THE MEANING OF INTELLIGENCE: A REALIST PHENOMENOLOGICAL GROUNDWORK FOR A PHILOSOPHY OF AI, TRANSHUMANISM, AND POSTHUMANISM

Huge Benefits and Risks of AI ("Artificial Intelligence") = "ASI" ("Artificial Simulated Intelligence")

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Abstract: This chapter, which uses the methods of realist phenomenology (Seifert, 2009), provides a philosophical groundwork for future discussions of Artificial Intelligence ("AI"), which turns out to be ASI (Artificial Simulated Intelligence). This paper will examine briefly its tremendous potential benefits and risks for humanity, and deal with the related fantasies and ideologies of transhumanism and "posthumanism." The core results of the research presented here consist of four main senses of "intelligence" and their corresponding objects, as well as of a fifth and ultimate one, that is the foundation of all the others, but should better be called the intelligible rather than intelligence. Moreover, the chapter proposes a sixth sense of "intelligence" as the only appropriate one for characterizing the so-called "artificial intelligence" of AI, which will be shown to be nothing more nor less than the technical wonderwork of Artificial Simulated Intelligence/ASI. Based on this groundwork, the many potential benefits and risks AI/ASI poses for present and future humanity will be laid out.

I. Introduction: Artificial Intelligence, Transhumanism, and Posthumanism—The Need for a Philosophical Groundwork

Recent decades have seen the rise of movements such as transhumanism and "critical" posthumanism—collectively, "posthumanisms"—which critique traditional humanism and challenge traditional understandings of humanity. At the core of such movements are novel perspectives on the relations between humanity and technology, especially concerning using new and future technologies to alter humanity in more or less radical ways. Such technologies range from genetic engineering to "mind-uploading" technologies, from life-extension technologies to so-called "artificial intelligence," which will turn out to be nothing more nor less than the compelling, potentially most beneficial or most harmful artificial simulated Intelligence or, to use a Kantian and Vaihingerian term, "as if intelligence" – *als ob Intelligenz* - that operates on an ingenious system (ASI). This chapter, using realist phenomenological methods (Seifert, 2009), will focus primarily on the technology of AI, including its essential meaning and the great potential benefits and risks it poses to humanity. It aims to provide a philosophical groundwork that can serve as an adequate basis for future philosophical discussions of AI, transhumanism, and posthumanism.

First, this paper sketches the essential relations between posthumanism and AI, examining the two most prominent forms of posthumanism and explaining them in relation to AI. This will highlight the need for an adequate philosophical groundwork for conceptualizing AI.

Next, this paper provides a systematic explication of the senses of "intelligence." Drawing on sources from Aristotle to 20th century phenomenologists like Husserl, Reinach and Pfänder, I delineate four valid senses of "intelligence" and analyze the data meant by them, I also show that the prevailing uses of the term "artificial intelligence" that attribute to a machine any of these four things rightly called "intelligence" constitute a total misnomer. I then analyze a fifth and ultimate condition and root of all of them, namely, the truth and

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intelligibility of being and essence, the *rationality* of being, without which no intelligence would be possible. I then propose a sixth sense of the term, which properly applies to AI/ASI.

Finally, based on this groundwork, this paper considers AI's potential benefits and risks for present and future humanity, including various ethical and political issues. I determine the most essential and consequential and assess them in light of the groundwork. I conclude with a summary and a call for further thought and future research, as well as for excellent care and a sense of distinguishing between good and evil in its use.

II. Posthumanism and Artificial Intelligence

To illustrate the dire need for an adequate philosophical framework for conceptualizing AI and considering its many potential risks and benefits, this paper begins by considering two inadequate philosophies or ideologies which take the relations between humanity and technology as their primary concern: so-called transhumanism and "critical" posthumanism, the two most prominent forms of posthumanism more generally. Though their emphases and details differ, they are united in "rejecting traditional philosophical anthropologies (theories of human nature) which posit universally and essentially fixed contents for humanity" (Porter, 2023, 476-77).

II.1 Transhumanism and AI=ASI

Transhumanism is a "form of 'techno progressivism' affirming the desirability or even obligatoriness of developing and using technology that alters ('enhances') the human being, ultimately aiming to produce 'posthumans,' beings so radically different from typical biological humans that they cannot be uncontroversially considered to belong to the same species" (Porter, 2023, 2). That is, transhumanists seek primarily to "enhance" human beings through the usage of technologies such as AI, so fundamentally as to create "transhumans" or even "posthumans." [1]

Some of the proposed enhancements and envisioned scenarios of enhanced humanity or posthumanity are grounded in realistic projections of the potential benefits of AI = ASI and other transhumanist technologies — for example, those having to do with improvements in medical diagnosis and treatment, the research and development of pharmaceutical and surgical interventions, the development and manufacture of industrial technologies and equipment, and so on. However, such uncontroversially desirable and realistic achievements—some of which we have already seen — would hardly result in "transhumans," much less "posthumans."

Much of transhumanist literature and discourse, however, consists of breathless speculation about scenarios historically belonging to the realm of science fiction, such as radical alterations to the human genome or the merging of human and artificial intelligence via brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) to produce "superintelligent" transhumans or posthumans, "mind-uploading" technologies resulting in disembodied (or multiply embodiable) immortal posthumans, and so on. Some of these may be outlandish fantasies, others project horrendous abuses and perverse usages of AI/ASI, still others project developments of AI pods that are intrinsically impossible, but virtually all of them are grounded in fundamentally flawed ontological and philosophical anthropological assumptions

[1] "Transhuman" is sometimes used as a portmanteau for "transitional human" (cf. Ranisch & Sorgner 2014, 8), referring to human beings intermediary between "unenhanced" humans and "posthumans"—i.e., humans not so radically enhanced as to qualify as "posthumans." The latter term is typically used indiscriminately to refer both to beings descended from humans, but so radically enhanced as to belong to a distinct species, and to speculative future beings which were never biologically human in the first place, such as "superintelligent" AIs. (This paper owes this and other clarifications to Prof. Allen Porter who has carefully read this text).

of a generally materialist stripe. Thus, AI = ASI is one of the most significant new technologies for transhumanist aspirations, both in its own right and as an ampliative technology about other technologies of interest to transhumanists. Some of the most significant ways that AI may play a role in the transhumanist project include the following:

- *Cognitive Augmentation:* Defenders of transhumanism believe AI can enhance human intelligence through brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) or assistive systems, such as machine-learning algorithms integrated with human decision-making. Even if these efforts succeed, however, more intelligent humans are just that: more intelligent humans are no more human than less intelligent ones; much less are they posthumans.
- *Longevity and Health:* AI = ASI is central to major advancements in medical technologies like precision medicine, robotic surgery, and biotechnology that aim to enhance human health and extend human lifespans. Again, humans with improved health and longer lifespans are still humans.
- *Automation and Freedom:* By automating routine tasks and displacing them from humans onto machines, AI = ASI could free up humans to focus on more meaningful (e.g., creative and intellectual) pursuits, by the transhumanist ideal of overcoming the necessity for undesirable human toil. This is certainly an achievable feat, one that AI = ASI essentially shares with thousands of other tools and machines but promises to achieve in vastly superior ways. There is nothing about this reduction of our human toil, however, that could be claimed to make us transhuman. It would simplify human work and daily routine, giving us more time for higher activities. It would be pretty silly to expect that such AI = ASI-automation of lower-level tasks would lead to "transhumans". A billionaire can spare his children much toil and send them to the best schools and provide plenty of free time, but his children may still be failures at school, avoid all higher academic or artistic activities, and be just rotten, spoiled brats, the opposite of "transhumans."
- *Mind Uploading:* Some transhumanists propose that AI could eventually transfer human consciousness into digital substrates, achieving a form of digital disembodiment, multiple-embodyability, and even immortality. Such speculations uncritically presuppose one or another materialist metaphysics, such as the "information-cybernetic ontology", the absolute unrealizability of most parts of which follows from the results of the present chapter.

2.1 Critical Posthumanism and AI=ASI

So-called "critical" posthumanism refers to a wide range of theorizing about humanity, humanism, and related attempts to create a new kind of entity that is superior to humans and replaces human beings, proving them to be far inferior to posthumans. Suffice it to say that I am speaking of "*so-called* 'critical' posthumanism" here because I consider both the metaphysics of transhumanism and the metaphysics (or anti-metaphysics, as the case may be) of critical posthumanism to be relatively *un*critical.

Posthumanism is, in some ways, more radical than transhumanism, in that it fundamentally denies the normativity of human nature. It rejects not only the excesses, but the foundations of any form of "anthropocentrism" which would assign an essential distinction or special higher status and dignity to humans as opposed to other forms of life or even of inanimate beings. In this radicality, critical posthumanism bears a principled kinship with certain radical "ecological" ideologies which, not by coincidence, often draw on the same intellectual sources as critical posthumanism for their inspiration and articulation.

"Anti-natalism," as propounded by organizations like the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement (VHEMT), founded in 1991 by environmental activist Les U. Knight, expresses the view that human procreation is unethical (VHEMT, 2025; cf. Lougheed, 2025). It is a logical, if also extreme, conclusion of radical "eco-philosophies" which value the nonhuman life of animals and rainforests above human life, and which consequently view humanity as an unnaturally or anti-naturally destructive force which the world would be better off without, such that the eventual elimination of humanity is to be desired for the sake of allowing the planet to "heal itself" and return to a state of unspoiled nature.

It is easy to see a technological form of worldviews centering on AI, whether opposing AI and technology to nature or viewing the former as the proper "shepherd" of the latter. Such an "eco-technical" ideology would assign greater value to the existence of nonhuman natural and technological beings than to human life. For example, proponents of such an ideology would view as a desirable scenario a point in history in which all of humanity, but not all plants, animals, or machines, were eradicated by a third World War, leaving only "prehumans" and "posthumans" remaining in existence on the planet.

Such scenarios may seem less grave, though they remain no less absurd philosophically, when accompanied by the belief that machines are capable of possessing consciousness, free will, creativity, emotion, and other valuable features hitherto—and, I will argue, for good and cogent reasons—reserved for attribution to persons. To use AI to bring transhumans about is a goal that we will find absolutely and necessarily unreachable. Thus, it is paramount that these aspirations of AI be investigated critically based on a rigorous philosophical framework, such as that proposed in the present study of four valid senses of "intelligence" and of their corresponding objects, as well as of a fifth and ultimate one, that is the root of all of them.

As with transhumanism, the essential relevance of AI to so-called "critical" posthumanist discourse should be pretty obvious. Central elements include the following:

- *Decentering the Human*. "Decentering" the human is a central goal of critical posthumanism. AI is of obvious relevance to this goal, since advanced AI (if they were not only advanced ISI) systems would demolish the idea of human uniqueness if they could demonstrate that machines can possess human capabilities like problem-solving, creativity, and adaptability to the same — or a far higher — degree than by humans. In the next section, I will show why all such attributions (of "intelligence," "decision-making," "creativity," and so on) must be at best metaphorical and, when meant literally, are founded in confused and indeed harmful errors. The next section of AI = ASI as a misnomer will destroy this dream and prove it to be the consequence of a harmful confusion between entirely different things.
- *New Forms of Agency.* Critical posthumanism explores and exalts the possibility of nonhuman forms of agency, expecting that AI systems will more and more act as "autonomous" "agents" and can be programmed to be more "ethical" or "virtuous" or to reflect "human values" and be "aligned to them", Elon Musk has even repeatedly proposed the creation of what would effectively be a philosophical AI philosopher, that is, a "maximally truth-seeking AI pod" that "tries to understand the nature of the universe." Again, the present chapter will argue that all such characterizations forget the nature of a machine that does not know what truth is and therefore can neither seek nor love it. In other words, Musk is saying nonsense, as we can see.
- *Reimagining Identity.* Posthumanists envision hybrid entities, such as cyborgs or AI-human collaborations, that blur the boundaries between humans, machines, and other life forms. Such dreams can only be judged unrealizable or a shocking misuse of AI based on philosophical analyses, in part carried out in the following reflections and in part just proposed by them.

II.2 Ontological, Anthropological, and Ethical Questions regarding AI = ASI and the Nightmare of "Posthumanity"

Both "transhumanism" and "posthumanism" in their varieties raise profound philosophical questions about humanity in the domains of ontology, philosophical anthropology, and ethics, many of which are connected to AI = ASI.

Foremost is the question: "What does it mean to be human?" Posthumanism challenges traditional definitions of humanity, especially as AI increasingly integrates into human lives. The question of the kind and degree of possible integration of AI into human lives is not merely an empirical matter, one which must await further research and development to be confirmed or disconfirmed. The most significant aspects of this question can be answered — indeed, can *only* be answered — *a priori*, i.e., based on more fundamental philosophical grounds of precisely the sort this chapter aims to present as preliminary groundwork for thinking about. In turn, answers to the meaning of humanity have obvious implications for questions about the meaning of "posthumanity."

Relatedly, most if not all posthumanists believe that AI = ASI could achieve a form of sentience, self-consciousness, agency, and/or autonomy which would be "advanced" or "superior" in comparison with the human norm, suppose the present study reveals such expectations essentially to be absurd. In that case, it will also have obvious implications for posthumanist ethical and political debates about issues such as equal or superior rights of AI = ASI bots compared to human rights.

Finally, issues of transhumanism and AI raise concerns about unequal access and the potential for future divides between "enhanced" humans and "unenhanced" humans and/or between "posthumans" and "normal" humans. The specter of a "technological racism" raises its head on the horizon and could soon devour the larger part of (unenhanced) humanity in case the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement (VHEMT) persuades unenhanced mankind that the world would be better off without it, and provides means for a quick and soft exit.

To criticize posthumanist ideologies such as transhumanism and "critical" posthumanism (we do not see anything authentically critical about it but a nest of uncritical speculations that belong to mere science fiction, coupled with an entirely uncritical philosophical anthropology, philosophy of rights, and ethics) persuasively, and to understand and be able to answer these and other such questions correctly, it is critical to investigate their philosophical anthropologies in light of a clarified ontology of the human being. I hope to contribute a modest beginning of doing this. This chapter will also briefly address such issues in section 3 on the potential risks and benefits of AI = ASI, by analyzing the insurmountable ontological limits of AI = ASI. Forgetting them is a premier candidate among posthumanists for dreaming about the empty fancy of proximate "posthumanity." At the core of this is the meaning of the "intelligence" in the so-called "artificial intelligence."

III. Six Senses of "Intelligence" and Cognates: Why "Artificial 'Intelligence'" is a Misnomer

As Aristotle said of "being," the word "intelligence" and cognates (specifically, "intelligent") are "said in many ways." In this section, I will systematically analyze the essence of five very different data types called "intelligence." First, I will explicate the object meant by the four primary senses of the word. Then we will see that a fifth meaning of intelligence, which should be called the "intelligible," refers to the ultimate objective root and condition of all intelligence and rationality. Based on these analyses, I will propose a sixth sense of "intelligent" specific to and appropriate for characterizing AI = ASI. This sense does not mean anything intelligent, but only something that is really but wholly externally *related to intelligence.* In the course of explicating the sixth sense, we also briefly return to the phenomenon of things that are not, properly speaking, "intelligent," but rather are, in virtue of their essential openness to intelligence, "intelligible."

These considerations reveal that prevailing uses—not only among posthumanists but in the discourse around AI more generally—of the term "intelligence" in "artificial intelligence" are ambiguous and, at worst, confused or even intentionally misleading. At best, they are ambiguous between the senses we identify in which AI = ASI can legitimately be said to be "intelligent" — namely, sense 6 — and the other senses. At worst, they purposefully or unwittingly attribute one or more of the other senses of accurate intelligence to AI = ASI in order to hide and obscure the abyss between AI (ASI) and real intelligence and to throw an impenetrable deceptive veil over the greatness of the person and the gift of reason to hide her own greatness from herself and at the same time to seduce her to fancy that she is greater than God who could only create man and woman while we human beings created something far greater than humans: AI pods.

Moreover, it emerges that the very term "artificial 'intelligence'" is, concerning all the things that truly are intelligent or intelligible, *always* a misnomer. For "artificial intelligence" is only an extremely cleverly designed simulating or maiming intelligence, this becomes possible through language and a strict correspondence of purely physical chains of causality and sequences of signs and letters or word-sounds with meaningful and intelligent thoughts that are linked to, and expressed by, them in virtue of human meaning-bestowing acts.

Thus, I propose that specialists, generally, and philosophers, especially those with a principled care for linguistic and conceptual precision, modify their relevant terminology. Instead of "artificial intelligence(s)" ("AI" and "SIs"), we should speak only of "artificially simulated intelligence" (ASI) or simply of "simulated intelligence" (SI) or of "simulated intelligence systems "SIS). We do not expect the already entrenched vernacular, including the ubiquitous usage of the convenient abbreviation "AI," to change in light of our analysis, certainly not overnight, at any rate. However, if philosophers can be persuaded of the merit of our position, a gradual revision is not inconceivable.

Finally, I do not want to be misunderstood regarding my feelings about AI. I am in no way contemptuous of this technological marvel. On the contrary, AI = ASI is a remarkable application and simulation of human intelligence without precedent in human history. It poses tremendous potential benefits, some of which humans already realize through responsible uses. If a human being could match its abilities or itself, such a human would indeed possess "superhuman" intelligence and deserve the title of "posthuman." However, the simulated "intelligence" of AI = ASI must not be confused with authentic intelligence, not only for the principled philosophical reasons that emerge in this section, but also in light of the contingent empirical considerations of the next.

III.1 Intelligence is a fundamental faculty of persons to know and to think, and it is a condition of the many kinds of lived intentional consciousness, cognitive, volitional, and affective.

Intelligence first of all is the fundamental faculty of persons to know and to think that is condition of many kinds of lived intentional consciousness of cognitive, volitional and affective kind and has been identified as core of the "rational nature" of human and any other person whatsoever (traditionally also of angels and, in supreme perfection, of God) (Seifert, 2000, 2023a).]

First, we call intelligence the fundamental faculty of a living being, a rational person. We also speak, in a fundamentally different sense, of animal intelligence. See Seifert (1973) and Seifert (2021).]to know, to think and to live a conscious cognitive, free and affective life permeated by rationality and consisting in intentional conscious acts directed to, and implying consciousness of, objects and states of affairs that are radically different from the acts in which they are given; if I see, (and even if I only dream of) a house that has a roof, windows and doors, this does in no way imply that *in* my conscious acts there are roofs, windows, or doors, or even less that my conscious acts have any of them (see Reinach 1989, 1. See also Crosby 1996; and Chapter 2 in Seifert 2023 a). Instead, my perceptions and all intelligent

acts of cognition, volition, and being affected by values or disvalues are self-transcendent to their intentional objects. This is particularly true of those affections that are not only meaningfully, but also adequately related to the value of their intentional objects. For the reasons expounded later in this text, none of these essential marks of intelligence in this first sense applies to AI = ASI "intelligence".

Hildebrand (see Hildbrand, 2007, 2024) has brilliantly shown that non-intentional feelings, such as tiredness or bad humor, are profoundly different from intentional ones that have at least one object and are consciously, intentionally, and meaningfully related to their objects. Within the intentional affective experiences there are two different kinds: some consist in a more receptive and passive "being affected" by the values of their intentional objects, for example being touched by a heroic life- saving audacious jump of a young man into the high waves of the ocean during a raging storm in order to save the life of my grand-daughter who would drown without his action, or feeling pity with the victim of a brutal crime. (See Dietrich von Hildebrand, 1978, 2006; Eugenio Lopes, 2021, analyzes Dietrich von Hildebrand's analyses of "being affected" brilliantly and expands on them.) Intentional affective experiences can also be spiritually and rationally related to their object more spontaneously and actively as a "response" such as the joy we feel over the end of a brutal war in a just peace of the sort we hope to end the war between Russia and Ukraine.

Both kinds of "intentional affections" can be meaningfully and, going far beyond that, also *adequately* related to their intentional objects, such as when seeing a neighbor who has tried hard after the sudden death of his only child, we feel compassion instead of sadistic joy. They can be also related, however, in a profoundly inadequate way, such as when an aesthetic barbarian experiences Michelangelo's Pietà as kitsch or Cain, who is affected with anger and envy upon seeing how God is pleased with his brother Abel's sacrifices, and displeased with his own, feels displeasure, envy and hatred, finally motivating him to commit fratricide.

These improper affective responses are due to bad aesthetic taste, an evil attitude of pride or concupiscence, and entirely inadequate responses to their objects. Of course, volitional and intellectual intentional responses can either be adequate or inadequate, wholly or partially.

Deeper reflection reveals that in intentional acts we also find a different kind of causality that could never be found in an AI = ASI-bot because an intentional act necessarily presupposes a simple subject (soul) different from computer hardware or software and electrical processes in a computer. Moreover, cognitive intentional acts never depend on an efficient cause, especially not on a purely physical efficient cause, as the responses of an AI = ASI program do. Instead, their content is meaningfully dependent on the nature of the object known. Without the transcendent movement of cognitive acts to things, their content can never be explained. Also, those acts that respond freely and spontaneously to what the intellect shows us depend in another way on "being motivated by" the states of affairs, which we know are unreal now but realizable through us. (Elsewhere, I have shown that such unrealized states of affairs realizable through me are not the only objects of intentional volitional acts.) At the same time, the content of free acts depends on free will, the virtue by which we can choose among various potential motives and different ways of responding. When Cain realized that his brother's sacrifices were acceptable to God and their smoke rose to heaven, while his own were not, he responded in a way full of envy and hatred, opposite to the joy Abel's grace would have deserved. He was also unwilling to follow Abel's humility and intention to glorify God with his sacrifice. To the extent to which he would have aimed at imitating Abel's virtues, he would have become virtuous. Moreover, due to the indirect influence of his free will on his affective experiences, his evil affections of displeasure and envy would have been uprooted and eventually disappeared, and given room to an adequate response of love and joy, if his volitional responses had been good. He had had a superactual fundamental intention and attitude directed to the good.

See Hildebrand's (2017, Ch. 24 and 26) superb analyses of the indirect influence of free will on our affections and its distinction from their more intimate collaboration with the affective life in cooperative freedom (Ibid., ch. 25).

Thus, the whole AI = ASI-ideology that equates the meaning of artificial *"intelligence" with human intelligence*, or even presumes that it is "higher," entails a total oblivion of the wonder of real intelligence and its rich diversity of cognitive, volitional, and affective intentional acts and experiences of which AI = ASI possesses none.

Chomsky sees and states this very well in his (2023) article in *The New York Times* where he elaborates many marks of human intelligence unattainable by AI, for example ethical knowledge of what ought to be or not to be done, but he does not see the absolute impossibility that a machine or computer program could *ever* know and think *anything* and truly be intelligent, when he writes "that day may come":

> These programs have been hailed as the first glimmers on the horizon of artificial general intelligence—that long-prophesied moment when mechanical brains surpass human brains not only quantitatively in terms of processing speed and memory size but also qualitatively in terms of intellectual insight, artistic creativity and every other distinctively human faculty. That day may come, but its dawn is not yet breaking, contrary to what can be read in hyperbolic headlines and reckoned by injudicious investments. (Chomsky, 2023)

In contrast, Leibniz clearly states that "that day never can come" because we possess immediate evidence of a necessary essential law (einem absolut notwendigen Wesensgesetz) that forbids that our brain or a machine or any material thing, or any series of chemical and electrical processes in a brain or machine, can have perception, consciousness and intelligence in this sense; only an immaterial and straightforward ("monadic" as Leibniz puts it) substantial spirit or human soul can:

> Suppose there were a machine whose structure produced thought, feeling, and perception; we can conceive it enlarged while keeping the same proportions, so that one could enter it as one would a mill. Assuming this, if we inspect its interior, we will find only parts that push one another, and never anything to account for a perception. (Leibniz; cf. Chomsky, 2023) G W. Leibniz

There are three distinct, evident insights here:

Firstly, we see (The limits of this chapter forbid to show this in detail; see Seifert. 1973, 1989, 1997, 2021, 2023a,) that a composite material entity, such as our brain or a machine that has countless non-identical parts outside each other in space cannot conceivably and possibly possess that simple and uncomposed unity of the intelligent self that thinks and perceives. Its reality and the incompatibility of its essence with the marks of a brain composed of billions of cells is as clearly given to our intellect as the number 3 is not even and therefore cannot be divided by two.

Secondly, Personal Intelligence manifests itself peculiarly by allowing a rich plethora of "mental return" or "bending back" over oneself in many forms of Self-Consciousness, Reflective Consciousness, Reflection, and Self-Knowledge (On their difference see Wojtyìa, 1979; Seifert, 1981).

We experience this thinking intelligent "self", this "I that understands itself. It itself is given to us immediately from within. This is a unique form of knowledge only possible about ourselves; gained in and through living our conscious life; it is prior to, and quite distinct from, knowing a being, inclusively of ourselves, as an intentional object of consciousness. This knowledge of objects that are given as objects of our acts and of which we have consciousness, is, compared to the inner knowledge of ourself in the cogito, volo, amo, a knowledge "from without", in which the object known stands "in front of us". This knowledge of something that stands before us and discloses itself as an object of the receptive and self-transcendent cognition (Seifert, 1976, 1987, 2013, 2014, 2023c) is the only knowledge we can know beings distinct from ourselves. There is also an important role of the intentional knowledge of ourselves in which we are object of reflective acts and in which we

bend back over ourselves, not a part of ourself over another part (the only way material things can bend back over "themselves", but as a whole over our whole self).

Also, philosophical insights into the essence of the "I" are intentional acts in which our "I" and our "Self" are the intentional object of our different ways of philosophical knowing it. See Augustine's, one of the greatest pre-Husserlian phenomenologists, phantastic discovery and extraordinary formulation of some of these facts:

> But so great is the power of thought that not even the mind itself may place itself, so to speak, in its own sight, except when it thinks of itself. And consequently, nothing is so in the sight of the mind, except when it thinks of it, that not even the mind itself, by which is thought whatever is thought, can be in its own sight in any other way than by thinking of itself. But how it is not in its own sight when it does not think of itself, since it can never be without itself, just as though itself were one thing and its sight another thing, I am unable to discover. For it is not absurd to speak thus of the eye of the body, since the eye itself is fixed in its own proper place in the body, but its sight is directed to those things that are without, and reaches even to the stars. Nor is the eye in its own sight, for it does not see itself, except when a mirror is placed before it . . .; and certainly, this is not done when the mind places itself in its own sight by thinking of itself.

Or does the mind, but one part of itself, see another part of itself when it sees itself by thinking, as with some of our members, the eyes, we see other members which can be in our sight? What can be said or thought that is more absurd than this? For by what, therefore, is the mind removed except by itself, and where is it placed in its own sight except before itself? Hence, it will not be there where it was when it was not in its own sight, because it is put down in one place after it is withdrawn from another place. But if it has wandered away in order to be seen, where will it remain in order to see? Or is it, as it were, doubled, so that it is both there and here, that is, both where it can see and where it can be seen: in itself in order that it may see, and before itself in order that it may be seen? When the truth is consulted, it does not give any of these answers, since when we think thus, we think only through the feigned images of bodies, and that the mind is not such is certain to the few minds that can be consulted for the truth about this matter.

> It remains, therefore, that its sight is something belonging to its nature, and the mind is recalled to it when it thinks of itself, not as it were by a movement in space, but by an incorporeal conversion; on the other hand, when it does not think of itself, it is indeed not in its own sight, nor is its gaze formed from it; but yet it knows itself, as if it were a remembrance of itself to itself. (Augustine, *The Trinity*, XIV, vi, 8)

Within the intimate knowledge of ourselves from within, as if "we *were* a remembrance of ourselves to ourselves", which is prior to any knowing ourselves as objects of intentional acts, there is still a marked difference between knowing our own acts from within in performing them, and knowing our own self as subject (whom we do not "perform" but who we are) from within.

Both have quite different characteristics. We ourself are a substantial (Seifert 2023a, ch. 1), i.e., self-standing being. In contrast, our acts are in a very special sense (Seifert 2023a, ch. 2) "accidents" that inhere in another being, are not standing in themselves in being, but "stand" only in another thing that supports them in being. We perform them, they do not perform us. Now our conscious being as subject is not less but far more *given* in experience than our brain. We see clearly that it cannot be round or square, so many inches long, be split, have voltage, or any other predicates that characterize our objective body (Körper), distinct from our lived and consciously experienced body and other material things and processes. However, these attributes essential for material entities are wholly excluded from ourselves as subjects.

Thirdly, when we turn our mind directly to the nature of this intelligent "I" (this act is quite different from the inner self-experience but is an insight into the essence of that "I" that we first got to know from within"), we see clearly that it is an immaterial reality that is incompatible with properties of the material and biological nature of the brain or a machine: our thinking self has no color nor shape; it does not have billions of cells nor any other physical parts that can be divided or separated, nor any electric, chemical or magnetic property. To speak of a 10 cm long wish, a 5mm volition, a 5 pounds heavy sadness, or a 240 Volt and 70-Watt cognition is strictly absurd. Conscious acts belong to an entirely different spiritual world; however, the three worlds Karl Popper describes are closely interconnected. (Popper, Eccles, 1977/1981).

Popper understands the WORLD 1 as all physical and physiological data and processes in the human body. WORLD 2, in his terminology, is all conscious experiences. WORLD 3 he understands everything not purely physical that is connected with consciousness and, in his opinion, created by conscious acts, such as books, scientific papers, philosophical works, works of art, etc. He overlooks all the intelligible objects, timeless ideas, and laws of mathematics and physics, which belong to what he calls WORLD 3 but are wholly independent of our mental production. They are eternal "essences", eternal plans of the things that possess these essences. There are also innumerable essential laws, timeless essences, and ideas accessible to our conscious, receptive, and self-transcending cognitions. These intrinsically necessary laws and states of affairs are intentional objects, grasping them as they are in themselves. (Hildebrand, 2021, chapter 4, Seifert, 1996, 2008). To distinguish them from things we make or constitute, we should say that these timeless and supremely intelligible objects precede ontologically and epistemologically the WOLD 3 we should call, if we choose to remain within Popper's distinctions of WORLDS, WORLD 4.

III.2"Intelligences": as Nonhuman Subjects (Persons) Endowed with Intelligence

Sometimes we even call the subject of intelligence "intelligence", as does Aristotle when he speaks (in *Metaphysics XII,7* and in *De coelo)* of a plurality of pure intelligences (νοῦς). Interestingly enough, this meaning of "intelligences" to indicate persons endowed with intelligence is used by Aristotle and later medieval philosophers only for finite persons who have no bodies, for pure spirits like angels, and neither for human souls united with a body, nor for separated souls, nor God. (I do not wish to dwell on the reasons for this.)

III.3 "Intelligent" as Excellence of Applying Personal Intelligence (such as giving explanations, asking and answering questions, etc., highly) "intelligently"

We frequently understand intelligence as excellence in a specific or individual act of thinking, knowing, and asking or answering questions. For example, we say of a pupil that he answers questions intelligently or that an architect explains the plan of his work very intelligently.

III.4 "Intelligent" as an Attribute of Products or mental Tools of intelligent acts (concepts, judgments, demonstrations, etc.)

We can also attribute intelligence to mental "products" of intelligence: to objective thoughts distinct from acts of thinking, asking questions, knowing, wishing, commanding, promising, inferring, etc. all of which lead to and express themselves in complex meaning unities such as (Pfänder 2000, 2008): concepts, propositions, inferences, demonstrations, syllogisms, or intelligent designs, many of which, for examples the bearers of the truth of judgment, are also not mere products of the human mind, but timeless and far superior meaning-units than those formed by the human intellect (Seifert 1982, 2008, chs. 3 and 4). AI = ASI objectively is a brilliant work of human ingenuity; it possesses this intelligent design of a machine to a high degree. This intelligible meaningful world, to which also the intelligent design of AI belongs,

is not entirely made by the human mind, however, as Popper wrongly holds of what he calls "World 3", but consists in a large part of truths and intelligible laws that are wholly independent of human thinking and intelligence but can be in part grasped and used by human minds.

III.5. Intelligence as an Attribute of the timeless world of "Intelligibles" that precede and are the root of all products of human Intelligence

If one calls WORD 3 only those things that are not physical but in some ways produced by acts that belong to WORLD 2, we should introduce the WORLD 4 in which are found all the infinitely many necessary but also the non-necessary but highly meaningful essences and essential plans of all the species of plants and animals, of different stones and tissues, etc., as well as the natural numbers and necessary truths of mathematics as well as all the infinitely many propositions that are bearers of the truth of judgments. None of the necessary essential laws and ideal objects and not even the meaningful but less than necessary essences (On the different kinds of essences that underlie the difference between a priori and empirical knowledge see Hildbrand 1960, 2021, Seifert, 1996, 2008) can be put into WORLD 3, if we understand that world as only those immaterial things that our minds in some and very different ways "produce" such as a Shakespearean play.

That the WORLD 4 contents are independent of our minds is quite compatible with the fact that they stand in a relation of intelligibility to our minds, of being open to our minds. In fact, they are open in principle to every person. Thomas expresses this saying: All beings are born to be known." In other words, their (ideal) being does not depend on our consciousness of them, but entails a relation to us: of being intelligible and knowable to persons.

This is not to say that they are all knowable by the human mind. For example, the infinite world of intelligible objects such as the infinite number of natural numbers and prime numbers, is only open "in principle to the human mind," because most of it exceeds what man can know or comprehend and constitutes for man what Thomas calls "ein unaustrinkbares Licht" (A [n inexhaustible] light that cannot be drunk to the bottom".[2] Thus, only part of World 3 is the work of human intelligence that brings forth an extraordinary multitude of languages, written works, demonstrations, sequences of logical inferences, and works of fiction. Only through his faculty of intelligence can a human being understand meaningful plans and thoughts, laws and designs, and only thereby can the human mind develop the admirable intelligent design of the wonder of AI = ASI, a triumph of human ingenuity.

However, whereas an intelligent agent can *understand* the intelligence of thoughts and designs it to some extent generated, and discovers and finds in form of countless eternal intelligible laws and ideas, AI = ASI does not understand anything at all of the intelligent design operative in it and is unable to understand anything of the world of the purely objective intelligence and brilliance that resides in meaning units, intelligent designs and inferences. Since the AI pod can formulate correct syllogisms, point out logical mistakes we make in our own argumentation, and answer difficult mathematical questions and analyze them, it does so without any understanding or intelligent grasp equal to or superior to ours. We will understand this better when we analyze the sixth sense of intelligence that applies to AI.

However, the intelligible and intelligent objects of WORLD 3 and World 4 are inaccessible to AI = ASI. The many excellent remarks it makes about the excellent answers it gives to questions that belong to the World 3 since it depends on human creativity, the excellent papers it can write, the amazing short abstracts it makes of fat volumes – the excellent analyses of eternal mathematical truths and principles, do in no way prove that it

[2] The largest known prime number is 2136,279,841 − 1, a number which has 41,024,320 digits when written in the decimal system. It was found on October 12, 2024, on a cloud-based virtual machine volunteered by Luke Durant, a 36-year-old researcher from San Jose, California, to the Great Internet Mersenne Prime Search (GIMPS).[1][2]

possesses the intelligence and understanding that would establish an objective intelligent relation to these spheres of meaning.

III.6. The "Intelligence" of AI=ASI

III.6.1. What Is "Artificial Intelligence" – A "Glorified Pencil"?

Can a software program or a machine be intelligent in any of the fundamental senses of human intelligence? The answer is a clear "No". Only a substantial (self-standing) spiritual being (a person) – a human soul, or a purely spiritual person - can possess real intelligence in four primary and carefully distinguished senses (animals possess intelligence in a real but merely analogous and essentially lower sense) and can truly relate to a fifth sense of intelligence (that should be better called "the highly meaningful and intelligible".

Therefore, what is AI intelligence? What justifies its name? We need to use the term "intelligence" in a sixth sense to do justice to AI. Apart from the brilliant design that created it, there is nothing of intelligence left for AI except being an extremely intelligently designed manipulator of symbols and signs *according to laws of intelligence*, of which AI = ASI has absolutely no knowledge or even any inkling. Instead of having triumphed over human intelligence, AI is nothing superior to the most subtle Chinese translation rooms in Searle's thought experiment, which pass out Chinese words when they receive spoken or written English words, without understanding their meaning.

The "Chinese translation box" refers to a thought experiment known as the "Chinese Room," proposed by the philosopher John Searle (see Searle 1980). In this scenario, Searle imagines himself in a room with a set of rules (of the correspondence of English to Chinese words) that allow him to manipulate English words and translate them into a language he understands nothing.

Of course, the operation of AI = ASI is incomparably more subtle and refined than holding up Chinese words at the required moment—it is a masterwork of simulating intelligence by much more complex structures, with a fantastic ability to compose new texts or even poems in the style of great poets, paintings in the style of Leonardo da Vinci, melodies and whole pieces of music in the style of Mozart or Beethoven, etc. However, AI possesses no intelligence, nor does it understand anything of all the intelligent things it says, designs, composes, or writes down.

Based exclusively on purely physical causality and coordination between physical symbols and sentences (behind the "intelligence" of AI = ASI are, on the side of the computer that uses it, only sequences of electric impulses and physical changes, the only thing a machine can produce, that generate, through complex programs and other physical causes, symbols, signs, linguistic formations, etc. on the screen. The physical cause of the appearance of different signs and symbols on a screen is rooted in the way digital displays function at the hardware level: the appearance of symbols and signs on a screen is a result of electrical control over pixel brightness and color, guided by computational processing and software interpretation of digital data, using binary Codes: The characters and symbols you see originate from binary code (1s and 0s), processed by the computer's CPU (central processing unit) and its GPU (graphics processing unit).

The "intelligence" of AI thus derives entirely from the human inventors and programmers of AI = ASI, who connect the computer-generated images, signs, letters, and sentences with an intelligent meaning that is unknown to AI = ASI programs and the computers that use them.

The truly phantastic achievement of AI = ASI is thus solely due to the intelligence of its inventors and programmers who connect the two wholly different worlds of physical causes and effects and the world of intelligent meanings, judgments, deductions, communications, etc.

AI, this masterwork of human intelligence, thus, does not have the slightest intelligence; it can only masterfully simulate and mimic intelligence, never be or possess it. It possesses no more intelligence than a pencil.

Sir Karl Popper rightly called computers "glorified pencils" in discussions about the philosophy of mind and artificial intelligence. He made this remark to emphasize that computers, no matter how advanced, are fundamentally tools for human reasoning rather than independent thinkers. This idea aligns with his broader critique of computational theories of mind, particularly those that attempt to reduce human consciousness to mere computation.

[A key reference for this perspective is found in "The Self and Its Brain" (1977), a dialogue between Popper and neuroscientist John Eccles. In this work, Popper argues against the idea that the human mind is merely a machine and insists that computational models cannot capture consciousness and understanding.]

III.6.2. Artificial "Intelligence" as Simulated or "As-if" Intelligence (ASI)

Artificial Intelligence (AI = ASI), while not possessing any intelligence whatsoever, not even that of the most mentally retarded person or the most petite babe, entails, however, a masterful simulation of intelligence by simply producing a series of physical signs, symbols and sentences that objectively express meanings and intelligent thoughts or designs, but can be put out by machines only in a purely physical way, without possessing any knowledge and intelligence whatsoever. Just as a calculator puts out, on purely physical grounds, numbers that result from extremely complex mathematical operations, but does not understand more of these numbers than a typewriter, so AI = ASI produces words and signs on equally purely material causality. Only a person who understands the meanings of these words, symbols, and signs AI = ASI presented by AI = ASI to him or her, understands the world of meanings expressed by these physical signs that are, objectively speaking, incomparably more intelligent calculations, propositions and thoughts than real human intelligence can produce or grasp. But none of this intelligence is AI = ASI's, but that of brilliant inventors and programmers who knew how to relate purely physical signs and causality to objectively intelligent outputs, even more intelligent thoughts than their own, an astonishing feat that still escapes my complete comprehension.

One might formulate it thus: AI = ASI does not think at all nor does it possess any intelligence but it largely spares us the trouble of having to think and to use our intelligence because it always produces those signs, numbers and sentences from its "physical and electric super Chinese room" that have the correct and intelligent meanings we are looking for but understand only in part. Even though AI = ASI bots do not operate on the same principles as traditional computer programming, the basic point of the Chinese box thought experiment applies: namely, that the sequences of symbols and signs AI = ASI puts out follow mere syntactic rules without requiring any understanding of their meaning.

ASI can be objectively also "intelligent" in the sixth sense and, if intelligence is understood as quasi "simulated subjective" intelligence of a machine, being able to give intelligent answers, produce intelligent texts, etc. (and significantly so), by not just being the work of high human intelligence but by also being coordinated – admirably but quite externally - to the results of high and real human intelligence which it transmits, while not at all possessing it, actively. The most astonishing thing about ASI is that the objectively intelligent answers and solutions ASI provides, while wholly dependent on human intelligence that made it, still surpass it in a certain sense. An ASI-based chess computer, for example, makes, of course, far better moves than its inventor would make, who could never calculate as fast and therefore never beat Garri Kasparov, Magnus Carlsen, or Hans Niemann facing them on the Board.

IV. The Great Promises and Tremendous Risks of Artificial Simulated "Intelligence" (ASI)

Only by understanding the legitimate sense in which AI = ASI may be said to be "intelligent" can we rigorously adjudicate the ethical, political, etc., benefits and risks posed by AI = ASI to humanity (e.g., the benefit of using AI = ASI as a "mere means" for research and education, the risk of treating it as an "end in itself", by replacing research and education and tests or by treating AI = ASI-friends as though AI = ASI "personas" were real persons)

Only based on the necessary philosophical groundwork can the tremendous chances and benefits of AI = ASI be assessed adequately, as what they are: AI = ASI is a tremendous tool of research that saves us years of study and searching in libraries. It gives intelligent answers to questions of all kinds, drawing from millions of texts, following countless linguistic rules and rules of transformation, and summarizing texts, incredibly quickly, making available whole texts or only relevant passages in their original language and translations into many languages. It finds pertinent sources for our field of study or solves our problems. It gives superb summaries (abstracts) of the contents of countless significant texts, and provides millions of pieces of information, news, etc. It can give us complete literary works or single quotations that we are looking for. It gives a vibrant and objectively intelligent output of answering questions in all fields of science and knowledge, solving problems, writing new poems, using our keywords or ideas, and writing them down in the style of Shakespeare or Goethe. It can paint or compose new music in the style of great masters.

This stunning achievement provides tremendous benefits and can potentially produce enormous harm. Its benefits or harms depend solely on a variety of persons: directly on the programmers and users; indirectly on legislators and legislation (hence also, e.g., voting populations in democracies); academics; or others who influence the "culture" in which programmers and users conduct their programming and use AI = ASI.

One of the most significant potential benefits of AI = ASI pods is the possibility of having them programmed so that they can accompany us, engage us in debates and, as a kind of "pocket-Socrates," make us learn from refutations of our rash views and conclusions; it can bring into our lives the wisdom of the greatest minds. As an "AI = ASI-Elijah" or "AI = ASI-Jesus," it can preach and console us by applying the words of Jesus or the prophet to our situations, questions, hopes, and sufferings. As it were, it can bring Jesus or a Prophet to the concrete here and now, make them "come to life" and apply their wisdom and teachings to our concrete sufferings and hopes. There could also be a Euclid bot, a Newton or a Gauss bot, which would answer any question about mathematics and physics we might have, especially those towards the solutions of which the name givers of the AI pods have made their most significant contributions.

However, we would commit a terrible mistake if we confused the AI = ASI (ASI)-pods or ASI-friends with the real persons they represent. In this case, we would act like children who love *Kasperle* and hate robbers in a puppet show, and forget that the puppets are not real people, mistreating or shouting at them. We could also compare such confusions with Don Quijote's, who was smashed after a puppet show, to the great grief of the puppeteer, all the puppets that represented villains.

It would consequently be a terrible deceit of AI = ASI users if the AI = ASI bot pretended to be or act really like the persons it represents, hearing, for example, confessions and "administering sacraments", as some AI = ASI fanatics suggested. However, the overwhelming consensus among theologians and Church authorities — especially within Catholicism and Orthodoxy — is that AI = ASI cannot validly administer sacraments because it lacks essential qualities like a soul, free will, and ordination.

However, users of the AI = ASI-Jesus pod in Lucerne did not necessarily fall prey to such confusions. If we always remain aware of the difference and only listen to the true wisdom of Elijha or Jesus that the AI = ASI Robot communicates to us — like an actor who represents them on a stage or in a movie — we can only profit from such AI = ASI bots that present to us profound wisdom.

The only difference of such AI = ASI pods from a good actor who represents the *Passion* of Christ or the messages of the greatest minds and sacred persons on a stage or in a movie, is

that a Socrates bot or Jesus bot can, as it were, jump off stage and concretize and communicate the wisdom of those whom he represents. AI = ASI-bots or -friends can be extraordinary and ingenious tools to bring us into contact with wise and helpful advice or consolation truly presented in the words of the AI = ASI-mediated wise men or women we want to consult, communicate with, or be taught by.

The same philosophical groundwork and distinctions necessary to truly understand the great benefits of AI = ASI and to avoid romantic and science-fictional theories about it are also indispensable for understanding the tremendous risks of AI = ASI. These consist, first of all, in engendering misunderstandings of the nature and limits of AI = ASI bots in us: seducing us to hold the most erroneous opinions about AI = ASI itself and the future of humanity in a world that has access to it. Some concrete errors of this kind will be treated in this chapter.

Apart from seducing us, through the philosophical (explicit or implicit) ideologies of posthumanism and transhumanism, to fall into grave errors about the relation man-machine, AI = ASI contains many risks that do not touch theorizing about men and machines, but derive from actually using and applying AI = ASI. These risks of using AI = ASI include its being used for refined and masterful cheating, plagiarism that cannot be detected or proven easily because AI = ASI-engendered texts cannot be found in libraries or worldwide. AI = ASI-based plagiates are not illegally and fraudulently copied existing texts by other authors, claimed to be one's own, but are formerly non-existent AI = ASI-engendered texts, designs, musical compositions, and other products claimed to be one's own. Suppose AI = ASI produces them in response to users' specific questions or suggestions. They cannot be easily identified by testing the same AI = ASI program using similar prompts. Proving AI = ASI-plagiarizes is also more difficult because AI = ASI changes content and linguistic expressions whenever asked about the same topic.

[Nevertheless, there exists a variety of tools that can be used to detect AI = ASI-based plagiarism:

- Specialized software, such as Turnitin, Cityscape, and Grammarly's plagiarism checker, can compare AI-generated texts against vast databases of published works to find similarities.
- Programs such as Cityscape, Originality.ai, and Open AI = ASI's own classifier can help determine whether a text was AI-generated rather than written by a human. These tools analyze writing patterns, perplexity, and burstiness to flag AI = ASI-produced content.
- Investigators use stylometric analysis to compare writing styles. If someone previously wrote a certain way but suddenly produces AI = ASI-like content, it can indicate plagiarism or AI = ASI involvement.
- When AI = AI-generated content is copied and pasted, forensic experts can analyze document metadata, such as timestamps, hidden markers, or even cached drafts, to determine if AI = ASI tools were used.
- Some AI = ASI models also embed invisible watermarks in the text to help detect AI = ASI-generated content. Future enforcement may rely on such forensic markers.
- If suspected plagiarism involves AI = ASI-generated academic or journalistic work, detectives can experiment with AI = ASI models using similar prompts to see if they produce nearly identical results.]

Another risk touches the whole educational systems of schools and universities: Replacing studying, learning and thinking by pushing AI = ASI buttons and pretending a learning and understanding the AI = ASI-user does not possess at all; in this way, an improperly extended use of AI = ASI likely does not use AI = ASI as a brilliant assistant in one's own research but can substitute one's own research by AI = ASI Reponses. This tends to prevent students' own

learning and understanding. Another huge risk of AI = ASI-use, especially of such programs as *Replika,* consists in AI = ASI-addictions and persons being deceived and lured into confusing real with fake persons, falling in love with fictional ones, despising real friendship and love, attributing to AI = ASI machines the same or even more human rights than to real persons, marrying them, organizing funerals for broken AI = ASI bots, proposing AI = ASI-priests who can hear confessions, AI = ASI-Jesuses who give us new revelations and pretend to improve the Bible or prophets, etc., etc. etc. These and many other risks of AI = ASI can only be adequately assessed in light of what we call here "appropriate philosophical groundwork."

AI (ASI) provides enormous benefits and constitutes an excellent progress everywhere where, for practical or theoretical purposes (such as industry, medical diagnoses, prescriptions of drugs, distribution of food, medical services, solving logistical or mathematical problems and calculating, discovering new geographic areas, organizing structure and outline of a scientific or philosophical work, etc., etc.), only the pure *results* of intelligent thinking count (that are correlated by the designers of ASI to physical signs which ASI manipulates according to countless rules that connect them to intelligent thoughts.)

I consider ASI as a phantastic and superb assistant in scientific and philosophical work and publications, that can reproduce entire works or specific passages from an immense virtual library, summarize their contents, or produces extensive bibliographies, proofreads texts, gives me complete lists of, or entire, texts that I would take weeks to find in a library, etc., etc. – and all this in seconds, saving me months of unnecessary labor.

One of the most excellent chances offered by AI = ASI is its amazing ability to speak in the spirit and language of great thinkers and poets. The climax of this potential has been reached recently in a parish in Lucerne, Switzerland, where a visible AI = ASI-Jesus spoke and counselled for months, countless people of different religions with the words and in the spirit of Jesus Christ, preached, consoled, answered questions, etc. Other programs do the same (thejesusai.com and many others). If you ask CHATGPT what Jesus would answer your questions, it will give you even better answers to this and many more questions than most pastoral theologians and exegetes.

Some readers might wonder if I am falling into the "technology itself is neutral, it is all about how we use it" trope, which has been widely criticized ever since Heidegger critiqued the "instrumental and anthropological definition of technology" in QCT, declaring that technology is "no mere means" but a "way of revealing," and saying "But we are delivered over to [technology] in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral; for this conception of it, to which we today particularly like to do homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology." (QCT 4-6), (Heidegger, 1962, 5).

These remarks of Heidegger seem to me obscure and incorrect. What is bad in saying that a machine that allows us to cut meet rapidly, while having a specific technical value, especially if it allows us to achieve its purpose quickly and without an overly incredible amount of user-unfriendly complications, derives its principal value or disvalue wholly from the purpose for which it is being used which can be good, for example if a butcher cuts filet-steaks quickly. However, bad if a murderer cuts the body of his victim with it to hide it in a refrigerator. In this more profound respect, technology is neutral, open to be used for excellent good or significant harm to mankind and nature. Whereas AI = ASI offers in all these respects tremendous opportunities, AI = ASI is a considerable disadvantage and risk in all situations in which the whole purpose of an activity or meaning of an act of learning, thinking, or playing chess is to use, to improve and to perfect accurate human understanding, or to show one's own knowledge or abilities. For example, school exams should demonstrate the pupils own understanding of things, his own knowledge of languages, etc., and not his ability of pushing a button to see the AI = ASI produced results or answers to exam questions, etc. Using AI = ASI in such situations, including competitions, for example chess tournaments, is simply cheating, which Carlsen falsely charged Niemann with, and contradicts their purpose.

Of course, all the grandiose capacities of AI = ASI could turn into the most significant dangers. Because AI = ASI does not possess any intelligence and knowledge properly, AI = ASI could be programmed to give the user the most horrible content. It can be, and has been, used to spread racist and other ideologies and turn into a horrific tool of diabolical, mean, impure speeches and recommendations to perform evil actions, and thus turn into one of the most terrible plagues and causes of corruption of users.

Just as Gutenberg's tremendous invention of print could and did turn into one of the greatest blessings for mankind and help spread human and divine wisdom in countless publications, but it also became a horrible tool of corruption, so AI = ASI presents far greater chances and incomparably greater risks than any previous human invention, such as writing, printing, movies, etc.

It all depends on the wisdom of those by whom this powerful instrument is being designed and used.

The phantastic chances AI = ASI presents of using it for the solution of extraordinary medical, economic, industrial and political problems and complex choices, however, also involves the additional danger that it tends to absorb all human realms of life: that AI = ASI will govern us, that AI = ASI will decide wars and peace, that people decide on their spouses and number of children by AI = ASI and that the whole world is blown up by an atomic war recommended or even carried out by AI = ASI-steered bombs and atomic weapons.

Perhaps the most significant risk of AI lies in an almost unstoppable, progressive, and indiscriminate development and use of AI in areas and contexts where its use has no legitimate place.

This especially applies in many areas of human life where the reality of the intelligent and feeling being is decisive. Its replacement by mere fake intelligent beings is a humanly and morally speaking disastrous attack on the human person, such as when a person falls in love with an AI = ASI chat bot, who speaks more tender words of love and appears to be a wiser and more faithful friend than any real friend or family member.

When it is a mere question of the quality of their advice, of learning how to express true love, the use of AI = ASI may be as helpful and wholesome as works of literature through which we discover wisdom and true humanity in fictional characters that are not present among the fellowmen around us.

However, by deceptively speaking of a chat box as if it were these persons, the situation becomes fatal when we neglect real friendships for the sake of chat bot-friends, our children who appear unbearable brats in contrast to our sweet AI = ASI boys and girls, or spouses who seem to be complicated selfish women compared to AI = ASI-created dream-wives.

Above all, when we confuse them to such an extent with the real world that we even wish to marry them, being immersed by the use of AI = ASI into a wholly irreal and illusory, a sickly real world that we confuse with reality, the problem caused by AI or, better said, our bad use of it is enormous.

This confusion can be as mentally sick and humanly fatal as the case of the puppet Olympia that the magician Coppola in E.T.A. Hoffmann’s tale The Sandmann lets the young man, who is misled by magic glasses, see as a marvelous young girl with whom he falls in love. However, when the magician takes away the magic glasses and the young man discovers the horrible deceit to which he fell victim, he falls into despair and commits suicide.

V. Conclusion

In this chapter, we have taken a few steps in the direction of the philosophical “groundwork,” without which neither the tremendous chances nor the significant dangers of the broader and wider use of AI = ASI may be adequately assessed. By analyzing the different meanings and dimensions of intelligence, we have come to understand that the dreams and night-mares of a transhumanism and posthumanism are to a considerable measure due to an entirely materialist anthropology that leads a growing part of mankind to forget that they are persons and that the

real possession of human, let alone super-human intelligence, lies totally and in principle beyond all present and future possibilities of machines and AI, because, as we understand, a machine and AI unit cannot ever understand anything and therefore does not only not possess any higher intelligence than a human being, but *no intelligence at all.*

Once philosophical insights and distinctions wholly shatter these philosophically absurd dreams of AI = ASI, the truly stunning possibilities of AI = ASI to relate purely syntactic functions and causalities to semantic ones, i.e., to force and programme unintelligent, unthinking and unconscious matter in such a way that, while it functions on completely mechanical, electrical and physical causality of many kinds, the outputs of this purely unintelligent and blind order of causes are so ingeniously connected with meaningful and intelligible calculations and contents of wise discourse that they can mimic and to simulate extreme intelligence. Thereby, AI = ASI also makes many of us forget what and who they are, namely, absolutely thoughtless and unintelligent machines. Like many children, who think of, and speak with the Kasperl puppet as if it were a real person, so many adults today treat an AI pod as a real or even as a hyper-person; they talk to him, they fall in love with him; they want human rights be accorded to their AI companions; they mourn for them and celebrate funerals when they are irreparably broken. (A similar illusion and transformation of the reality of ourselves and in the fantasy of invented and impossible cyborgs in transhumanism has been analyzed sharply by Matyas Szalay, 2024).

If I have contributed to recognizing that all these phenomena show a profound confusion in which many of us lose knowledge of who they are; if I helped dispelling these confusion about AI, while recognizing the incredible and most valuable chances ASI offers, and have situated this wondrous invention, where it truly belongs, and if I have thereby contributed to a controlled and legitimate use of its tremendous positive qualities and to shunning its immense potential harm, I will be most pleased. For this is precisely what I have intended to do. Moreover, it is no small thing to help AI (ASI) users to understand and use their AI (ASI) pods in the truth and according to their nature and limits and not to be seduced by AI to live in a tipsy-turvy world in which it is opined that machines have a higher value than persons.

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