

## COGNITIVE HOLISM: UNDERSTANDING COGNITIVE HOLISTIC THEORY OF LANGUAGE AND ITS PUBLIC UTILITY

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*Abstract: Understanding an indivisible cognition through the analytic part has its own beauty that we can call analytic skill, but that must aim at clarity and conception of the cognition which is a whole approached through individual steps. Composite forms have their own beauty, imposition of the cognition on our different allegiance has a different beauty but if one does not understand clearly the different roles the indivisible cognition plays in causing the pleasure in some and pain in others, amusing in some and an obsession in others, illuminating in some and deviating in others, one cannot enjoy wisdom and bliss. Holism talks about language as power, the potency that works differently in wise and in ignorant in causing different effects that veils and deviates from the indivisible cognition. Interpretation of the cognition needs cognitive holistic approach to realize wisdom.*

Consciousness, at human level, is channelized for flashings of concepts/thoughts that are determinate because language infuses them. All that consciousness flashes is a concept that serves as incentive for action including producing verbal noises and is analyzed and interpreted variously to make it understandable to beginners and ignorant. The language that infuses cognition is intelligible being and so is the thought we directly know them when they flash. In order to articulate the intelligible being of language, we use verbal noises (dhvaniyān), gestures and written marks (lipiyān) which differ from one to the other language speaking communities. Cognition is indivisible whole and language only determinates it. The unit of language that determinates verbal cognition and that satiates the expectancy of a complete sense/meaning, is a complete unit of communication that we term sentence. Indivisible sentence, in an analytic scheme, is divided into words and words into nominal, verb, prefixes, suffixes, particles and post-positions which are divided into letters and accordingly their meanings are decided in analytic scheme as universal and individual. There is difference between the concept and the flashing of it. There may be theoretical controversy over concepts “whether they are given or innate or abstracted or constructed,” but there is no controversy on the fact that they are cognized only when they flash. Cognition is the flashing of the concept; the concepts are grasped when flash. Thus, the language and the meaning are universals. For verbal noises we articulate, the term “dhvaniyān” and for the written marks the term “lipiyān” is popularly used; they are individuals. Written marks by proxy stand for verbal noises and are more lasting than the noises which disappear the moment they are spoken.

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Like words, sentences are also universal not only because they are manifested by different individual words but also because identical cognition in different instances and occurrences of them are caused. Letters spoken or written in sequences are produced by the effort and the special effort of the speaking organs;<sup>1</sup> the universal of them causes incentive to produce them, that is, individuals. The universals are manifested through the individuals when they are heard. Verbal noises are individuals; they are grasped; surrounded in the ears pit, they are transformed into speech sounds. Written marks (Lipiyān) by proxy stand for the verbal sounds (dhvaniyān) we speak. They are atomic; spoken or written in a sequence and are called letters (varṇa). Syntactically, the words are formed by the association of letters and an association of the letters conveying a meaning (padārtha), is called word (pada). The sequence is conventionally fixed; however, there may be changes in style and tone involved in speaking from community to community. Thus, meaningful association of letters is called word and the association of such words, for a complete sentential meaning (vākyārtha), is called sentence (vākya). It is through the understanding of the process of their syntactic and semantic construction that they are analyzed into their parts and accordingly their meaning is known.

### I. Difference between Knowledge and Cognition

Information, knowledge and cognition are different concepts. In brief, information is a collection of events which have occurred beforehand in different part of time; it serves as the material available for an investigation into knowledge. Knowledge is concerned with a set of propositions or with the understanding of these concepts. It is theoretical and practice based, foundational and abstract; it is used for knowing in all parts of time: past, future and present and by any source of knowledge. But cognition is always accomplished in the present. One can understand something only when the

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<sup>1</sup> There is no possibility of their production if the flashing or sphoṭa as the cause of incentive to speak is not revealed. For a clear understanding of the process of producing articulate utterances, let us observe the verse: *Ātmabuddhyā samartharthān manoyunkte vivakṣayā. Manaḥ kāyāgnimāhanti sa prerayati mārutam*, from Pāṇinīśikṣā-6/7, accepted by almost all masters of traditions of Indian philosophy of language. According to it, prior to speaking, expectancy (vivakṣā) to speak is caused in a speaker and that is caused because of flashing of consciousness beforehand. This flashing causes incentive to speak. Because of expectancy, the mind (mana) associated with intellect (buddhi) stimulates digestive fire (jāṭharāgni). This stimulation stirs up the vital air (prāṇavāyu) and touching with stations or centers of speaking different letters (varṇasthāna), in the head, moves fast upward from the navel to the head. Knocked from the top of the skull, the air stirs down fast through the throat vibrating speech centers from which it is externalized in the form of verbal noises to be distinguished as dental, palatal, etc. Since we are accustomed and habitual in the art of speaking we do not mind the subtleties involved in the emergence of verbal noises. Verbal noises are material in nature; they cannot produce themselves. In brief, no verbal sound can be produced or there is no possibility of speaking if the sphoṭa, the flash of understanding that causes incentive for speaking is denied. Sphoṭa is accepted as the cause of incentive to the production of articulations.

concept of that thing flashes in the mind. Past memories and future predictions are also cognized in present. Concepts flash or figure always in present, and infused with language which we call cognition. It is that figuring which is communicated, shared and acknowledged. One can claim to know, can respond and reflect over the concept only when they “flash”. It is these flashes which serve as incentive to our immediate determination - enabling us to decide to do or not to do or otherwise. Knowledge may be determinate or indeterminate, true and false, valid and invalid but Cognition is always determinate, it is verity and serves as the cognitive ground of logical skill of validity and invalidity. However, for brevity sake, I put the two, knowledge and cognition, into the category of knowledge due to its popular use.

## II. Difference between higher knowledge and pure knowledge

If life is the process of conscious efforts to make our thoughts clear, the mind creative and the action fearless then it is essentially and inevitably spiritual to reach to the pure knowledge. There is difference between higher knowledge and pure knowledge. Higher and even highest knowledge on an issue may be interested but true and pure knowledge is independent of our interest to any sort of allegiances - sensory, physiological, psychological, religious, scientific and cultural. Pure knowledge is independent and free from all sorts of our allegiances. We are sometimes, captive of grasping it in the way our skill is trained. It is true that certain type of analysis, clarification and argumentation based on affirming our basic conclusion even in cases of interested knowledge are utilized for our enrichment and progress. Hence, they are no less good than the pure knowledge in merit. Interested knowledge in any case is not free from being interested with our allegiances and hence, not pure; in case of pure knowledge we get the light, the flash, free from all sorts of allegiance. It flashes through garbs which are not private property of any and infused with concept-language which, being the flash of consciousness is ubiquitous. The knowledge shines forth and we feel determinately illuminated and, our mind enjoys more creativity to resolve the actions. A higher knowledge may contradict to that of another but true but pure knowledge is contradictory to none. Philosophy serves to clarify our thoughts against the doubts, delusions, inconsistency, mysteries and other sorts of ignorance so as to make us fit for a thinking that enables us to perceive clearly the nature and value of our rational existence and the way of a wise. To live the muddled way of passions to our allegiances is an abuse of rationality and, hence, to a rational living. To live in and with the world of thoughts is to live in spirituality. Thoughts are the flashes of consciousness; these flashes comprise of intelligible beings of the language and the meaning and their identical awareness; the discriminating knowledge of them leads to wisdom. Philosophy is concerned with the highest level of reflection even on lowest problems of life. One becomes reflective only when consciousness confronts some problem; the problem flashes; we cognize anything only when it flashes and the thing, as flash is intelligible being we know, we concentrate, analyze, reflect, rationalize, dilute and lastly resolve the problem. During reflecting, we are in constant channel of self-awareness with cognition. Unlike interested knowledge, no problem for pure knowledge is problem for itself. Any problem is a problem till it is not clear and when

it is clear, it is removed; the discourse with cognition is satiated and that provides bliss. It does in no way amount that after the resolution of a problem, the philosophy ends. Some or the other problems confront in mind and that involve us for further philosophical reflection. It is the proportion of rational/ philosophical hunger that one is evaluated as stupid, rational and wise respectively. One can evaluate one's rationality in proportion to his/her rational hunger. Throughout the life some persons live only the physical and sensuous hunger and never feel a need of rational hunger. Rational hunger is another name of confronting with problems and reflecting over to get rid of them.

Things outside, that in Kantian Jargon, are the thing in-itself, and are known by implication or by inference made on the basis of intelligible objects as their external substratum. In other words, they are transcendental to our cognition; the things our consciousness does not flash. The language does not reveal or express things outside; it only indicates and, hence, in case of external things, language is only reference/ pointer or representation. Pure knowledge, that flashes, intelligible being of language and meaning as the object, is taken by imposition as interested knowledge. Western Philosophers of language and different schools of Indian philosophy, excluding Pāṇinian philosophers like Mahābhāṣyakāra and his commentators, specially, Bhartṛharian, give primacy to meaning or thought and accept language as tool/reference/representation that only represents the meaning. It only a vehicle or tool for conveying the thoughts. For them, the two are separate. Language is not thought and vice versa. Taking that way true and pure knowledge cannot be accrued. A pointer is a tool, a device that acts from outside only as indicator to things but does not reveal or express the things. For us, language is expresser; it expresses the meaning non-differently and, thus, there is no difference between language and meaning the language, expresses non-differently.<sup>2</sup> The expresser is *sphoṭa* and the meaning it expresses is termed as *pratibhā*. It is called *sphoṭa* because it flashes its own nature first, from which its meaning flashed non-differently. If meaning is not infused with language then analysis of language will not necessarily be the analysis of meaning because meaning, in case of the theories who take the two as different, is separate and independent. No meaning is possible, isolated from language that expresses.

### III. Controversy over Potency of Language

Indian controversy on many meaning by word (*śabda*) concerns with the concept of its potency. There are three basic views regarding potency of language. First, there are potencies more than one, that is, denotative power (*abhidhā*) in the word and second that the language itself is power (*śakti*). the third view is that there is no other than the

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<sup>2</sup> “*Kīmasmākam vastugatena vicāreṇa, Arthastvasmākam yaḥ śabdenabhidhīyate,*” Tripādi on Mahābhāṣya 1/1, Edited by V.B. Bhagwat & Saroja Bhate, Bhandarakar Oriental Research Institute: Poona, 1986.

denotative power in the word as we find in Māhima Bhaṭṭa's Vyaktiviveka.<sup>3</sup> All other systems of Indian philosophy, except Grammarians accept two that is figurative power (lakṣaṇā) in the word. Vaiyākaraṇas have altogether a different view. For them, the language (śabda) itself is śakti. Kumarila Mīmāṃsakas and Kāśmīra Śaiva philosophers accept letters and the words formed by their association as meaningful units. The sentences are formed by association of words. Sentential- meaning emerges out of association of words-meanings. The words are Vācaka (denotation) and the meaning they convey are vācyas (denoted = padārtha). Similar is the case with linguists like Naiyayikas, Vedantins, Buddhists and Jainas. Letters are not meaningful units for them; word by its natural power, that is śakti, conveys word-meaning that is denotative meaning (vācyārtha) and sentential meaning emerges out of association of word-meanings which they call figurative meaning (lakṣyārtha). The two powers nitya śakti and kārya śakti are therewith words because of which it acts on for word - meaning and sentential- meaning respectively. Nityaśakti is literal power on the basis of which the word is called vācaka (signifier) and the meaning is called vācyā (signified). Kāryaśakti is the power of the words emerged by association with other word- meaning that is, sentential meaning. The sentential meaning according to Naiyayikas is called meaning by association (sansargamaryādā).

Rhetorics accept three powers in the word and these powers, in a sequence, act on independently for the three categories of meaning they fit with. For example, the abhidhā śakti acts on for denotative meaning of the word, the intended power (lakṣaṇā) acts on, in cases the abhidhārtha is not intended, for lakṣaṇārtha. For example, the sentential meaning 'residence on the bank of the Ganges' is taken by lakṣaṇā because the denotative meaning 'the residence in the current of the water' is not conducive by the statement (Gangāyām Ghoṣaḥ). If the two sorts of meanings are not intended then the third power 'vyanjanā' works for vyangārtha that is non-intended or implied meaning of the word. In the example under consideration, force number third that is vyanjanāśakti acts on when the earlier two powers are not conducive, for the meaning 'cool and sacred house' by the expression 'Gangāyām ghoṣaḥ'. Different from them, Grammarians do not accept two or three powers in words/sentences rather they accept the 'language (śabda) itself is power (śakti)'. It is because of energy or light that it conveys all meanings literal, intended and non-intended. The word expresses all meaning of which denotative meaning is primary. The denotative meaning is imposed by some similarity on meaning intended. Meanings that are known by the closeness or nearness of the denotative meaning is tertiary meaning (nāntarīyakārtha). For example, the denotative meaning of the word cow is cowness; by intention it is imposed on cowherd and by the closeness of the

<sup>3</sup>Anumāne'ntarbhāvaḥ sarvasyaiva dhvaneḥ prakāśayitum. Vyaktiviveka, Māhīmbhaṭṭa, with commentary by Ruyyaka, edited with Vaikharī, Hindi commentary, by Brahmanand Tripathi, Chaukhambha Surabharati Prakashana, Varanasi 1987. the text is written to refute his predecessor Anandavardhan, who propounded theory of dhvani in his Dhvanyaloka. Māhīmbhaṭṭa shows in the beginning verse of first vimarsa of his treatise, that dhvani is not different from lakṣaṇā and thus he reduces it along with vyanjanā into inference.

cowness, tertiary or non-intended meanings that is, the number, gender of the cow are also known. The word is naturally fit to express all the meanings and the division of meaning as intended and non-intended and deciding them so are based on popularity, proportion of sharing less or more, closeness or proximity with the denotative meaning and other factors.

The uniqueness of the cognitive holism is that it accepts the existence of the word and of the sentences as well. Both are expressers (vācaka) and have their independent denotative meanings. The word is the power for expressing word-meaning and so is the sentence for sentential meaning. However, grammarians accept sentential form as original unit that satiates the expectancy of a complete sense/meaning. They accept the words, suffixes, prefixes, etc., derived by the analysis of the sentential whole into parts. The parts have their own existence in the analytic scheme and, hence, denotations (vācakas) of word –meaning. Sentences are also denotative, they denote sentential-cognition. It accepts sentence and sentential meaning, indivisible, original unit of cognition and communication. The sentence is indivisible whole and is divided artificially into words and their meanings. The indivisible sentential cognition is cognitive whole and with the analytic scheme, it is not really divided; it is made understandable through the steps, that is, words and their meanings; their existence in analytical scheme is also real. In brief, unlike all others, this school does not accept figurative meaning and the concept of three powers in the word. For it, the language itself is power because of which a word is naturally fit to express word-meaning and so is a sentence the sentential meaning.

#### IV. Non - difference of Language and Thought

There are popularly two theories about the relation of language and thought. First, they are separate and independent and second, they are infused or non-different. Difference of language and meaning / thought is acceptable to those who take that the law of language and that of thought are different. Western and Indian schools of philosophy other than Pāṇinian Grammarian take only the meaning as thought and make a difference between the two by taking language only as a referring tool of thought. For the theory discussed here in, language is thought/concept. If language and thought are different and the meaning is transcendental to language then as Jacques Derrida observes,<sup>4</sup> the analysis of language (separate from thought) will not

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<sup>4</sup> Logocentrism is described by Derrida as a “metaphysics of presence,” which is motivated by a desire for a “transcendental signified.” A “transcendental signified” is a signified which transcends all signifiers, and is a meaning which transcends all signs. A “transcendental signified” is also a signified concept or thought which transcends any single signifier, but which is implied by all determinations of meaning. Derrida argues that the “transcendental signified” may be deconstructed by an examination of the assumptions which underlie the “metaphysics of presence.” For example, if presence is assumed to be the essence of the signified, then the proximity of a signifier to the signified may imply that the signifier is able to reflect the presence of the signified. If presence is assumed to be the essence of the signified, then the remoteness of a signifier from the signified may imply that the signifier is unable, or may only be barely able, to reflect the presence of the signified. This interplay between proximity

then be the analysis of thought; it will be difficult to accept philosophy as a system of analysis of language for clarification of thought, and, hence, it will be an aimless game. If language and thought are taken as different how can the clarification of the latter by analysis of the former be achieved? Not only philosophy but the analysis will also be a useless task if language and thought are taken as separate. It is rather putting the cart in the track of philosophical move to assume language and thought as different on one hand and to accept analysis of language as a basis of the clarification of thought on the other hand. This difficulty is equally applicable to all those philosophies, which take language as confined to language-token and also to those who take language as abstracted from verbal utterances. For the autonomy theory, the same idea from the point of view of expressibility is language, and from the point of view of that which is expressed by it, is the meaning. Language is concept/ thought-object governed by the law of cognition infused by language. The idea of infusion of language and thought or language and cognition serve as the ground of our philosophical activities as cognitive activity par excellence.

#### V. Language as Expression versus Representation

On the nature of language philosophers are having different opinion based on allegiance to their systems. Language is taken as representation that stands for the thought and reality which are the things represented. Likewise some others take it as reference that refers to the things or reality in the empirical world or in the world of our empirical experience. In J. L. Austin's functional analysis,<sup>5</sup> language is functional; it performs not several activities grossly categorized as locution, illocution and elocutionary acts. Traditional way of taking language as reference and representation is challenged by Austin he shows a third possibility that is, it is functional. Cognitive holism discussed herein accepts language as expresser and the referential, representational and function uses of it are known so because they are also expressed so when presented by language. This view widens the philosophical reflections on language on one hand and properly estimates the potency of language on the other. Viewing from holistic point of view the representation, reference views of language have their own pitfalls. I am putting a brief account of them that follow- The problem of identical cognition arises if language is taken as the representation. The cognition expressed by language is identical cognition of the language and meaning it reveals non-differently. In the representation theory, the facts are derived by perception. The entity perceived is retained in the mind by memory and the fact as resurrected in memory comes to the mind when one desires to represent that. Thus, there is no principle to base the identical cognition of the instant entities perceived, the fact resurrected in memory, the language and the fact represented by language. To

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and remoteness is also interplay between presence and absence, and between interiority and exteriority. Derrida: The father of Deconstruction, <https://newderrida>.

<sup>5</sup> *Philosophical Papers*, J.L.Austin, second edition, edited by J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock, Oxford University Press, London 1970, chapter 3, the meaning of a word, pp. 55-75.

accept the mind, as the base is to give undue importance to subjective element i.e., mind to which all are subordinated for their existence. The possibility of certainty of identity in between the objects-perceived, the facts in mind and the represented facts remain itself a problem. If the identical cognition by language is denied then the fact represented by language will be altogether a different fact –different from the object-perceived, facts and the memory of the facts and that will go against the identity of objects – proper of the representation itself.

Firstly, if it is taken as the representation is a mere tool for representing the things or facts derived by other sources like perception or memory and, thus, subordinated either to moot things or abstracted facts which in that theory are primary. This underestimation of the language is against the active theory of language according to which in cognition the language expresses its own nature first and then it reveals meaning non-differently. Language if taken, as representation of the reality or fact then the cognition by language will not be authority. Either it will be memory or implication, inference and, thus, the expressive power of language will be underestimated. Secondly, if we take language as representation, the question arises as to what extent the language represents the reality or facts. If it represents them in their completeness then the knowledge by perception, verbal knowledge will be identical, and then it will be useless to say language as representation rather it will be a presentation. If it is taken to represent them to a certain extent, the question of certainty of the represented facts will remain unsolved and that amounts to partial and, hence, uncertainty of all verbal cognition. Thirdly, in verbal cognition, the cognition revealed by language serves as the cause of incentive for articulations but if it is accepted as representation, the question arises as what is the cause of producing representations that is verbal articulations. Is it external/internal objects or facts? Abstracted sense-data/facts themselves require the expresser in order to be abstracted and to be presented. As they are abstracted, they cannot do so by themselves. As the language is implied only as a representational tool, the representationists are not privileged to accept that language is the cause of incentive for production of representation of the facts. To deny the primacy of language as expresser is to deny the cause of incentive to producing referring or representing tools. It is the cognition expressed that serves as the cause of incentive. Fourthly, if identical cognition is accepted, by resemblance or by group/assemblage then the represented fact will only resemble similar to the perceived fact but it will not be identical. In the cognition by group, the differences are primary and not the identity. However, the group theory is not applicable to representationists as the group of different characters viz. the object-perceived, the fact resurrected in memory and the fact represented are different not only in character but in time and space also. If it is accepted, to be grouped by mind then it will be difficult to distinguish the fact represented by language and the fact retained in the mind and there will always be a case of confusion. Fifthly, cognitive holism concerns with verbal cognition as authority. For them, all knowledge is veridical and the veridical cognition for demarcation of it as valid or non-valid or as truth or false, is made understandable to those who can understand it in those terms on the basis of presence or absence of corresponding referents. Even the cognition expressed by the language ‘non- veridical, contradictory, etc., are also known thus



because they are expressed so by language. Representation and further verification in terms of truth and falsity based on availability or non-availability of referents of which they are representations are significant for logical purpose but that is a secondary job based on the expressed thought as the ground and, thus, the representation theorists are not serious on the issue of cognitive ground.

#### VI. Controversy between the Meaning- Oriented and the Language- Oriented Views

Fixing a goal of standard use for a determinate meaning, language in the history is approached popularly in two ways, first, in a preconceived model of the meaning and second in a preconceived model of the language with which linguistic scholars occupy. Both sorts of the attempts work with a model that relegate most of the creative uses of language and even so by concentrating only on some chosen sentence-instances that fit in their model of determining meaning. For example, A. J. Ayer<sup>6</sup> and the empiricists adopt a preconceived model of meaning for which a statement in order to be a statement must refer to a referent in the empirical world. This static model does little care about our daily uses of language, for some or the other duties and, thus overlooks dynamism of the language. The metaphysician's model is trapped so highly with the meaning that they observe the language only as a pointer to something-in-itself. The view of language as representation / reference overlooks other functions of language. J. L. Austin tried to provide with functional analysis of language that is, what function does the language perform in a use. The problem with all these theories of language is that they estimate language from the view of the meaning that is separate from the language or only a vehicle of meaning. Meaning, in cognitive holism, is what the language expresses;<sup>7</sup> it is never found separate from language. The meaning isolated from language is inexpressible (apada) but they ascribe it as an outcome of the use of language and overlook the very nature of language as it figures or is expressed. Viewing language from the consequences of the function of the uses, the function and nature of function the language performs are different. Any attempt of philosophizing based on the meaning oriented view fails to note the great variety and ways and above all the conceptual nature of language; it overlooks even the difference between the concept and the flashing of the concept and, thus, drives away philosophy from its proper object. The nature of the meaning we reflect on in a reflective activity is awareness and taking the nature of language and meaning as intelligible that philosophy is defined as cognitive activity par excellence.

Wittgenstein is popular because of the inspiring attention to actual use of language but early Wittgenstein is trapped only in statements of logic and science. Later he demonstrated with illustrations and samples about how we use language in daily life and emphasized the meaning of the word in its uses in language. He also

<sup>6</sup> See, A.J.Ayer, "Language, Truth And Logic," (chapter on the refutation of metaphysics), Gollancz: London, 1936.

<sup>7</sup> Śabda pramāṇakānām hi yacchabdāḥ tat parmārtharūpam. Helārāja on VP. 3/1/11.

perceives that statements that are not logical or scientific cannot be ruled out of the court as meaningless. With his game theory, in his *Philosophical Investigations*, he observes that there is no common element in language. There is family resemblance like games. By this method, he opined that words have family of meaning and, hence 'do not ask for meaning, ask for the use' is welcomed as a very effective theory of meaning on the basis of which we can understand different meanings of a word as we find in dictionaries. This was really a great move of him but, for giving importance to use for meaning, he underestimates the power of language and preferred to induce some ultra-virus elements like context, intention, convention, and likewise other factors, with a hope that these factors are fit if the meaning is use. To my view, these factors are neither language that is used nor meaning that is conveyed by language. The problem, lies in the way of one's thinking and therefore, despite of giving facts, justification, evidences and proofs, it is not removed. The disease lies in the very method or way of deliberation. We are captive of thinking thoughts as the picture of language and language as representation of the things outside in the external world. We sometimes think that all words are words and sentences are sentences and thus similar and alike in functioning for meaning. We imagine a picture of our mind, knowledge, faith, emotions, etc., when these words are articulated. Our allegiance with those pictures is so strong that we avoid giving any other picture to these words. Wittgenstein<sup>8</sup> rightly observes that "that is the kind of proposition that one repeats to oneself countless times. A picture hold us captive and we could not get outside it for it lies in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably". The great sayings and great books artificially create obstacles in our way of approaching the real. They condition the human self in such a way that the real is overlooked and the conditioned self is wrongly assumed as the real spirit. All religious and great thinkers who are realizers of spirit create this confusion when they impart their realization in language to the followers'. This may help in forming well organized organizations of the followers but by following those sayings they get themselves away from their spirit and they are involved in strengthening the organization for a relief to their self in the conditioned life. Such attempts not only keep man away from his spirit but also keep an inner distance from one to another, from the nature and from his own intellect and the spirit. The man identifies with the ideas/thoughts, experiences of the book and that identification operates as the cause of suffering. Even in yogic concentration the man concentrates on a particular point and while concentrating on that point, he puts himself away from all the other and from the open nature of the spirit. The present is amalgamated with the past experience and the enjoyment of a divine future as gift. But does he not make his intellect dull and a machine of stereo-typed copying?

Freedom that we enjoy is channelized freedom; freedom of expression, religious, political, economic, moral and all sorts of freedom are freedom type. The real freedom can be realized in the transcendence of these channelized freedoms. Wittgenstein accepted words and sentences as dead that become alive in actual language game rooted in the forms of life. Wittgenstein is not specific on the issue whether spirit is acceptable as the form of life or is the fabrication out of our

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<sup>8</sup> The issue is discussed precisely in the chapter "Language and translation".

experiences. Freeing the thoughts/meaning from captive of pictures is a great move of him but at the cost of primacy to meaning as transcendental, he underestimates the power of language. His game-device for freeing thoughts from the defect raises many questions about the proper estimation of the power of language. However, meaning as per use and the meaning the language represents are not the same. Is playing with the language a playing with the thought at the same time? Philosophers doing with logical skill accept language as the representation and the thought as represented or represented fact. They play with idea that the world can be understood by human limitations related only as representation and the represented thing. For that reason they have to maintain the difference between thought and language - one which is indicated when the other is applied and make a division of thought and language on the basis of function they perform. They take language as tool to understand and determine meaning which they place in center. They accept the necessary truth of the analytic only and with contrast to it, the truth of synthetic is put into question. Meaning cannot be cognized if it is not an intelligible being or if it is transcended to language; it cannot be determinately known if it is free from or isolated from language. Nothing except language can determine the cognition/thought and that the former can only determine the latter.

The meaning that figures by language is always determinate and makes the game of determination through logical skill possible and interesting. They overlook the cognition that serves as ground of all logical games about meaning. Philosophization of natural language demands concentration on cognition which is expressed and is infused by language and which serves as the basis of different types of conceptual, logical, functional analysis and interpretation. The Quinean solution to the dogma of analytic and synthetic<sup>9</sup> is an indication of shifting towards synthetic or the cognitive role of natural language that can only act on as the cognitive ground of solving the dogma. If, it is otherwise, either one has to accept the distinction of them or one has to reject the analytic for giving value to the synthetic. Quine favors for the later is an attempt to coming home to the natural or to the ordinary language for providing logical skill a cognitive base. Quine's favor of sentence against the proposition, his argument against the analytic-synthetic distinction and refutation of analytic truth-conceptual (bachelors are unmarried), logical (copper is copper) and Mathematical ( $5+7=12$ ) show that he realizes the limitation of logical/artificial skill and argues for synthetic. Truth of synthetic sentence is not only by virtue of what it means but by the way the world is also. The meaning flashes by language; it is not known prior to language rather language infuses it; it is what the language expresses and is cognized only when the language flashes it. The meaning - oriented activities approach the problem that in fact, comes after the language expresses it or that which cannot exist in isolation from language. Analysis, interpretation, investigation and determination independently of language cannot begin without language. All our cognitive activities are performed by language. In active theory of knowledge, language expresses itself first its own nature and then expresses meaning. The meaning is eternally infused by

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<sup>9</sup> Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 2009. *Philosophical Investigations*, I.114, Wiley-Blackwell.

language and that is the reason, we take analysis of meaning by the analysis of language. To analyze language and to conceive that “I analyze meaning” is possible only when language that we analyze is taken to infuse meaning otherwise, no cognitive activity will be possible; doing activities through language and taking language as separate and transcendental to thought, is a misconceived, misguided attempt causing unsolvable confusion

Language oriented theory of meaning, discussed herein, provides not only all powers to language but views it as an autonomous principle in the matter of cognition also. Language is not confined to speaking/writing only; it is not confined to any sort of garbs. Garbs are instrumental in manifesting the concept language that comprises of the language as it flashes and the meaning non-differently expressed (sampratya= intelligible beings). Both the expresser and expressed are intelligible beings which are only objects we know and which serve as cause of incentive to speak in speakers, expression of objects in audience, and cause of expressing identical cognition in different occurrences and instances of the users that is, speakers and listeners. These cognitive beings also serve as the object imposed on individuals falling under a class. For example, the intelligible being of language is imposed on garbs because of which they stand for reference as the term is popular in West and the meaning expressed is imposed on individuals in the world of experience and trans-experience that are referents. The discrete external and internal individuals are known only if the cognitive beings are imposed on them. Imposition on external beings, on the basis of some similarity and resemblance, implication or inference or even by opposition of the being expressed, is not possible if intelligible beings do not serve as the cognitive ground for imposition; it is because of imposition that we use language as indication of the thing indicated and presume them as the ontic substratum of the intelligible beings.

## VII. Meaning and Convention

Language is naturally fit to express meanings. Convention is not relation; it is like the perceiving through a tube. Relation is eternal fitness of the language because of which language is called so. It is naturally fit to express all its meaning (śabda is śakti). The convention is also power but the two powers, that is, relation and convention have different functions. The former is the power that expresses meanings and the latter delimits the former that is relation to a popular meaning. Convention is also not a mess; it is a skill learnt at different phases of one's life. For example, a child below five learns the uses of language by his elders and the elder's uses 'donkey' to a child for donkey, the animal standing before him. After five years of his age, if he is found lazy in a case, elders address him as 'donkey' and then, he knows that because of some similarity in laziness, carrying of heavy loads, eating much, foolishness and likewise of the donkey; the word is used for other meanings also. But this is all possible because the meaning of the word 'donkey' is universal that inheres in all the individuals for which the word donkey is used. All meanings of a word are categorized into three categories- i-the primary or literal meaning, that is, the meaning for which a word is popularly used in communication ii-the intended meaning known

by imposition of the primary meaning due to some similarity and iii-the non-intended meaning implied by the primary meaning or known by proximity with the primary meaning. For example “cowness” is the primary meaning of the word cow and its intended meaning may be all those forms, qualities and functions or any of them that resemble, for example cowherd, an innocent, a lazy, a voraciousness, foolishness on which primary meaning is imposed. The number and gender of the cow is known by the proximity with the primary meaning of cow. There may be a number of intended and non-intended meanings of a word and all are expressed by language. Different sorts of meaning expressed by the same word are known only when the primary meaning is known first. We find that this theory provides sufficient ground for reasoning for conceptualizing a concept differently in different theories and for different meanings in different uses of a word. It does not only open reason for accepting individuals as meaning but gives a rational ground for identical cognition by the words as well. The criteria, we accept, for interpreting different sorts of meanings of word is equally applicable for interpreting different meanings by a same sentence. For example, the primary meaning of the sentence “Gangāyām ghoṣaḥ” is the ‘residence in the current of water’. Its intended use may mean ‘residence on the bank of river’ and the non-intended meaning ‘the cool and sacred residence’ is known by proximity with the primary meaning. The same is not applicable if we accept śakti with meaning and meaning as separate from the language. Meaning being transcendental cannot be independently moving in different capacities of finished and non-finished characters. It is only the word that presents the meaning in different capacities of finished and non-finished.

#### VIII. Are intelligible beings Abstractions?

Concepts may be assumed given, may be abstraction or construction but in any case, it is cognized only when it flashes and I, therefore, prefer to use the term intelligible beings that is flash that flashes only in present. The flash is cognized and stands as the object of our cognition. Observed this way, the concepts, as abstracted being in any of its senses as indicated earlier, cannot be settled logically and cognitively both. Let us critically analyze and evaluate the arguments of it as abstraction. If concepts are abstractions- abstracted differently on the basis of different experiences of different attributes and functions, and, hence, different from one-another, how can dialogue and communication be possible if the abstraction, is different with the difference of persons, their abstracting capacity and experiences? How can one claim a better philosophy comprising full compatibility and adequacy? Can abstraction without language be possible? And even if possible, can it be of any philosophical significance without language? Is there any abstraction that is known isolated from language? The problems raised above are concerned with the centrality of language in a cognitive activity. In brief, cognitive holism is observed here as a theory based on autonomy of the language. Language is primary; it expresses its own nature and the meaning non-differently and independently of physiological, psychological, ontic or religious entities and our allegiance to them. The knowledge by language is

disinterested but becomes interested when imposed on our allegiances. Abstraction cannot be the object of knowledge without being determined by language.

### IX. Word Holism

Holism is interpreted chiefly as word- holism and sentence- holism. The former, in Indian philosophy, is attributed to Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas. They are wordists; they take word as meaningful unit; word denotes its denotative meaning (vācya). Word-meaning and sentential meaning, the word conveys, are both denotative meanings. They deny the existence of sentence and explain sentential –meaning as the meaning by the word itself. However, they, unlike Naiyāyikas, Advaita vedāntins and Kumāriḷa Mīmāṃsakas who are associationists, interpret that the word, when used for communication, expresses a mutually related meanings that is called sentential-meaning. Thus, word expresses their own independent meaning (padārtha) and in use it conveys sentential- meaning (vākyārtha), that is, mutually related meaning as well. Frege<sup>10</sup> perceives that meaning of a sentence is determined by the condition under which a competent speaker would assent to or dissent from it. Unlike them, Prabhākaras do not take that the meaning of a word is to be decided in the context of the sentence only. Unlike them, Prabhākaras do not accept the existence of sentence. They simply say that when words are used they express not only their own meaning (word-meaning) but a connected denotation, that is, the sentential meaning also. For example, when we utter ‘shut’, it conveys its own word-meaning and the sentential meaning ‘you please, shut the door’ as well. The word ‘door’ expresses mutually related meaning of words of the set, that is ‘shut the door. In that case, other words only qualify or translate the meaning conveyed by the word ‘door’ and thus, mutually related meaning of a word is sentential meaning and that too being the meaning of a word is also denotative meaning (vācya). Unlike Frege, there is no need for Prabhākaras, to accept sentence and to decide the word-meaning in the framework of a sentence. The word holism of Prabhākara is criticized by other wordists and the sphaṭavādins for accepting that the word has two denoted-meanings of its own and of sentential meaning; there is no need of the logic that word-meaning in a use is to be decided in a structure of a sentence.

### X. Sphaṭa Holism (Sphaṭavāda)

It is particularly a theory attributed to Bhartṛhari and is interpreted as sentence holism. The word ‘holism; stands for a theory of wholeness that accepts the reality as an indivisible whole; a whole, that is not constituted of parts and does not break into parts. By analysis, the whole is understood in the part-whole scheme. With Bhartṛhari,

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<sup>10</sup> See Gillian Russell, “Quine on the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction” published in *A Companion to W. V. O. Quine*, edited by Gilbert Harman & Ernie Lepore, Wiley-Blackwell pp. 181-202, 2014.

the whole is indivisible and all divisions come out of the analysis of the whole<sup>11</sup> He observes that the communication is beginninglessly performed by human community and it is accomplished by a complete sense. The complete sense is expressed by a sentence and not by a word. Therefore, the original unit of communication is sentence. In verbal cognition, it expresses its indivisible nature first from which its meaning is expressed non-differently. Meaning is also indivisible whole and is non-different from the sentence. Sentence is of awareness in nature and there is no possibility of any real division in indivisible sentence that is unit of awareness. The whole- part scheme of dividing the indivisible sentence into words, nominative, verb, prefixes, particle and post positions and words into roots, suffixes, prefixes, letters, etc., is practical skill that helps only to make the sentence understandable in syntactical and semantic scheme of analysis. But through the divisions of the artificial skill, the indivisible sentence as such is not divided. The active theory of cognition by language comes into existence with the theory of sphaṭa. The language, in this view, is śabda that comprises both the verbal articulations as instrument/tool and the sphaṭa as the expresser that is, expressed through the tools we learn conventionally. The sphaṭa is expresser and the expressed is pratibhā,<sup>12</sup> the two are the name of the same indivisible awareness from two perspectives that is from the perspective of expresser and the expressed. The sphaṭa is indivisible and is analyzed through into different parts of language as per the sequences occurred in manifesting and approaching the indivisible sphaṭa in an analytic scheme. Sphaṭa is neither metaphysical, nor psychological substance; it is the flashing of the consciousness that is directly expressed.

#### XI. Sentence Holism

Sentence holism can be understood in Indian context as a theory that perceives that the cognition a complete sense and communication is accomplished by it. The complete sense is expressed by a sentence. Conversation and communication are not

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<sup>11</sup> In Frege's theory of meaning each word and each declarative sentence is the thought expressed by the sentence. The reference of a descriptive word or phrase depends on the particular sentence in which it occurs. In simple case it is either an object or a concept depending on whether the word or phrase is a name or a predicate respectively. The sense of a word or a phrase is very difficult to characterized,. It also depends on the sentence in which it occurs. Frege asserts that in the introduction of his work "On word versus sentence meaning", Grunblagen der arithmetic. He has always kept in mind three fundamental principles. i. always who separate sharply the psychological from the logical, the subjective from the objective, ii. never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition. iii. never to lose sight of the distinction between concept and object. *Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, If Particular, P. T. Geach and Max Black, Basil Blackwell, pp, 1-2, Oxford, 1966.

<sup>12</sup> *Upāyāḥ śikṣamānānām bālānāmapalāpanāḥ Asatye vartamani sthivā tataḥ satyam samīhate.* Vākyapadīya, Bhartṛhari, part II, Verse 238, Edited by Bhagirathi Tripathi, Sampurnanand University: Varanasi. 1980.

confined to speaking and listening of verbal noises; it is accomplishment of cognition (sampratya) by language. Verbal noises produced by the speaker when grasped by the audience manifest the *sphoṭa* and thus cognition is not abstraction out of the utterances which are only vehicles helping manifestation of intelligible being of language. Manifested so its own self is expressed by itself from which its meaning is revealed non-differently. The indivisible flash, in some cases, as I have pointed out earlier, is revealed even by uttering a single letter,<sup>13</sup> a single word<sup>14</sup> by a sentential garb, a gesture, by perception, and in some cases it may not be revealed even by hearing a large number of subordinate sentences and sentential garbs. Thus, the question of its long or short is useless. It is a flash of awareness having no length, breadth, no parts, and no division but in all cases, the cognition is a complete sense expressed; a complete sense is indivisible sentential cognition revealed by a sentence, an indivisible sentence. Sentence and its meaning are of awareness in nature and there is no possibility of any real division in indivisible awareness; it is not a construction out of letters and words, or a grouping of words. The whole- part scheme of dividing the indivisible sentence into words, nominative, verb, prefixes, particle and post positions and words into roots, suffixes, prefixes, letters, etc., are artificial remedy that only helps to make the indivisible sentence understandable in syntactical and semantic scheme of analysis as construction of parts that is association of words and word-meanings. But through the artificial divisions, the indivisible sentence, as such, is not divided; it is made understandable through the divisions that are steps to understand the indivisible. Taking this sense into consideration, the theory is called sentence-holism. Let us observe the popular and possible kinds of holism.

## XII. Sentence holism and the logic of Propositions as abstraction

Propositionists accept propositions as abstracted facts -abstracted from several instances and occurrences of sentences (sentence-token) signifying the same proposition. Opposite to them, intelligible sentence is not an abstraction from occurrences and instances perceived but are the flash of consciousness. Verbal noises, tokens, etc. are tools only in manifestation of intelligible being of language that is, sentence which neither an abstraction from is neither outside nor mental construction in its popular use of the term but is awareness. Language ceases to be so if taken as abstracted; it will lose its expressive character (*vācakatva*). An abstracted unit, if accepted for a moment, also implies concept-language in order to be revealed, otherwise, how could it be known so? If thought is taken abstracted from language, it cannot reveal itself and then no meaning, no knowledge will be accomplished and, hence, no abstraction will be possible. The idea of abstraction may lead to undesirable metaphysical presumption of the things from which it is abstracted, the mind which

<sup>13</sup> *Soyam iti abhisambandho budhyā prakramyate yathā. Vākyārthasya tadaikopi varṇaḥ pratyāyakaḥ kvacit.* VP.2/40. Tr. by K. Raghavan Pillai, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971.

<sup>14</sup> *Vākyam tadapi manyante yatpadam caritakriyam,* VP .2/325. Tr. by K. Raghavan Pillai, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971.



abstracts and the relation of them also. An abstracted proposition may be taken as that signified by sentences but how can it signify meaning if it does not signify itself first as a signifier and hence, the idea of proposition as abstraction is, cognitively and logically, inconsistent presumption. Proposition implies two level of abstraction from the sentence and the sentential meaning; otherwise, it will be difficult to say if it is an abstraction from sentences or from sentential meanings. Contrary to it, concept-language is not a unit abstracted from sentential garb but an intelligible being directly expressed. A signifier ceases to be so if taken as abstracted; it will lose its expressive character (*vācakatva*). Even, thought as an abstracted unit (if accepted for a moment) also implies signifier, if otherwise, how could it be known so? If thought of language is abstracted from language, it cannot be a determinate thought and then the language as expresser cannot be at work for that and, thus, no abstraction will be possible. An abstracted proposition may be taken as that signified by sentences but how can it signify meaning if it does not signify itself first as a signifier and, hence, the idea of proposition as abstraction is, cognitively and logically, inconsistent. Is proposition abstraction of the meaning or meaning itself? It cannot be abstraction from meaning that being transcendental is not given for abstraction. What will be the signified of the abstracted thought? To say that it is meaning abstracted from different instances of sentence is ambiguous and logically inconsistent. Contrary to it, the signifier (*vācaka*) is not a unit abstracted from token or garbs but a being of awareness in nature. The indivisible knowledge is artificially divided as intelligible being of language and that of meaning and these beings are further divided into words and word-meaning. Another level of division is made when the intelligible being of language is analyzed through verbal noises, written marks/scripts and a third level analysis intelligible being of language and meaning imposed on external reference and referents in the empirical world. The indivisible sentence as such is not divided though its artificial divisions at different level; these divisions helps only as steps for understanding the indivisible sentence.

### XIII. Meaning Holism (Akhaṇḍavākyaṛthavāda)

Meaning Holistic trends are observed therewith metaphysicians who take the reality as substance beyond the grasp and independent of knowledge and its analysis. The analytical skill is taken just a step to exercise intellect about the things beyond intellect. Analysis cannot involve and affect the cognition of transcendental meaning. Assuming divisions of indivisible, using language about that which is beyond language and cognition, thinking of cognizing a non-intelligible, transcendental are all metaphysicians 'intellectual game that destroys the light and beauty of cognition and proper utility of analysis. As different sorts of ornaments having different shape, size are the same substance gold likewise all the diversities are the diversity of the substance. It is the reality of the diversities. The pure gold remains the same even if the different ornaments are melted and destroyed. Likewise, meaning remains the same despite of ascribing divisions of sentences, words, suffixes, etc. According to another theory, meaning is universal and a universal is that in which enumerable individuals belonging to past, future and present of the class of individuals, inhere.

The individuals manifest it and different category of individuals manifests different universals and, hence, there is discrete cognition by all words. Universal is not reduced to analyzed individuals falling under they just help manifest the universal. Meaning, is whole, an indivisible flash revealed by language and while understanding meaning in communication we do not search the meaning of its parts. Anything that flashes determinately is Pratibhā; even the language<sup>15</sup> as flash is pratibhā that is meaning as intelligible being and that is what serves as the basis of analysis of language by language. All artificial divisions are attempts of understanding indivisible pratibhā or meaning. However, isolated from language, no meaning is acceptable for Bhartr̥harians. Meaning holism of Linguistic philosophers of the West cannot sustain because they give primacy to meaning but accept it transcendental to language; in that case, the door of philosophy that moves with language will remain closed. Perceiving death of language for giving space to independence of meaning is declaration of the death of philosophical reflections.

#### XIV. Holistic Interpretation of the Meaning of Negative Sentences

Some Western philosophers, especially Wittgensteinians, concern with meaning in the center of their thoughts and then they try to search the language that can appropriately point to that. Meaning and reality are external to language and the language refers to thought that represents the reality. In Pāṇinian system, the language and meaning even the meaning 'non-existence or negation',<sup>16</sup> are the intelligible beings, flashes of consciousness. No analysis is possible if meaning is transcendental to language. Being the sense transcendental to language, there will be only conjecture about meaning and it can be grasped as such by no way of using language. To accept language as dead for grasping meaning is a lack of serious thinking. Cognitive holism, discussed herein, considers that analysis and translation are cognitive and, hence, philosophical activities and that the analysis of language is the analysis of cognition as well. The theories, who accept language as tool and meaning as transcendental and separate from the language, face problem in interpreting the negative sentences which have no referent as meaning. According to Naiyāyikas, negation (abhāva) is defined as absence (pratiyogī) of existence and existence as absence of negation. The question is: do we use words for communication and apprehend cognition always in the process of pratiyogī and anuyogī? It is not, rather, we can say that language expresses meaning directly without recourse to its counter (pratiyogī). Negation is absence and it being formless has no other formless counter and being in present cannot be its counter (absent). Thus, negation in their theory can

<sup>15</sup> An account of Pratibhā as meaning satiating a complete sense is given in *The Central Problems of Bhartr̥hari's Philosophy*, chapter on Sentential Meaning, pp.196-207, by the same author, ICPR, New Delhi, 2008.

<sup>16</sup> *Vākyam tadapi manyante yatpadam caritakriyam*, VP.2/325. Tr. by K. Raghav Pillai, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971.

neither be known by itself being negation not can be known by any other source. Cognitive holism provides equal importance and even the same criterion of the knowledge by the words “existence” (bhāva) and that by non-existence (abhāva) as well. According to it, being cognitive units all sentences, negative and positive, are different and, therefore, they are independently used for their own meanings directly. For example, ‘Tree exists’ and ‘Tree does not exist’, both are independent sentences and convey their own meaning independently of each other. Thus, the negative sentences are as original as the positive sentences; they convey their own meanings independently of each other. Ontological non-being is philosophical being and only the philosophical being that is intelligible being figures positively as non-being that we know by the use of negative sentences. Being and non-being, both figure positively as being of being and that of non-being respectively.

#### XV. Cognitive Holism

Cognition is a complete indivisible whole; it is the flashing of consciousness. Focusing the primacy of meaning, language philosophers of the East and West are motivated in way that they stick to meaning as whole and overlook the proper role and estimation of the power of language. They accept language only a tool for conveyance of meaning. Not only that but they negate the role of language and forget that if language expresses meaning it can express language itself, as we find in the case of language as the meaning of language. For example, dog is a word and when one asks what does “dog” mean, we quickly reply “svān” in Sanskrit, *kuṭṭā* in Hindi, *hound* in German and ‘chien’ in French languages. In this case, we are putting only words from different languages for the meaning of a word. Not only that but if meaning is separate from language that is if they are two level, higher and lower, of existences and the later is transcendental to or beyond the grasp of the former then analysis of meaning by the analysis of language will not be possible. There will be no way to explain analysis of language by language itself, if the meaning status of language in a cognitive activity of analysis of it, is not accepted. If the language expresses language the expressed language, at the same time, will not be the expresser language because the language that is analyzed artificially stands as concept-language and the language in our hand that serves as tool for the analysis of the concept language is means; former stands in the capacity of meaning and not the language. Cognitive holism resolves all the above problems on the basis of infusion of cognition by language that is a theory of the non-difference of the thought and the language. Not only that but, unlike the referentialists and representationists theory of cognition by language, cognitive holism discussed herein maintains a remarkable difference between the cognition and the object of cognition we know. Cognition is not an object in that or in any cognition; it is always in present but the object of cognition that flashes in present cognition may be the memory of that object or another flashed in past. In cognition, the object of cognition i.e. the universal is known but it is not the cognition itself. It is neither individual nor universal but the light that flashes the objects and its self-consciousness as well. The objects of cognition are analyzed by the analytic devices but in that analysis cognition of that cognitive object is not

analyzed; it remains indivisible though it serves as the light of flashing and its self-consciousness. Cognition is the cognition of the objects and self-awareness of the object (object-awareness) as well. Otherness is the character of objects but not of the cognition itself. As in cognition so in memory and recognition, the object of cognition is not the cognition of the cognition but the object figuring in that cognition. All words and, hence, the word 'Jñāna'(knowledge), Brahman, sky, universal and individual expresses universal; the universal the word expresses is imposed on individual objects by some similarity or as the ontic substratum of the universal the language expresses. However, the knowledge itself is not an object itself. The universal is the object of awareness and Individuals are known by implication of the universal expressed by the word. As a lamp does not need another lamp in order to light, the knowledge need not be known as object or another in that knowledge.<sup>17</sup> Knowledge, for us, is not relational but foundational and as such free from any allegiance to object, private feelings, etc; it is the self-consciousness of the object of cognition.

#### XVI. Knowledge is Determinate

The explanation of cognition as determinate knowledge and the theory of verity of cognition are unique contribution in the history of philosophy. To take the former first we can say that since language infuses cognition, we succeed in explaining that cognition as such is discriminate by nature. Determination is not possible without language. In Indian Philosophy knowledge is studied as divided, basically in i. determinate (savikalpaka) and ii. indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) and as Naiyāyikas say, none of them is infused by language. Buddhist scheme of nāmajāyādiyojā<sup>18</sup> observes that pin pointed particular (svalakṣaṇa) is isolated from language and hence, indeterminate; the object of perception and the inferential knowledge are determinate because of the language, form, etc. As per their theory, the two kinds of knowledge cannot be differentiated if infused by language. For the theory discussed herein knowledge is always determinate and no cognition is indeterminate. If it is a case of cognition, it is a determinate cognition. Cognition ceases to be so if isolated from language. How can the sense-datum of 'pot' be distinguished from that of 'cot' if the cognition of them is not taken as infused with language? Even the sense datum of 'pot' if separated from the language cannot be the object of cognition if it is not expressed by language 'pot'. Abstracted from language, no cognition either by perception or by inference which are only instrumental in the manifestation of the concept-language, is possible.

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<sup>17</sup> An account of Pratibhā as meaning satiating a complete sense is given in *The Central Problems of Bhartrhari's Philosophy*, Chapter on Sentential Meaning, pp.196-207, by the same author, ICPR, New Delhi, 2008.

<sup>18</sup> The problem of Meaning of Negation is discussed, in the chapter on *Language and Negation*, volume II of the book.

### XVII. Reason for Accepting Meaning as Universal

Knowledge is no knowledge if it is not determinate. Even the knowledge of newly born babies, is also intertwined with language; knowledge flashes to them but since their speaking organs are not mature enough to speak, expressing of activities like crying, tittering, smiling, etc; in them, are possible. One may ask a question as to how the universal, a word reveals, is a determinate object. If the meaning is a determinate-object, it must be individual and not universal. It is true that the universals are expressed by the words. Everything and, hence, every meaning is distinguished by their universals.<sup>19</sup> Universals are not abstracted-abstracted from individuals but are being of awareness in character; they are intelligible beings. These units are concepts and are called universal for the reason that they are manifested by several individuals. Identical cognition of meaning by the use of language in its different instances and occurrences is possible because of language and meaning being universal and not because they are abstracted from several instances. Even the individual, indeterminate, are also known distinctly by the words because of their distinct universal. They are known thus because the language present them so. All cognition is revealed directly by language and hence veridical. This verity is the nature of verbal-cognition. Even the cause of the cognition of non-verity as thus, is the veridical cognition expressed by the term non-verity. What we count in communication is not the validity but verity. Verification by logical justifications and evidences is given importance by logicians for convincing others about the verity of cognition directly known by the language. Verity cannot be denied even without a veridical cognition revealed by the language “denial”.

### XVIII. Practical Utility of Cognitive Holism

Unlike metaphysics, Philosophy of Cognitive Holism, assumes conscious as ontic whole, perceives cognition as indivisible whole; it concentrates on knowledge that is directly known to us determinately because the language infuses it. The highest philosophical point of the holism is that it accepts the artificial division made on the basis of utterances or marks only as a remedy and assumes that even the uttering of a single letter or a single word can express the complete meaning and in that case, the unit is a complete sentence. “Language is power, the light” is the basic argument in cognitive holism. The length and breadth of the written marks or the time duration of the verbal utterances are not important. The revelation of cognition is primary and if a single letter expresses the complete sentential sense, it is a sentence. It, as such, is not divided but the division scheme helps illumination of the indivisible whole to an ignorant and beginner through these steps. Since meaning in all philosophical systems is observed as awareness in nature, we perceive the unit that expresses it, is sentence and that in its conceptual form is also of awareness in nature (bauddha-śabda). The two being the objects of awareness or of awareness in nature are non-different. That is the reason we understand the sense, communicate, converse, discuss and respond

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<sup>19</sup> The issue is discussed in great detail in the chapter “Language and Universal” of this volume.

without the want of a referent outside in empirical experience. Cognitive Holistic philosophy analyses and explains the meaning of all words and sentences including negative sentences, empty words/sentences and pseudo sentences as well on the basis of cognition as it figures when presented by language so. 'Language infuses cognition' is the cognitive ground not only for the idea of non-difference of language and thought but for the determination and communication of thought also. Thought can be determined only by language and it is the determinate thought that gives incentive to speak. Cognitive holism, maintains a difference between the sentence as intelligible being (idea) and the syntactical the structure of the sentence as association of words articulated in a sentential set. Both are involved in cognition, the former as the expresser and the later as the instrument or tool through which the former is manifested and analysed. The syntactic and analytical remedies to make the intelligible being understand may differ as per the competency of the interpretations. But they all have a purpose to make the indivisible, intelligible being, that is, indivisible concept/thought or idea, understand in a piecemeal scheme. The language is not confined to uttering and listening only but the awareness also and hence the blend of the two-one the external articulation and the other the thought level. Without the understanding of the blend of two levels of language, no cognitive activity can be explained logically and cognitively possible.

#### XIX. Cognitive Holism on Controversy of Disinterested versus Interested Knowledge

Why is there a discussion on disinterested and interested knowledge? In fact, philosophers many times used to reflect over the problems with their own interests and allegiances and that deviate not only the thinking proper but the conclusion they derive also. Dayakrishna<sup>20</sup> writes 'the reason why philosophical writing are generally interspersed with non-philosophical matters lies not merely in the fact that the philosopher is not only a philosopher but a man with other interests as well, but also in the misconceived notion that the philosopher has of his own function. What does disinterested knowledge mean? Cognitive holism believes in the dynamic/active theory of language. Accordingly, in a case of cognition, the language flashes its own nature first from which its meaning is expressed non-differently. The philosophy that they want to reach is that our cognition as such, expressed by language is disinterested and it is interested when imposed on our allegiances. Following arguments can be given to justify the stand cognition as such is disinterested. It becomes interested when we impose the cognition on our interests.<sup>21</sup>The process follows thus- i. Disinterested knowledge, ii. The intelligible beings of the language

<sup>20</sup> *Yasya jñānasya kalpanā nāsti tat pratyakṣam. Atha keyam kalpanā nāma: Nāmajātyādiyojanā, Dignāga's pramāṇasamuccaya*, Chapter I, Aphorism 3, p.3, Ernst Steinkellner, April, 2005, Dignāga defines construction as the relation of a proper name, genus (name) and so forth (to a thing).

<sup>21</sup> *The Central Problems of Bhartrhari's Philosophy*, Universal as import of words (*padārtha*), pp. 301-321, discusses a precise account of Bhartrhari's chapter on Jāṭisamuddeśaḥ. ICPR, 2008.

(concept –language, that is, universal). iii. Meaning (universal) and iv. The articulations of the verbal noises are accordingly imposed i. on our interests/allegiances, ii. Representation/reference (articulations) and iii. Individual things in experience (represented thing/referent) of our allegiance and iv. Verbal articulations respectively and we become to live the imposed as the knowledge.

#### XX. Holistic Philosophy of Relation

Language is light, it is naturally fit to express the meaning and this fitness of the former is its relation with meaning. Relation, Bhartṛhari<sup>22</sup> envisages, is natural fitness (yogyatā) of the language to express meaning; it is always to be found in between the two- the language and the meaning (dviṣṭa). Without relation, no verbal knowledge is possible. The word is naturally expressive and it is through its expressiveness that it expresses its meaning non-differently without the act of relating them by memory and inference. This relation is neither a relata nor changed into a relata and, hence, it is not known independently of the expresser and the expressed. As it is natural fitness of the language, it is eternally dependent relation (nitya paratantra). It is by this fitness of the language that the cognition by language, independently of our physiological, psychological and ontic things and our allegiances to them, is accomplished in communication.

#### XXI. Thinking sound is Thinking Independently of Passions

Consciousness flashes through mind as intelligible beings, awareness in nature but these intelligible beings that flash in a cognition are very often imposed on the objects of our passions and allegiance with the passionate things of which we are captive and, thus, we get interested knowledge, that is, deviated from being-proper and, thus, fail to be guided by the incentive caused by cognition as such that figures in and take our private interests as the incentive of our activities; that is a disordering and deviation of mind from the objects proper. Confusing the pure knowledge expressed as the knowledge of the objects of our allegiance on which we impose the pure knowledge, we get interested and confused; for the cultivation of which or for becoming receptive to the pure knowledge that all system of education is considered as value disciplines. By the term-interested mind, I mean the mind captive of some or the other passions and allegiances that quickly impose the cognition expressed as such, by language on them and treat the habitual as natural. This is not the rational way to be guided by passions on which the cognition is imposed only. Being captive to our passion about some or the other things or thoughts, we fail to live the world of flashes that is true and the authentic world of knowledge; we construct a world of our own and live the world we create by imposing on our allegiances. We start to live a disguised life and

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<sup>22</sup> *The Nature of Philosophy*, Daya Krishna, Calcutta: Prachi Prakashan, March, 1955, p.226.

fail to live the world of wisdom, the world of flashes and, thus, the world of cognition, as such, is left behind un-lived, unattended. The simple and easy life is the life that allows one to live the flashes as expressed or figured in by language. Even the passions are viewed and analyzed as they flash and should not work for making one blind. This is the living wisdom.

## XXII. Living Own Life and Experiences

To live other's experiences whether it is the experience of a great religious book, a prophet or god men makes the mind dull and non-working. The person does not feel any rational hunger and thinks that it is easy to live with others experience than making the life complicated by using mind; life is an occasion of sensuous gratification. If one wants to live a pleasant life one has to minimize the use of mind to maximize the emotions and passions in such a case, the person does not make a difference of the world of cognition or the meaning expressed by language and the life of allegiance and passions about the world outside. It is not only the allegiances that are imposed but the cognition that flash is imposed on allegiances and one becomes so addict that he/she does not even think that there is a life he/she can live each moment with knowledge. Flashes of awareness must be the guide if we are rational having a reflecting mind. We cannot live the life of others; a ghost, of whom, we are captive cannot rule and guide us. This is in the very feature of the human spirit because of which one feels proud of being human. Human being is the totality of spirit/soul and the dynamism of thoughts or his creativity. But some people are so weak that they fear from a rational living; they keep their creative and adept dull by the passions. By rational living, I mean a living in which our language, thought, mind and action are not conflicting rather, in a direction, they cooperate and coordinate without deviation of any from their joint venture. In other words, what we think, we speak and what we speak the other understands that and, accordingly, concentrates doing that which is spoken. They act on the same progressive line of the purpose that directs us in our conduct. There is fearlessness that makes us a strong professional. Ordinary persons live the life of passions and try to justify the passions just to show that they have reason to follow the path of sensuous gratification and that their life is not less good than others. All are different and it is not that my life is better and others not. All ways are venerable and good. They can claim so but the personality is formed out of living a balanced life, the life in which consciousness is creative; cognition balances the emotions and concerned activities that make the mind dull. My view is that justification adds nothing to reason but justifies the intensity of emotion one lives in such a way that he can think of justifications and prompt them to put those justifications as disguised rational base of emotions. However, in each case, the knowledge, the reason does not serve as light. Pseudo justifications cannot prove the satisfaction of a rational life. For example, in the name of openness of modern civilization, polyamory, polyandry and any altered enjoyment of personal space, personal choice and freedom of a member having obligations to children, society and a family cannot be justified culturally. An interested mind that never confronts with the real problem, never feels rational hunger, and never cares for rational satisfaction



and happiness, cannot decide that justification about an obsession is justified rationally and it does not try to do so because it fears to lose or getting the captive disturbed even for a while.

### XXIII. Remedial Uses of Cognitive Holism

Cognitive analysis is a process of dividing the indivisible cognition into piecemeal and philosophizing the issue for clarity, conception and wisdom even so without involving any metaphysical, epistemic or ontic allegiances. It aims at interpreting the cognition as accomplished in communication. What philosophical excellence can be achieved by doing pure philosophy based on a principle that all cognition is infused and is expressed by language, is a unique case with the cognitive holism. The task of philosophy is to analyze the cognition as it flashes by language. Linguists and conceptualists analyze language and thoughts respectively as written or spoken but in view of cognitive holism, even the verbal sounds and writings are cognized so first and then they are analyzed on the basis of how they flash. Isolated from the cognition, no analysis is possible and cognition is inevitably infused by language. Different persons approach the indivisible cognition through different devices of analytic scheme; the cognition is deviated and understood variously with their varied intention, theoretical impregnation, psychological, physiological, cultural, and religious allegiances of the listeners. In such cases, the use of language is confused for different meanings interested by their personal allegiances that act as the cause of different effects like pleasure, pain, indifferent with the inclination and attachment of the listeners. For example, take the sentence 'the sun has set'. The cognition expressed by the sentence is clear to all but when it is imposed on our allegiance, we understand different meanings- to a neighbor of a great man, it may mean the great man who was suffering illness is died, to a cowherd it may mean the time to herd the cows in, to a student it may mean the time to stop reading, to a dancer, it may mean the time to put on anklets to perform and likewise. Cognitive holism proposes to understand the flashing part and the part on which the flashing part is imposed and if the two are discretely known, there will be no tension, no confusion and no pain and pleasure. There is no conflict on truth; all conflicts are due to impositions on it. The wise keep unaffected by the allegiance aspect and enjoys the flashing aspect. He can remove the others doubt as well by distinguishing the flashes from its imposition on our allegiance and can remove the doubts and tensions. Understanding an indivisible cognition through the analytic part has its own beauty that we can call analytic skill but that must aim at clarity and conception of the cognition which is a whole approached through the individual steps. Composite forms have their own beauty, imposition of the cognition on our different allegiance has a different beauty but if one does not understand clearly the different roles the indivisible cognition plays in causing the pleasure in some and pain in others, amusing in some and an obsession in others, illuminating in some and deviating in others, one cannot enjoy wisdom and bliss. Holism talks about language as power, the potency that works differently in wise and in ignorant in causing different effects that veils and deviates from the indivisible cognition. Interpretation of the cognition needs cognitive holistic approach

to realize wisdom. The cognitive holistic philosophy gives the way of a gradual spiritual practice. Accordingly, 1. the practitioner has to use the correct form of the language and avoid incorrect uses. One must be aware that, even in uses of incorrect forms, the correct form is manifested and that expresses meaning. 2. While knowing and communicating, he must concentrate on the cognition as the language expresses and 3. He should refrain from imposing the cognition directly expressed by language and, thus, from making the cognition interested. This practice creates the dawn of wisdom and then 4. He should distinguish the knowledge from that of the knowledge of the object and lastly, 5. he should practice to get above the objects of knowledge and concentrate on pure knowledge which is never an object, neither in that very knowledge nor in another. Knowledge is always the knowledge of the object but not the object of knowledge; it is not another but is spirit.

### Conclusion

Cognition is the light; it lights itself and the objects; it is self-consciousness of consciousness of the objects. When we impose intelligible beings on things of our allegiances which are outside it, we involve consciousness in an extraneous ontic and psychic entities and fashion some or the other relation with them; we are thus, deviated ourselves from the cognition as such and accordingly feel pleasure and pain according to satisfaction or dissatisfaction of our passions. Thus pleasure and pain are the products of our deviation from the cognition; a lower level activity of consciousness, lower to cognitive activity. If we confine to flashes and the incentive caused by them and do accordingly without deviation, there will be no pain, no pleasure blended with pain. Cognition, being light, is independently of pain and pleasure caused by our allegiances to desires and interests; it is guide to perform duties as per pure knowledge expressed by language and, hence, doubtless and blissful. No problem is problem for itself; all problems are problems for a reflecting mind that confronts with the problem; all problems are at thought level and can be solved by thinking and reflecting. Cognitive holism prescribes all the means required for cultivation and sublimation of rationality and conduct because only that way one's mind can attain pure knowledge. Knowledge and ignorance both are illuminated only when they are cognized so and we know their difference by cognizing them only. When we concentrate on them as they figure in cognition, we confront with problems if any and then we analyze them, reflect over them to remove and get clarity and wisdom. Cognitive holism unlike language philosophers of the West, do not perceive that problems are caused by the misuse of the language but by the misunderstanding of the meaning the language expresses. It perceives that language is power and can express all meaning; the meaning which others may find beyond context of reference and referents -empirical and transcendental; non-referent, non-context as well are also known only as the language express them so. Cognitive holism is an understanding of pure cognition and, thus, has a concern with a spiritual purpose in philosophizing the practice of controlling knowledge from being the interested with we call cultivation

and, finally, understanding and practice of disinterested knowledge<sup>23</sup> which we call pure knowledge or wisdom. It is the practicing of natural and simple from complicated and allegiances and thus, getting spiritual freedom where all the possibility of meaning of language is open. It is a remedy against spiritual sickness, the ill of thought and defects of misguided thinking. (Tripathi, 1976: 146) Cognitive holism perceives (Tripathi, 1980: Verse 484) that one's thoughts cannot excel, if one rushes, with his own prejudiced reasoning; the intellect can get the discriminating pure knowledge only if one discriminately knows different sources of traditional wisdom. Practice of avoiding and controlling interestedness of the cognition and follow up of the non-interested makes man simple and wise, more creative and free from all relative limitations. It is the spiritual technique to engineer the life by managing the desires and knowledge that leads to spiritual freedom where language opens its all possibilities of disinterested knowledge free from our passions and non-intelligible desires of things.

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<sup>23</sup> Possibility of disinterested knowledge is discussed in detailed in second volume of the book.