as valid cognition by the early Naiyāyika. Hence this type of intuitive knowledge (*prātibha-jñāna*) is not accidental or unexpected. *Pratibhā*, after Jayantabhaṭṭa, is a different source of valid knowledge.

The Mīmāṃsakas, like Kumārila, state that a man, possessed of the superior power of vision, perceives only visible objects. However, nobody comes across such superiority of sense-perception apprehending the transcendental objects like *dharma*, etc. *Dharma* is the merit arising from the performance of that acts directed by the scriptures. *Dharma* is known from the Vedic texts only. It can never be the object of perception. Again sense organs have limitations. Though the power of sense organs may be increased by practice, it still has limitations.

This type of criticism of Kumārila cannot be justified. It is true that though *dharma* is transcendental to normal sight yet, it is perceived by the sages or seers. It has been stated that though a very distant object and an object covered by darkness are beyond the reach of our normal eyes, they are perceived by Sampāti and a cat, respectively. (Ibid., 96)

In reply, Kumārila may say that if a sage perceives a transcendental object, he should also perceive smell, taste, etc., with his eyes. If someone imagines that an omniscient sage grasps every object of the universe through a single source of knowledge, he should admit that the sage perceives taste, smell, etc., with his visual organs. Kumārila's objection is not based on facts. The other sense organs of the sage have super-excellent powers like eyes. Hence the peculiar hypothesis that a sage perceives taste etc, with eyes is not to be conjectured.

The Mīmāṃsakas may point out that the Naiyāyikas cannot imagine that a sage perceives *dharma* with his eyes. In response, the Naiyāyikas hold that *dharma* is not invisible, like the taste, etc. The argument of the Mīmāṃsaka is based upon the misrepresentation of the above sentence. It is known that taste and similar qualities other than color are always imperceptible. The Naiyāyika reacts to the Kumārila's arguments and asserts that the later cannot say from his experience that a sage, though possessed of super-eyes, cannot perceive *dharma*. For *dharma* and the excellent power of the eyes of a sage are imperceptible to him. Therefore, Kumārila should not point out that *dharma* is not an object capable of being perceived with the eyes.

The knowledge of eternal *dharma* is only derived from the Vedic injunction, such as, should sacrifice “*yajeta*” etc. *Dharma* is the eternal fulfillment of duty. It has no limitation in the past, present, and future. We should not think that *dharma* is perceived with our moral eyes. However, it is not difficult for omniscient sages to

perceive it. A sage intuits *dharma* with his internal organ through the practice of constant meditation on it.

The justification of such intuition is that the internal organ can comprehend all objects without exception, and there is no such thing in the universe that disturbs its penetration. There are many examples to show those persons who have a clear and vivid vision of objects. Such visual perception is possible only through the constant practice of meditation. When we repeatedly concentrate on an object, each act of concentration leaves an impression behind. These impressions accumulate in ourselves. They constitute the permanent basis of our knowledge. They generate the highest form of knowledge if they are arranged in perfect order. (*Nyāyamañjari*, 1936, 97)

If the sages are the pioneer in knowing the true nature of *dharma* from the Vedas, then the well-established proposition that the Vedas are the only source of *dharma* is never contradicted. It is the final argument of the objector, e.g., the Mīmāṃsaka.

A reply to this objection is as follows: there is a truth in the above objection that sages are initiated into *dharma* by the Vedas. Later on, when they attain the fruit of meditation, the transcendental perception of *dharma* flashes in their mind. As a result, we can say that the ascertainment of the truth of the thesis that the Vedas are the only source of *dharma* becomes doubtful. Thus the argument offered by the Mīmāṃsakas against the possibility of a transcendental perception of *dharma* by the sages is not convincing. According to the Mīmāṃsakas, perception arises only from the contact of the sense organs with an existent object. The *sages cannot perceive dharma* because an existent object is only perceived.

The following argument has refuted the view that the scriptures are the only source of *dharma*:

Every word informs us only of known facts. The Vedas are nothing but the sum-total of words. So they possess the character of words. Each of the words cannot give us a piece of knowledge of an object not known before. In other words, words do not denote novel objects. The Vedas which are words do not signify novel *dharma*. *Dharma* is grasped by some other means of proof. Thus the Vedas are not only the source of *dharma*. A jar is knowable object; so it is to be perceived by somebody in the universe. All the counter arguments are easily available in order to silence the objectors. Therefore, the *sutra* on perception, put forward by the Mīmāṃsaka meant for the refutation of transcendental perception is actually irrelevant. (Ibid., 98-100)

S. Radhakrishnan has accepted the supremacy of *yogaja pratyakṣa*. He says, “By constant practice of meditation a man may acquire super sensuous vision, and can apprehend all objects near and far, past and future, remote and hidden. This highest kind of insight has the immediacy of intuition. What is miracle for us is a natural power of the sages...” (Radhakrishnan, 1962, 68)

According to some philosophers and psychologists, *yogaja pratyakṣa* has been developed into Extra-Sensory Perception. It is justified by the research conducted by distinguished philosophers and psychologists at the Psychological Research Society of England and Duke University, USA. The existence of a sixth sense or Extra-Sensory Perception is a real possibility, not a conjecture or mere delusion of the mind. Hundreds of scientists in the various laboratories in the USA, Canada, and England,

are working on data gathered from all over the world, such as psycho kinesis, forecasts, telepathy, intuition, deep meditation, and clairvoyance. (Sharma, 1995) The experiments conducted at these institutions establish that the senses perceive distant objects and actions without having contact with them.⁶²⁹ This phenomenon is called Extra-Sensory Perception. So Extra-Sensory Perception is a perception without any usual contact between the senses and the objects perceived. Reality is grasped not only by the five sense organs alone. Telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, and psycho kinesis are examples of paranormal phenomena perception.

The Indian philosophers, in general, and Nyāya philosophers, in particular, have accepted yogic perception, i.e., intuitive knowledge. It is admitted by some distinguished Buddhists like Dinnāga, Dharmakirti, and Dharmottara. Dharmottara points out that there are three stages in yogic perception. Finally, a *yogin* perceives the image of an object which is not vivid but has begun to be vivid. Here contemplation is in progress and is taking shape. In the second stage, the *yogin*, in his contemplation, perceives the object covered by a thin cloud. In the third stage, the *yogin* actually perceives an object vividly.

Now the question is: Is there any justification for yogic perception or intuitive knowledge? Though it is a kind of direct knowledge, we may consider whether it is really a case of perception or not. One could know some object existing in a remote place transcendently. It is challenging to verify the truth. Hence the question of transcendental knowledge is not beyond question. As such, knowledge is purely personal, secret, and non-communicable; one may challenge the same truth. If this is the case, the perceptuality or truth of such knowledge is difficult to establish as the verifiability principle fails here. If it is taken as perception because of its direct awareness, by which definition can it be taken as perception? The standard definition of perception given in Nyāya is as under:

The knowledge which evolves from the contact of the sense organ with an object is called perception (*īndriyārtha sannikarṣotpannaṁ jñānaṁ pratyakṣam*). There should be contact between a sense organ and an object for perceptual knowledge. In this case, the mind acts as a sense organ, and an object existing in a remote time and place is taken as an *artha*. The question remains unsolved regarding the contact between them. As such contact is not easily conceivable, the question of its validity may crop up. If this contact is beyond the range of direct awareness, it may not be accepted as perception. It is reasonable to describe it as something belonging to the metaphysical world.

In response to this criticism, it is said that in a broader sense, perception is to be taken as a direct awareness (*sākṣāt pratiti*). This directness (*sākṣattva*) may be defined as

⁶ The Psychological Research Society of England (of which Professor C.D. Broad was President for a number of years) and Duke University, U.S.A. have conducted several experiments to tackle the problems of Extra-Sensory Perception (E.S.P. and Telekinesis Motion at a distance without visible physical contact): L.P.N. Sinha: *Indian and Western Philosophy*, Classical Publishing Company, New Delhi, 1984, p.60.

something not arising from the instrumentality of other knowledge (*jñānākaraṇakam jñānam*). If a broader definition of perception is taken into account, transcendental knowledge is to be put under this due to having the form of direct apprehension (*aparokṣānubhūti*). Though this feeling is non-communicable, secret, and personal, it cannot be denied as an experience. It is not also correct to say that impersonal and communicable knowledge is always perceptual. We can know many things intuitively in our daily life, but these are not always communicable. From this, it is not proved that our experience is not true or direct. Therefore, the reality of yogic perception occupies a place in Indian epistemology.

Explaining Vaiyākaraṇas view D.N, Tiwari in his book “Language, Being and Cognition” observes *pratibhā* as meaning and meaning; it is the flashing of consciousness. He writes “few scholars interpret *pratibhā* as mind or intellect and then explain the sentential meaning as an object that figures in the *pratibhā*. For them, sentential meaning is actually an object of *pratibhā*, but ordinarily, *pratibhā* itself is called sentential meaning. It hardly makes any difference if flashes are identified with *pratibhā* because even in that case, the sentential meaning is emphasized as an idea or clear and distinct flash of awareness, and Bhartṛhari accepts those flashes or ideas as *pratibhā*.” (Tiwari, 2021, 388) *Pratibhā* is intelligible because language expresses, and language and meaning are the objects of knowledge. The language is *sphoṭa* that expresses its own nature first, then expresses its meaning non-differently, which we call *pratibhā*.

It is concluded that *Pratibhā*, whether it is intuition or expressed by consciousness, is direct knowledge that is without any mediacy of senses. Unlike the former, it, in the latter case, is meaning infused by *Sphoṭa* (intelligible being of language). It is self-veridical knowledge.

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- Tathaiva bhāvanābhyāsād yogināmapī mānaṣaṃ. Jñāne sakalavijñeyasākṣātkāre Kṣamaṃ*

*bhabet Asmādadeścā rāgādimalābarāṇadhūsaram. Mano na labhate
 jñānaprakarṣapadavīm parām. Pratyūhabhāvanā bhyāsakṣapitāśeṣakalmavam. Yoginām
 tu manaḥ śuddhaṁ kamivārthaṁ na paśyati. Yathācu teṣām rāgādi pramāṇamavakalpatē.
 Tathā 'pavargacintāyām vistareṇābhīdhāsyate. Tadevam
 ksinadosanamdhyanavahitacetāsam. Nirmalam sarvavisayam jnanam bhavati yoginam.
 Tatra Kevalamabhyāsātprakṣaye Kaphamedasoḥ. Śarīralāghavaṁ labdhvā laṅghayanti
 yothocitaṁ. Iha vijñānānyastu saṁskāro vyavatiṣṭhate. Kramopacīyamānosau
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