

HUMAN NATURE AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EMOTIONAL CORRESPONDENCE

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Abstract: This paper considers how a careful, reflective phenomenological awareness of particular emotional events can help us to understand the nature of emotions and how they correspond or fail to correspond to things in the world. First, I will approach this from the negative side of things, by considering clear cases in which emotional responses do not seem to fit that which gives rise to them. I claim that it is possible to see that our emotions sometimes correspond and sometimes do not correspond to the things which they are about. Second, the nature of the relata in the relation will be analyzed. I consider the "object" of emotions and consider what properties such an object might require such that an emotion could correspond to it. Finally, I will argue that the relation of emotional correspondence is plausible if the objects in the emotional correspondence relation have real natures.

Introduction

The notion of correspondence between mind and world is often applied to the concept of truth. This notion has yielded "correspondence theories" of truth over the last 100 years from a wide range of philosophers including, Russell, Wittgenstein, Austin, Moore and Husserl. In a correspondence view of truth, a belief is true just in case it matches the way the world is. This is the notion of *adequation* of thing and intellect found as far back as the middle ages, for example, in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. It is possible to conceive of our emotions as similarly "corresponding" to the way things are. Consider one "popular" example from C.S. Lewis' *Abolition of Man*,

Until quite modern times all teachers and even all men believed the universe to be such that certain emotional reactions on our part could be either congruous or incongruous to it—believed, in fact, that objects did not merely receive, but

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could merit, our approval or disapproval, our reverence or our contempt"
(Lewis 1944, p. 14).

Lewis claims that there can be a "fittingness" between objects in the world and our emotions. What Lewis' descriptions here amount to is this. There are objects in the world which have properties. These properties, when perceived appropriately ought to bring about specific emotions in those who perceive them. Emotional responses can correspond or fail to correspond to emotive properties that are in the objects which have them.¹ We might call this view a "correspondence theory of emotional truth."

This paper will consider the notion of correspondence applied to emotion. It will consider how a careful, reflective phenomenological awareness of particular emotional events can help us to understand the nature of emotions and how they correspond or fail to correspond to things in the world.

First, I will approach this from the negative side of things, by considering clear cases in which emotional responses don't seem to fit that which gives rise to them. I claim that it is possible to see that our emotions sometimes correspond and sometimes do not correspond to the things which they are about. For example, one might experience an extreme emotion of raging anger over some small matter such as being cut off on the highway by another motorist. It is possible to recognize that such an extreme emotional "over-reaction" to a minor offense was inappropriate. It did not correspond to the circumstances of that event.

Second, the nature of the relata in the relation will be analyzed. I consider the

¹ Lewis gives examples of this idea as it is applied to a variety of kinds of objects. **Waterfalls:** "To say that the cataract is sublime means saying that our emotion of humility is appropriate or ordinate to the reality" (Lewis, p. 14). **Horses:** He describes "the man who really knows horses and really loves them, not with anthropomorphic illusions, but with ordinate love" (p. 11). **Persons:** "[T]o call children delightful or old men venerable is not simply to record a psychological fact about our own parental or filial emotions as the moment, but to recognize a quality which demands a certain response from us whether we make it or not" (p. 19). **Human Actions:** "When a Roman father told his son that it was a sweet and seemly thing to die for his country, he believed what he said. He was communicating to the son an emotion which he himself shared and which he believed to be in accord with the value which his judgment discerned in noble death" (pp. 21-22).

side of the "object" of emotions and consider what properties such an object might require such that an emotion could correspond to it. Finally, I will argue that the relation of emotional correspondence is plausible if the objects in the emotional correspondence relation have real natures. I will consider one such rejection of real natures in the "subject" side of the correspondence relation and argue that this rejection fails.

I. Awareness of Emotions

In this section of the paper I am working with an analogy of perception and a correspondence view of truth in which one believes that one's keys are on one's desk and one sees one's keys on one's desk. In such cases, we can say that the belief that my keys are on my desk is true because we see the match between the belief that the keys are on the desk and the real perception of the keys being on the desk. This is a very simple way to state a correspondence view of truth. A belief is true if it corresponds or matches the way things are. This is an experience that is very simple for human beings to have, and examples of it abound in ordinary life.

Can the same be said for emotions? An emotional state does not seem to exhibit the same relation of being true or being false in the way that a belief can be said to be true or false. However, if beliefs can be said to be true or false because they correspond or fail to correspond to the way things are, can something similar be said of emotions? If beliefs are evaluated with respect to their truth and falsity based on correspondence or lack thereof, can emotions be so similarly evaluated?

Let us take a case. I am driving with a colleague who is my passenger on a crowded Southern California freeway returning home from work. Traffic is heavy, but moving along at a good pace (around 70 mph /110 kph). I am keeping up with traffic in the middle of a three lane south bound section of highway. From my right, a driver to my right moves ahead of me in the lane to my right, and then moves to the left directly in front of me without signaling. He then moves again into the far left lane of traffic and continues on. The driver's actions did not require me to put on my brakes or take evasive action. Further, I knew then and there that there was no imminent danger to myself or other drivers around us. Yet, at the moment the other driver entered my lane neglecting to use his blinker (turn signal), I respond with visceral anger and proceed to curse and swear at the other

driver, gesticulating with various internationally recognized hand signs of displeasure, all the while my face turning beet red and spittle flying against my own windshield from my intense rage. Suppose my friend who is riding in the front with me glances over and mutters, "Dude, you gotta lighten up... that guy just forgot to use his turn signal."

I immediately realize that I over-reacted. My anger was not commensurate with the situation at hand. The intense rage at that moment was not appropriate. My emotions did not in some way correspond, to the properties of the action during that event. Let us turn to the phenomenology of this event. It is possible to hold before my consciousness the "what it was like" to feel the anger I had during the event under consideration. When I engage in such an act, I am aware of three things. I am aware of the properties of the emotion of anger. While it may be difficult to give an assay of all of the properties of an experience of the emotion of anger, it seems fairly clear that one can distinguish the properties of an experience of an emotion of anger from an emotion of say love or charity. The feeling of anger that I had toward the other driver was one that was essentially constituted by a specific set of properties such that if the experience/feeling lacked those properties, then I would not be experiencing that emotion. I would be experiencing no emotion or some other emotion. To be in an emotional state requires the presence of a set of qualities which are internally related to that state such that if of those qualities were removed, that emotional state would not exist as that emotional state.

The phenomenal qualia of emotions are analogous to the qualia of the experience of color. The experience of redness is characterized by the phenomenal qualities of redness itself. While it may be impossible to give a full assay of the color red as it appears in experience, it seems reasonable to say that one can see in that experience that one is having a "red experience" as opposed to a "yellow" or "green" experience, even if one had not use of or facility with either color concepts or the language needed to express ideas about those concepts. Emotional states (like color states) have as their essential feature the phenomenological quality of being in that state. Here are a few arguments to this conclusion.

1. All mental states are intentional states.
2. All awarenesses of experiences of emotions are mental states.
3. Therefore, all awarenesses of experiences of emotions are intentional states.

4. All intentional states are essentially constituted by their phenomenological qualities.
5. All awarenesses of experiences of emotions are intentional states.
6. Therefore, all awarenesses of experiences of emotions are essentially constituted by their phenomenological qualities.

What the conclusion of these arguments gives us is that when we are aware of our emotions, we are aware of them because of their phenomenological qualities. It is these qualities then, if there is such a thing as an emotions' "correspondence" to an object external to an emotion, which allow us to see whether they are congruent or fitting with respect to those objects.

II. The Objects of Emotions

I have argued so far that it is possible to be aware of experiences of emotions and that those experiences are essentially constituted by their phenomenological qualities. The next step is to ask, to what are my emotions directed such that they are inappropriate (or appropriate), *to what* are they inappropriate (or appropriate)?

Consider the analogy with straightforward experiences of truth. I form a belief that my keys are on my desk. This belief has intentional phenomenal qualities which are about the way things are. If my belief is false, then to what is it false? One could argue that it is false just in case the intentional qualities exemplified in the belief do not match/correspond to the exemplified qualities in the objects about which the belief is directed. This would be the case even if I were not aware of the properties of the object to which my beliefs are directed. Thus, even without a perception of my keys being (or not being) on my desk, my belief would be true or false, it would correspond or fail to correspond just in case the keys being on the desk is exemplified in the world.

I can come to have an experience of a perception of the keys being on the desk, and then I can see that my belief is fulfilled by the experience of the perception of the keys being on the desk. Yet, ultimately my belief is true or false independent of the experience *because of* the real properties really exemplified in the world which my beliefs may or may not correspond. That is, a *perception* is neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth or falsity of my belief. It isn't necessary, because the matching between the intentional properties exemplified in my concept/belief of the way the world is (e.g. my keys being on my desk) can be

a real match even if I lack a perception of the matching.

A perception isn't sufficient either, for it is possible that my perception is faulty. I open my door to my darkened office, turn on the lights while looking directly at them, turn my head to look at my desk, and because of a vivid after-image of the lights, I perceive my desk as lacking my keys being on it; I then leave my office thinking that my belief that my keys were on my desk is false, but because of this perceptual error, my belief is true. So, the perception is not sufficient for my belief being true. However, the perception is that vehicle by means of which we are able to see whether our beliefs are true or false. The fact that we do very regularly see that our beliefs match and correspond to reality is an indication that truth in this sense of correspondence is a reasonable place to begin an analysis of truth.

Turning now to emotions, to what, if anything could my phenomenal experience of an emotion correspond? One option which is quite an old one is that emotions are directed upon "formal objects" of experience. The notion of a formal object as that towards which an emotion is directed has been viewed as entirely plausible. One such view was articulated by Thomas Aquinas. According to Peter King, Aquinas maintained that, "the sensitive appetite, as a passive power, is reduced from potency to act when it 'inherits' objectual content from the evaluative response-dependent concept (which is the actualization of the estimative power). For the resulting act of the sensitive appetite is the emotion of fear when it is caused by the formal object the wolf as a hard to-avoid imminent evil, with the appropriate associated somatic responses" (King 2012, 215).

More recently, Ronald De Sousa has used the notion of formal object as the "specific criterion of success," which for beliefs is truth, and which for emotions is the "success" "that its target" have the quality which corresponds to the emotion. For example, an emotion of fear is successful if "its target be fearsome," and an emotion of love is successful if "its target be lovable" (De Sousa 1987, 20).² More elaborately, De Sousa states, "The formal object will still define the actual nature of the emotion and define its conditions of appropriateness, in terms of whether the proposition or situation type has a property that instantiates the formal object. My attitude to being late for dinner is appropriately one of *worry* only if being late for dinner is rude or inconvenient or imprudent, or in short has

² For additional information about the notion of success and fittingness to formal objects see De Sousa 2011, p. 57.

any property on which supervenes the higher-order property of being *worrisome*" (Ibid. 139). He re-states these notions as his thesis IX: "If an emotion has a purely propositional object, it consists in an attitude appropriate to some fact, proposition, event, or situation type that has a property instantiating the formal object of that emotion ." (Ibid. 139).

De Sousa's formal objects are connected somehow with something outside of them. However, De Sousa following Nissenbaum does not think that there is any object directedness of emotions such that there can be a strong natural correlation or correspondence between formal object and real object, or between emotions themselves and real objects. Here are his reasons for this view.

First, he claims that Nissenbaum's argument to the conclusion the notion of "object-directedness intentionality" (ODI) of emotions is incoherent. De Sousa presents Nissenbaum's argument as follows in an argument against ODI.

P1. ODI means that "emotions have a content, specifiable in terms of propositions and/or denoting expressions" or ODI refers to refers to a "genuine relation to some existing object" in which emotions relate to "various 'aspects' of *emotional episodes*" including "the individual state of affairs on which the emotion is 'focused,' as well as various explanatory properties (p. 72)" (Ibid. 113)..

P2. It is not the case that ODI means that "emotions have a content, specifiable in terms of propositions and/or denoting expressions" because intentionality "is merely a grammatical matter without ontological implications" (Ibid. 113).

C: Therefore, ODI refers to refers to a "genuine relation to some existing object"... (Ibid. 113).

De Sousa claims that his own view of the relation in P2 is one in which emotions emerged biologically from "simple causality of reflexes" to "the full capacity for singular reference" with the "unifying idea" behind the emotion-world relation" being one of "*meaningful representation of information*" (Ibid. 114).

The main difficulty with this rejection of the objectivity of emotions based on intentionality is the rejection of intentionality as that by means of which our psychological states are what they are. This, I think is due to the simple fact that the qualities of intentional states are not reducible to physical properties. Examples from the literature in the philosophy of mind such as "What Mary

Didn't Know" (Jackson 1986) or "What It's like to be a Bat" (Nagel 1974) type arguments, coupled with the reality and uniqueness of first person awareness of intentional states, as well as the incorrigibility of such states, can be thought of as a starting points for a longer defense of the irreducibility of intentionality to physical states.

De Sousa's restatement of Nissenbaum's argument presupposes that intentionality is reducible to or nothing but something linguistic *qua* "propositions and/or denoting expressions." However, this seems unlikely. For if one maintains that intentionality is linguistic, one simply shifts the question of whether or not propositions and denoting expressions can be what they are without the reality of intentionality. Both propositions and denoting expressions have *content*, which seems to be characterized by antecedent mental phenomenal intentional qualities. Therefore, P2 in Nissenbaum's conclusion has not been, indeed cannot be established. Therefore, De Sousa's argument against ODI is unsound.

Indeed, De Sousa's claim (following Nissenbaum) is that of a "unifying idea" of "meaningful representation of information." However, all three of these concepts seem to contradict P2 above. Intentionality as irreducible phenomenal mental qualities is central to the very notion of meaning, representing, and even informing. This view faces a dilemma: either accept the irreducibility of phenomenal mental qualities or give an account of how meaning, representation and information (analogously to emotions) are themselves "episodes" and "states of affairs" that are biologically emergent. It may be difficult for any reasonable argument for this sort of conclusion. If intentionality is reducible to causal relations (regardless of how complex) then consider two arguments in basic logical form with each statement identified with a particular brain state.

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| I. <i>Modus Ponens</i> | <i>Modus Ponens physicalized</i> |
| 1. If p then q | → Brain State 1 (BS1) |
| 2. p | → BS2 |
| 3. Therefore, q | → BS3 |
| II. <i>Denying Antecedent</i> | <i>Denying Antecedent physicalized</i> |
| 1.* If p then q | → BS1* |
| 2.* not- p | → BS2* |
| 3.* not- q | → BS3* |

Assume for the sake of discussion that BS1-BS3* are really nothing more than complex causal relations of the variety that De Sousa believes gives rise to our mental lives. Suppose that one person argues for 3 and another for 3*. If 3 and 3* are ontologically reducible to (or identical with) complex causal relations, then how does one non-arbitrarily choose between them? Unless there is a real intentionality to logical relations such that we can be directly aware of those relations because of the intentional phenomena, then logic itself becomes something that is a mere tool used for our own interests. De Sousa's view of the relationship between emotions, formal objects of emotions and the world without intentionality as a real, irreducible phenomena, seems to be unreasonable because it does away with rationality itself. Thus De Sousa faces a dilemma, either accept the reality of intentionality or admit that the alternative view is unreasonable.

Intentional states (e.g. concepts) connect with their objects because those objects really instantiate the same universals that are intentionally present in intentional states. Take a simple case of truth. My belief that the book is in the bookstore is about the book being in the bookstore, and is what allows me to guide myself to the bookstore to look to see if there is a match between my belief and the way things are. The intentional states of the belief *fit* the books in the way a door fits its frame. Both realities stand in a relation to the same universal. If this is possible for emotions, then the intentional qualities of an emotional state will not only be directed towards the world, but be related to the same universals that are instantiated in the world. De Sousa speaks of things like this when he says things like an emotion of fear is successful if "its target be fearsome." However, the notion of success for De Sousa is quite different than the notion of "correspondence" between an intentional state and its object. I have given brief reasons why I think De Sousa's causal relations (which are supposed to replace intentional relations given Nissenbaum's argument) will be problematic for understanding the relation between being afraid and something being fearful. If this route fails, then we must examine other options.

One option is to follow something analogous to G.E. Moore's view of moral qualities as "non-natural" properties that stand in no relation to the things that have them. They are just out there in the objects. One possible worry for this is that it leads to subjectivism or emotivism about moral (and I would add emotional properties).

A second alternative is to consider that our emotions simply correspond only to our formal objects within the mind. This might preserve intentionality, but has

other problems. For example, take a case that is quite old. In his analysis of Thomas Aquinas' view of the relationship between emotional states and that to which they are directed, Pete King writes, "For the resulting act of the sensitive appetite is the emotion of fear when it is caused by the formal object the wolf as a hard-to- avoid imminent evil, with the appropriate associated somatic responses. If an object were presented as a hard-to-attain imminent good, say, the way the sheep might appear to the wolf, the act of the wolf's sensitive appetite would be hope" (King 2012, 215). The idea here is that an emotion is caused by and correlates to the formal object of that emotion, X perceived as F.

The difficulty with the relation of emotional state and formal object is as follows. Consider two sheep, S1 and S2 who see the same wolf but have two different formal objects and thus two different emotions.

S1 has formal object O1: {wolf-as-a-hard-to-avoid-imminent-evil} and has emotion E1: fear.

S2 has formal object O2: {wolf-as-a-hard-to-attain-imminent-good} and has emotion E2: hope.

If S1 is the right emotion (as King says in his paper) for a sheep "because of the kind of thing each is," then it seems like O1 causing (constituting) E1 is because of the properties of the wolf which make O1 what it is. In other words E1 is the right emotion because it corresponds to the properties of the wolf. If this is the case, then emotions appropriately correspond not merely to formal objects but to objects themselves (albeit through or by means of formal objects).

In the concluding section of King's paper, King discusses the analogy of perception which he claims Aquinas uses. He writes, "Indeed, Aquinas exploits the structural parallel between perception and emotion frequently, and, as with perceptions, he holds that the most fundamental way to understand emotions is to see them as modes of engagement with the world" (Ibid. 223).

I take this to mean here that Aquinas does believe that our emotions do "engage the world" by fitting or not fitting to real properties of objects and not merely fitting or not fitting the "formal objects" within the presence of emotional states. It is the objects themselves which have the properties they do regardless of the formal objects that an individual may experience to which our emotions ultimately fit/correspond or not. Further, this is what explains how emotions can

be wrong; the formal objects don't correspond to any properties in the objects which they are about.

This leads us to our third option. One can argue that the intentional properties of emotions correspond to real emotional properties in the world that occur in objects *not* in a non-natural *Moorean* sense, but due to other natural properties, had by human actions, states of affairs, artifacts, really anything that exists.³ This view would require the existence of what I want to call "natures" or "essences" in the Aristotelian-Thomistic sense of properties which make a thing to be and to be the kind of thing it is. This would apply to all of reality. Most importantly it would apply to human nature. For if there is not a kind of thing we are, then there cannot be any consistent way in which our intentional emotional states correspond to the way things are outside of ourselves. Only if we are a certain kind of thing, only if there is real human nature can emotional phenomenal qualities correspond to the real emotional qualities had by things because of their natures. Thus, our emotions could be congruent or incongruent, correspond or not correspond to the way things are analogously to the way in which our beliefs correspond to the world when they are true.

III. Human Nature: The Kinds of Things We Are

To give a robust defense of the reality of natures, is beyond the scope of this paper. However, I would like to consider De Sousa's rejection of natures and show that at least this attempt to reject human nature fails. This of course will not show that there is human nature, or what exactly it is, but given our discussion of the nature of emotions, since human nature plays this crucial role on the view I want to advocate, I believe that I must show how one major objection to it is highly problematic.

In his paper, *Being Natural* (De Sousa 2000), De Sousa states, "There is no human nature" (De Sousa 2000, 287).⁴ I take this to be logically equivalent to

³ Non-existent objects might present some challenges, but might be handled counterfactually.

⁴ De Sousa also maintains this claim when he says, "The problem with human nature, however, is that if it refers to a set of interesting properties true of all and only humans, and robust enough to support normative standards, then there probably is no such thing." (De Sousa and Adam Morton 2002, p. 254-255).

the claim:

P: No humans are beings with natures or more formally: $(x) (Hx \supset \sim Nx)$.

How does De Sousa prove P? If P is a negative universal categorical proposition, and it is known by deduction, then there are four possible argument types by means of which it can be proven, in two possible moods and two possible figures for each mood of traditional Aristotelian logic, EAE and AEE. De Sousa cannot use EAE arguments. The minor premise in each argument contains an A proposition with a universal generalization about all human beings. Since P denies human nature (*qua* any quality all human beings have in common), this route is closed for him.

This leaves the AEE moods with their two figures (which are simply versions of conversion of an E proposition). This would look something like this argument, let's call it AEE 2/4 for the mood and figure of the argument:

AEE 2/4

P1: All Nature-having-beings are *mmm*.⁵

P2: No Humans are *mmm*.

C: No Humans are Nature-having-beings. ⁶

Can De Sousa use this mood? The answer is, no. Here is why. A negative universal makes a claim about all members of each of the categories in question. That is to say, both the subject and predicate terms are distributed in an E proposition. However, if one denies that there are any properties that all members of the category share, then one can't even specify the category of "humans" and thus can't say anything about the category at all, including that they lack natures. To say that Humans don't have natures is to refer to a category, "human." To refer to a category is to refer to something which all members of the category have in common. De Sousa denies that there is any property or properties which all members have in common. Therefore, De Sousa can't reasonably prove P. In fact, given what De Sousa says throughout his paper, what appears to be extreme

⁵ Where *mmm* stands for any middle term given.

⁶ I have intentionally left the middle term here un-specified, because given what De Sousa presents in his paper, I'm not sure he can have a middle term. A middle term would have to be the same term in P1 and P2, but if there are no natures (including natures of terms in arguments), then there can be no middle term connecting the premises in this syllogism.

nominalism about universals as applied to biological entities seems to cut against the possibility asserting P1 in the above argument. If AEE 2/4 is to be established, the middle term must apply. However, if DS denies natures across the board, then he would be forced to deny P1, regardless of what the middle term is. And this, I think shows the absurdity (possibly self-refuting) nature of P. If P were true, it could be proven to be true, but to prove it to be true, one would have to maintain that all human beings could see (or possibly could see) that it were true, by means of shared logical ability. If that were the case, then one maintains that there is a property that all human beings have in common, but that is part of what it means to have a human nature.

De Sousa additionally says the following regarding natures which if taken together entail certain difficulties. Consider the following claim about human characteristics:

HC: "We have the word of biologists that the lineage of humans carries with it no interesting set of defining human characteristics" (De Sousa 2000, p. 292).

If this is the case, a description of the type, "X is F" is being asserted by HC which involves at least two things.

- 1) x has a relation to other "members of F," and
- 2) x stands in relation of being of the lineage of other Fs.

Here's the problem with HC and 1 and 2 taken together. HC and 1 pull against one another. If one claims that x stands in a "relation to other members of F" one has to specify what type of relation. If the notion of "relation" is to be intelligible, it must be specific. There must be a kind of relation to which all members of F stand. However, and here's the rub, if there are no properties connecting all members of F together, then there can be no members of F at all, unless grouped arbitrarily, but then the question is what differentiates Fs from non-Fs? One cannot specify. If one can't specify, then it seems that one can't specify at all, including being specific about N.

In addition, HC and 2 pull against one another. How can x be a member of F because of lineage and the lineage itself has no interesting set of defining characteristics for membership in F? If x is F because of L, and L has no set of defining characteristics, then one can't say x is F because of L. In addition, if every human being is a counter-example, then there just aren't human beings. There are $h_1...h_n$ s. However, if there really is no commonality, one can't even

assert that there are $h_1...h_n$ s, because "h" itself has to have something in common with other "hs". What De Sousa has here is *difference* in the worst possible sense. It is worst because it is self-refuting. To say there is no commonality is to make a negative universal generalization, which is a type of commonality.

Finally, quoting David Hull (Hull 1986) De Sousa asserts, that, "Variability is at the core of our being" (Ibid. 292). If this is true, then it implies that "To be is to be variable" which seems logically equivalent to "To be is to vary." Suppose we call this proposition V: "To be (human) is to vary." Suppose we consider, Not-V: "It is not the case that to be is to vary." In the strongest sense, the conjunction V and Not-V is also to vary. Therefore, V and Not-V is to vary.

So, we can assert that to vary is to be variable. V and Not-V is variability, and thus V and Not-V are at the core of our being. But, V and Not-V are logically contradictory. Therefore, logical contradiction is at the core of our being. If logical contradiction is at the core of our being, then this applies to V itself. V and Not-V are at the core of being human. To be human is to vary *and* not to vary. Thus, it follows that De Sousa's claim *and* its contradictory both apply to human nature. That is De Sousa's claims are asserted to be both true and false. This is worrisome.

To alleviate this worry, De Sousa states, "The sum of our emotional reactions to the worlds we create is *all there is* to 'Human Nature'" (Ibid. 307). This will apply equally to emotional reactions and to rationality as well. Although De Sousa has been seeking "a way of forming rational judgments" (Ibid. 307), if there are no human natures, there are no rational beliefs either. Rationality (a property that could be exemplified by all beings having a human nature) will itself fall by the wayside. If rationality is connected with emotions, then it will itself be part of the "stories we are able to tell ourselves," and "as history changes, so do the stories" (Ibid. p. 307), according to De Sousa. If that's the case, then we can't be *rationally* persuaded to believe what we are presented with in De Sousa's paper. There are other ways to motivate belief, but in this case it can't be reason which does the work.

Thus, I conclude with this idea. I have argued that emotional states can be identified by their phenomenal qualities. I have argued that these qualities could correspond if there were something for them to correspond to. I have considered, briefly the problems with the notion of "formal object" as that to which emotions correspond. Finally, I have argued that one plausible defeater of the notion of natures, as presented by De Sousa as that to which, or by means of which, our

emotions correspond is highly problematic. What remains to be done is to offer a clear account of what exactly the nature of being human is, such that the real phenomenal qualities with which we are all familiar can be such that they correlate to real emotive properties which are in objects apart from our experience of them. This is a long, difficult task which cuts against materialist notions of emotions, but attempts to capture the old notion that our emotions can be commensurate with the natural world.⁷

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⁷ For a description of what might be involved in this type of project see, Salmela 2006 where she states, "In so far as emotions involve evaluative perceptions of actual objects in terms of formal properties, an analogous account may be available for emotions" (p. 390).